Scott v. Government Employees Insurance
Opinion of the Court
The instant matter is before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs complaint for no-fault benefits. Since the parties have agreed on all the material facts and since plaintiffs complaint stands or falls solely on the proper interpretation of a statute, the matter is clearly ripe for summary judgment. See, Pa. R.C.P. 1035.
This court agrees with defendant that no such bizarre entitlement exists under the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, §101 et seq, 40 P.S. §1009.101 et seq (No-fault Act). Indeed, defendant correctly observes that the No-fault Act clearly and expressly dispels plaintiffs argument.
The relevant facts are as follows. Plaintiff, an uninsured Pennsylvania resident, was involved in an accident on August 6, 1979, in Washington, D.C., which apparently does not have a no-fault system. The driver of the motor vehicle that plaintiff was riding in: (1) resided in Washington, D.C.; (2) had registered the vehicle in Washington, D.C.; and (3) had insured the vehicle under a policy of insurance issued in Washington, D.C.
The No-fault Act, at 40 P.S. § 1009.201(b), states:
“Accident outside this State. — If the accident resulting in injury occurs outside of this Commonwealth, a victim or a survivor of a deceased victim is entitled to receive basic loss benefits if such victim was or is:
(1) an insured; or
(2) the driver or other occupant of a secured vehicle.”
Since plaintiff concedes that she was not an “insured,” she may not recover No-fault Act benefits unless she was riding in a “secured vehicle.”
“(a) Security covering a motor vehicles. — Every owner of a motor vehicle which is registered or which is operated in this Commonwealth by the owner or with his permission, shall continuously provide security covering such motor vehicle while such vehicle is either present or registered in the Commonwealth. ...” Id. § 1009.104(a).
Since the instant vehicle was registered, operated and insured in Washington, D.C., it clearly is not a “secured vehicle” under the No-fault Act, and plaintiff may not recover No-fault Act benefits from the vehicle’s insurer.
Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary are frivolous, and the cases and portions of the No-fault Act that plaintiff relies on are inapplicable.
Plaintiff laments that the result reached here, denial of any no-fault benefits, violates “all senses of justice and fairness,” however, we believe that the statute compels the only just and fair result.
ORDER
And now, this August 9, 1983, after consideration of the motion for summary judgment of defendant, Government Employees Insurance Company, it is hereby ordered and decreed that summary judgment is entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiffs complaint for no-fault benefits.
This order does not affect defendant’s counterclaim.
We also note that plaintiffs situation is by no means unique. See, e.g., Lyngarkos v. Commonwealth, 57 Pa. Commw. 121, 426 A.2d 1195 (1981); Smith v. Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan, 24 D.&C. 3d 2 (1982).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.