Barton v. Baker
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Wilson v. Senier (Wis. 1861)
- Union Bank v. Hodges (S.C. Ct. App. 1858)
- Walker v. Walker (Ark. 1847)
- Catlin v. Jones (Wis. 1841)
- Williams v. Brobst (Pa. 1840)
- Commercial Bank v. Hughes (New York Supreme Court 1837)
- Watkins v. Crouch & Co. (Va. 1834)
- Patton v. McFarlane (Pa. 1832)
- Bank of the State of South-Carolina v. Myers (N.C. Ct. App. 1830)
- Juniata Bank v. Hale (Pa. 1827)
- Gibbs v. Cannon (Pa. 1823)
- Sandford v. Dillaway (Mass. 1813)
- Crossen v. Hutchinson (Mass. 1812)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The objection to the verdict in this case, is, that due notice of non-payment by the maker of the note <on which the action is founded, was not given to the defendant who was the indorser. It is confessed that due notice was not given; but the plaintiff contends, that under the circumstances of the case, notice was not necessary. The circumstance principally relied on at the trial, and on which the plaintiff had the charge of the court in his favour, is, that at the time when the note was made and indorsed, and also at
I have no hesitation in admitting, that my charge to the jury in the particular of notice to the defendant of the non-payment of the note by the drawers, does not accord with the most modern authorities. I considered the cases of De Berdt v. Atkinson in 1794, (2 H. Black. 336.) and of Cornay v. Da Costa in 1795, (1 Esp. Rep. 302.) under circumstances very similar to those disclosed in evidence on the trial, as decisive of the question of notice ; and that, according to the expressions of Buller J. in the first case, the general rule as to notice was only applicable to fair transactions, where the note had been given for value, in the ordinary course of trade. The justice of the case in favour of the plaintiff struck my mind forcibly, and I thought Nicholson v. Gouthit, in 1796, (2 H. Black. 609.) and Jackson v. Ritter, in 1805, (2 Caines, 343.) might be admitted to be law, without overthrowing the two former decisions. In the first of them, (2 H. Bla. 610.) it is stated, that if the note had been presented when it became due, it would have been paid, as Burton (a prior indorser) had lodged a sufficient sum of money in the defendant’s hands for that purpose, but which he paid away, when he found the note did not come to him as he expected. It appeared to me very singular, that although Eyre Chief Justice, and Heath and Rooke Justices, sat in the Common Pleas, and decided both cases, the decision in De Berdt v. Atkinson was not cited nor adverted to in Nicholson v. Gouthit, if it established a different principle, either by the court or counsel, although nineteen months only had intervened. I was led to remark on the trial that Chitty, (who is generally deemed a very correct compiler, in his treatise on Bills and Notes, p. 87, 1 Bond. Ed.) lays down the broad proposition, that the payee of a note, indorsing it to give it currency, and knowing the insolvency of the maker at the time, cannot insist on the want of notice as a defence; and yet, though he cites Nicholson v. Gouthit, in the following page he does not consider it as effecting any change in the commercial law before asserted. In the New York case (2 Caines, 343.) notice was given to the indorser of non-payment by the drawer, prior to any demand upon the drawer, and consequently the notice was null, as the drawer was not '
New tidal refused.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.