Brown v. Scott
Opinion of the Court
On the 15th of November, the President delivered the opinion of the cozzrt as follows :
The justice and faiz-ness of the transaction, on the part of the plaintiff, is so obvious ; and the consent of the parties to consolidate the actions, is so naturally implied from the whole of the proceedings, that my brethren
For myself, I doubt the legality of it, because I do not see how it is possible to-enter judgment upon the report, so as to avoid error-. The consolidation of actions is intended to save expense, and might have been oz-dered by the court on motion ;
Report confirmed.
Fleeson and William Rush, Justices.
Merrihew v. Taylor, 1 Bro. App’x lxviii.; Rumsey v. Wynkoop, 1 Yeates 5; Prior v. Kelly, 4 Id. 128.
In Groff v. Musser, 3 S. & R. 264, C. J. Tilghman, speaking of Brown v. Scott, said, “President Shippen thought that he arbitrators had no right to consolidate; and although he was overruled by his associates (who were not lawyers), yet I have always understood that his opinion has been held for law.” The case of Hart v. James, in the supreme court, post, p. 355, confirms the opinion of President Shippen; and in Groff v. Musser, the supreme court reversed a judgment of the common pleas, on the ground that arbitrators, under the act of 1810, had no right to consolidate, without the consent of the defendant. “ Whether the common pleas had power to direct an amendment,” said C. J. Tilghman, “is not so clear.” Judge Duncan was decidedly of opinion that they could not.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.