Heinrich v. Charles W. Young & Co.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from the Workmen’s Compensation Board.
The claimant presented a case under the Occupational Disease Compensation Act of July 2,1937, P. L. 2714, which provides inter alia (section 5(b)) :
“Compensation shall not be payable for partial disability due to silicosis, anthraco-silicosis, or asbestosis. Compensation shall be payable, as otherwise provided in this act, for toted disability or death caused primarily (as definitely distinguished from a contributory or accelerating cause) by silicosis, anthraco-silicosis, or asbestosis, or by silicosis, anthraco-silicosis, or asbestosis, when accompanied by active pulmonary tuberculosis or streptococcic infection of the lung.” (Italics supplied.)
There is no dispute as to the salient facts, the controversy really arising over the meaning placed upon the word primary. This is not the word used or defined in the statute which simply says “disability or death caused primarily (as definitely distinguished from a contributory or accelerating cause) ”. Primarily means in a primary manner and “primary” has been elsewhere defined as first in order or principal, immediate, fundamental, original.
The decedent was in a somewhat advanced stage of silicosis contracted in an occupation involving exposure to a silica hazard but kept on working until 1939 when he suddenly developed a carcinoma of the throat or mouth and was forced to stop work. Due to this malignant condition it was almost impossible to get him to swallow and he died of exhaustion on May 14,1940.
The Compensation Board noted this inconsistency, struck it out and proceeded to substitute another which reads:
“10. That the primary cause of claimant’s decedent’s death on May 14, 1940 was silicosis with a squamous cell carcinoma of the mouth as the immediate factor, and that the aforementioned silicosis was incurred in the course of his employment with the defendant.”
Of all the physicians called, but one gave silicosis as the primary cause of death. This was Dr. Umstead who attended the decedent throughout his illness. He signed a death certificate in which he gave silicosis as the primary cause with carcinoma as a contributing cause and he so testified. In cross-examination however when asked:
“Q. When you say ‘primary cause’, you mean because it was present first?”
He replied :
“It was first present.”
In response to a question as to which was the major cause of his death aside from that which was present first, he said that it was the patient’s inability to be nourished as he couldn’t get food due to the condition of his throat. Now if there is a major cause any other
While conscious of difficulty in the application of a word susceptible of different meanings, we think that the common acceptation of the word “primary” in this connection is principal or immediate. If, as the Compensation Board found, the immediate factor causing death was carcinoma, then whatever part the silicosis played in the catastrophe it was not the immediate or precipitating cause. We think it follows that it was not the primary cause. As silicosis will not produce carcinoma it would seem that its only contribution to the result was in providing a debilitated system less able to withstand the onslaught of an unrelated disease.
But this is not enough under the statute making occupational disease compensable. It was essential to a recovery that the claimant prove by unequivocal testimony that death was due to silicosis primarily as definitely distinguished from a contributory or accelerating cause. This burden is not sustained by a showing that the decedent suffered from silicosis which may have proved fatal but had not reached a crucial stage when he suddenly developed a malignant growth in the back of his mouth which prevented his swallowing his food to such an extent that he died of lack of nourishment.
In Monahan v. Seeds & Durham et al., 336 Pa. 67, it was held that testimony which is conflicting or of such a nature as to render any inference drawn from it a mere guess or conjecture is insufficient. Here the testimony as to fact is not conflicting for the medical ex
While the Board’s findings of fact when supported by competent evidence are binding and cannot be disturbed, nevertheless the question whether there is evidence to support a particular finding is one of law and may be reviewed on appeal. Stahl v. Watson Coal Co., 268 Pa. 452.
We are not unmindful of The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act of June 21, 1939, P. L. 566, sec. 420(a.), requiring a reference to the Medical Board created therein for a determination of medical facts in cases such as this. We are informed however that the mandate of the Act has not yet been obeyed in that no appointments to the Board have been made. To remand the record would be a meaningless act as it could serve no purpose but that of prolonged and indefinite delay.
The award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board is set aside and judgment is entered for the defendants.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.