Chesebrough v. Chesebrough
Opinion of the Court
This is an action of divorce charging desertion, brought here on exceptions to the master’s report recommending the dismissal of the libel on the ground that the separation of the parties was by mutual consent. The libellant is employed by the J. G. White Management Corporation of New York as an electrical engineer, and came to Pottsville, Penna., Dec. 19, 1921, to do work in connection with the East Penn Electric Company
He is thirty-one years old. His father is dead and his mother has been traveling, and he testified that at the filing of the libel, June 2, 1923, and at the hearing before the master, Aug. 23, 1924, he was a citizen and resident of Pottsville, Pa., although on the latter date he was employed by the J. G. White interests in Oneonta, N. Y. Pottsville, he said, was the only settled place of abode he had ever established, although during his stay in Galveston, Tex., for a period of two and one-half years immediately prior to coming to Pottsville, he voted there and never voted elsewhere, and during his stay in Pottsville he did not register as a voter. His work with the J. G. White interests has always required him to travel about and over their various properties, and these, we know from the testimony, lie at least as far apart as Galveston, Tex., is from Oneonta, N. Y. The libel was sworn to in Pottsville, April 2, 1923, but was not filed until June 2, 1923, at which time the libellant was in Kentucky on a business trip of six weeks; but whether the business was of a private nature or in the interest of his employer, the J. G. White interests, has not been disclosed, and the period covered by the trip has not been shown. In December, 1922, the libellant gave up his apartment and took a room at 519 West Norwegian Street, and in May, 1923, he went on several trips and transferred “his belongings” to the Rennas Hotel, Pottsville, Pa. He never owned any furniture, and when he traveled he always took all his clothing with him. Since the libel has been filed, his work has been traveling, largely, and he has not stayed in excess of three weeks in any one town. His permanent mailing address is Pottsville, Pa., which he calls “home,” because most of his friends live there, and he maintains his mailing address through a post-office box in the post-office at that place, and does his banking there. He has returned to Pottsville frequently, at irregular intervals, since June 2, 1923, on an average of at least once a month, but for what purpose, or where or how long he stays when he is in Pottsville, has not been told.
The five exceptions filed to the master’s report resolve themselves into the single allegation that the evidence does establish a wilful and malicious desertion by the wife for and during the term and space of two years. The separation occurred April 18, 1922, and twice within the year, immediately preceding the filing of the libel, was interrupted by a reunion of the parties; first, for a period of three days in June, 1922, in New Haven, Conn., whence the husband had gone to see his wife, and there cohabited with her on two successive days in the homes of her mother and her sister, and next, when the wife, pursuant to a letter written to him, returned to Pottsville in November, 1922, and was received and treated by him as his wife for a period of at least four days. Assuming, for argument sake, that the original separation was a wilful and malicious desertion under the authority of Leonard v. Leonard, 67 Pa. Superior Ct. 412, and Smith v. Smith, 85 Pa. Superior Ct. 74, cited by appellant, the respondent could at any time before the expiration of two full years break the continuity of desertion, either by a bona fide offer to return or by a bona, fide return to her husband: Gordon v. Gordon, 208 Pa. 186; Murray v. Murray (No. 2), 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 575, 577.
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 37 Montg. Co. Law Repr. 194, and Danforth v. Dan-forth (Maine), 33 Atl. Repr. 781, are cited by the libellant to establish the contention that the cohabitation for three days in New Haven, consummated by intercourse on two successive nights, and the later cohabitation in Potts-ville for four days, not so consummated, does not break the continuity of the original desertion which he charges. In the first cited case, the original desertion of the wife by her husband occurred on Jan. 5, 1911, and when and after
More important, however, than the question just discussed, is the question of jurisdiction. This court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter if the libellant did not reside within this Commonwealth for one year previous to the filing of his petition or libel. The essentials which must be proved to establish the domicile of a libellant are succinctly stated in the syllabus to Gearing, Jr., v. Gearing, 83 Pa. Superior Ct. 423, thus:
“On a libel for divorce it must affirmatively appear that there has been a clear intention on the part of the libellant to abandon a former residence and to make Pennsylvania his permanent place of residence with domiciliary intent, coupled with an actual bona fide residence for one year within the Commonwealth previous to the filing of the petition or libel. Each requirement is essential and all must combine to warrant the courts in making a decree in divorce.
“A mere legal residence in the State with an actual residence out of it is not sufficient.”
A case quite similar in its facts to the case at bar is Abbott v. Abbott, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 483. See, also, Harrison v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580.
Residence in this county at the time of the filing of the libel was also essential to our jurisdiction: Mauser v. Mauser, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 275, 281. The libellant was in Kentucky when his libel was filed June 2, 1923, and his work for the J. G. White interests in Pottsville probably had ceased before that time, and, so far as is shown by the evidence, he never worked in Pottsville after that date, nor thereafter had or maintained a fixed or established residence in Pottsville. Paragraph 15 of Rule 17, prescribing the duty of masters in divorce (Rules of Court, page 35), provides, inter alia, that “It shall be his duty, whether requested by either party or not, to summon and examine such witnesses as he may have reason to believe have knowledge of any matters relevant and material to the just and proper determination of the cause.” The testimony in this case casts sufficient doubt upon the bona fides of the libellant’s residence in the State one year immediately preceding the filing of his libel and in the county at the time of its actual filing to require the master to summon and examine witnesses who he may have reason to believe have knowledge of the libellant’s residence in Pennsylvania and to recall the libellant for cross-examination on that point, along the lines indicated by the authorities hereinabove cited, and also to cross-examine him on the contents of his letters to his wife.
The case is referred to the master for further testimony upon the question of the jurisdiction of this court and the letters written by the libellant to his wife.
From M. M. Burke, Shenandoah, Pa.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.