General Accident Group v. Doctorovitz
Opinion of the Court
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant, an uninsured motorist, was injured in an automobile accident on February 10, 1977, while driving his own automobile. He filed a claim for loss benefits under the Assigned Claims Plan, section 108 of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, 40 P.S. §1009.108. Defendant’s claim of $3,629 was assigned to and timely paid by General Accident Group. Now General Accident Group sues under section 501 of the No-fault Act to recover from defendant as “owner” the amount paid to him as injured “occupant” of the motor vehicle. Defendant has filed prehminary objections, contending that to permit recovery by General Acci
II. DISCUSSION
The Assigned Claims Plan of the Pennsylvania No-fault Act, 40 P.S. §1009.108,
Defendant contends that if section 501 is applied to recover payments made under section 108 to the injured owner (as “occupant”) of the vehicle, the result would be absurd, unreasonable and contrary to public interest. Curiously, defendant bases this contention on a rule of statutory construction which presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when two sections of a statute are construed together, but does intend the result to be both effective and fair. Defendant views the application of section 501 to him to be ineffective and unfair. However, this court’s view of the matter is directly contrary to that of defendant. First, defendant’s proposed result would be unfair to, inter aha, all insured motorists whose diligent payment of premiums makes the no-fault system possible. Second, such result would be ineffective to deter automobile owners against fading to insure as defendant has done. Defendant’s hollow reasoning is devoid of substance, and it is this court’s determination that the public interest would only be served by applying section 501. As defendant himself points out, the stated purpose of the No-fault Act is to establish “a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims.” Section 102(b). Although it is initially difficult to perceive the owner who fails to insure as a “victim,” that is not an issue under the act. But defendant neglects to
Defendant questions the two-step process which to him conjures up the proverbial vision of one hand giving while the other takes away. Although the use of these two somewhat contradictory steps may appear self-defeating, the two-step process is actually quite consistent when viewed in proper perspective. The rationale for paying claimant first and questioning his entitlement second is clearly stated in the statute:
“(9) A Statewide low-cost, comprehensive, and fair system . . . can save and restore the lives of countless victims by providing and paying the cost of services so that every victim has the opportunity to: (A) receive prompt and comprehensive professional treatment; and (B) be rehabilitated to the point where he can return as a useful member of society and a self-respecting and self-supporting citizen.” 40 P.S. §1009.102(a)(9).
Compensating the injured victim is no-fault’s primary concern, thus it is the first step employed. Only after that step is completed can the owner be assessed for the amount of the compensation. To strictly enforce the pay now, ask later scheme, section 106 requires that benefits be paid to the victim within 30 days, and imposes a penalty if they are not.
Section 501 is a risk of loss section. It dictates who will ultimately bear the risk of loss in an uninsured motorist claim. The plaintiffs right of recovery thereunder cannot be stated more clearly— the obligor “shall be entitled to recover. . . .”
Finally, defendant ignores section 301 which abolishes tort liability under the act, “except that: (1) An owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident remains hable if, at the time of the accident, the vehicle was not a secured vehicle.”
In the context of no-fault defendant gambled and lost. He cannot expect to be permanently benefitted by the same law which he deliberately chose to disobey. To countenance defendant’s intended result would seriously undermine our no-fault system.
Accordingly, this court enters the following
ORDER
And now, November 26, 1979, defendant’s preliminary objections to plaintiffs complaint are hereby dismissed.
. “§1009.108 Assigned claims plan
(a) General. — (1) If this act is in effect on the date when the accident resulting in injury occurs, a victim or the survivor or survivors of a deceased victim may obtain basic benefits through the assigned claims plan established pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, if basic loss insurance: (A) is not applicable to the injury for a reason other than those specified in the provisions on ineligible claimants.”
. Basic loss benefits are defined as: “benefits provided in accordance with this act for the net loss sustained by a victim, subject to any applicable limitations, exclusions, deductibles, waiting periods, disqualifications, or other terms and conditions provided or authorized in accordance with [the] act.” 40 P.S. §1009.103.
. Cf. Cataldo v. Rick, 10 D. & C. 3d 348, 352 (1979), where the court distinguished between the obligor-insurance company’s right to sue as a subrogee under section 108, and the very different right to reimbursement under section 501.
. Section 501 neither says nor implies that proof of negligence or fault is requisite to the obligor seeking payment. Since no-fault was enacted due to problems with the fault system, 40 P.S. §1008.102(a)(5), to infer a requirement of fault as a condi
. Note the section’s physical placement in the act is not among the penalty provisions of article VI.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.