Carothers v. Lessee of Dunning
Opinion of the Court
The errors assigned in this case, are exceptions to the charge of the Court, before whom the cause was tried. In the charge the evidence is so fully stated, that it is unnecessary for me to go into a detail. I shall, therefore, mention but a few of the most material facts, referring to the charge for the rest. [His honour here recapitulated the facts of the case.]
1. The first exception to the charge is, that the Court left it to the jury to decide, whether the improvement made by John Calhoun, was or was not, on the land of Robert Dunning. (Whereas, if the improvement was made on the land claimed by Calhoun, and included in the license, it was wholly immaterial whether it was on Robert Dunning’s land or not.) I confess, that as referring to the expressions of the Court, I can see no ground for this exception. “ It ‘‘ is alleged too, (says- the Judge,) on the part of the plain- “ tiff, and endeavoured to be proved, (with what success you “ may determine,) that the improvement made by John Cal"houn, (if any improvement was made,) was upon the land “ of Ezekiel Dunning, and not upon the land in dispute.” Now, in the first place, the matter submitted, was, whether the improvement was on the land in dispute, that is, the land claimed under the license. This, the defendant supposed to be material, because he had offered evidence to prove it. But, in the next place, the Court neither gave, nor were requested to give, any opinion concerning the legal effect of the improvement. But they gave, in another part of the charge, as strong an opinion as the defendant could wish, on the efficacy of Rlunston’s license. It is
2. .The second exception is, to the following passage.' “ If “ Calhoun never settled on, or improved the land ; or relin- “ quished it; knew of the payment and transfer of Armstrong “ to Dunning, and acquiesced in Dunning’s claim, and there- “ by abandoned all right, as was contended by the plaintiff’s “ counsel, Calhoun would not have a spark of title.” The plaintiff in error picks out a few words from the whole sentence, and by severing them from the rest, endeavours to make them appear erroneous. But this is not fair; it is not doing justice to the charge, to say, the jury were instructed, “ that if Calhoun never settled on the land, the defendant “ would not have a spark of title.” The bare settling on the land, was not made the sole criterion of title. Many other strong circumstances were added, and if all were united, it is clear, that there would not have been a spark of title, because they would have demonstrated, that although John Calhoun intended to take up the land, when he procured a license from Blunston, yet he afterwards relinquished his intention, (as he might lawfully do,) in favour of Dunning.
3. The third exception is, to the Judge’s opinion respecting the decision of the board of property. It is contended, that after so great a lapse of time, that decision was prima facie evidence of the truth of all the facts affirmed in it; and unless contradicted by evidence on the trial, the jury should have been instructed to presume the truth of them. But, it appears to me, that in speaking of this decision, the Judge went as far as he ought to have gone, in support of it. The board of property proceeds without much form, and decides facts, without a jury. Their decisions are received as evidence, but have never been supposed to be conclusive, either as to law, or fact. The jury were told, that if most of the circumstances stated in the decision, were, in their opinion, proved by evidence produced to them, it furnished a strong presumption that the rest were true ; but, that after all, they must decide on all the facts, because the decision of the board certainly was not conclusive. I can find no fault with this. To have gone further, would, in my opinion, have been going too far.
5. The fifth exception is, that the. Court left it to the jury to decide, with what intent William Dunning, one of the plaintiffs, entered on the land in dispute, and whether it was such an entry as in law would prevent the operation of the statute of limitations, whereas the jury should have been instructed what constituted a legal entry.
The plaintiffs had given evidence of an entry by William Dunning; but it was a question for what purpose he entered. This was submitted to the jury, and very properly, for they alone could decide it. The intent of the entry, was to be inferred, from the words, and conduct; of the person who entered. No particular form, or words, are essential. One of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, (James Davidson,) swore that William Dunning, went on the land, from year to year, prosecuting and claiming his title. The fact of entry being proved, the quo animo was material, and the Judge- could not do otherwise than leave it to the jury. I do not find, in the record, any question proposed by the defendants’ counsel, to the Court, with regard to the law of entry. There
6. The last exception is, that whereas William Dunning actéd, not only for himself, but under a power of attorney from his brothers, he ought to have entered, with a special declaration, that he made the entry, as well on the part of his brothers, as for himself. But the Court instructed the jury, that if a legal entry is made by one co-heir or tenant in common, it enures to the benefit of his co-heirs, or co-tenants.
The counsel for the plaintiffs in error, concede, that the entry'of one joint-tenant, or co-parcener, enures to the benefit of the others. But they suppose, that co-heirs under our act of assembly, are to be considered as tenants in common, and with regard to tenants in common they take a distinction j they admit, that the entry of one tenant in common enures to the benefit of the others, so far as concerns themselves, but not as concerns a stranger. No authority was cited in support of this distinction. And, indeed, it is not easy to comprehend, how the entry in this case, could operate for the benefit of each other, unless it affected the stranger,.on whom the entry was made. The possession of tenants in common is one and undivided, neither can one alone support an action of trespass. The possession of one, therefore, is the possession of all, and if one enters generally, without saying for whom, it will be implied, that he entered according to law ; that is to say', for himself and the others. I find a case, in which it was expressly decided, that the entry' of one tenant in common, shall enure to the benefit of another, as regards strangers. (Small v. Dale, Hob. 120. Moor. 868. 14 Vin. 512. P. a. pl. 1.) A, being seised of land, held of the king, by knight’s service, and having issue by several venters, devised it to his wife, for life. A, died, and his wife entered into the whole. The devise was void, for a third part of the land, which descended to B, the son of the first venter, who died, having never made an actual entry. It was held, that the entry of the widow of A, enured to the benefit of B, who was tenant in common with her of one third, and who, by virtue of her entry, became actually seised of one third. The consequence was, that of this third, there was a possessio patris, and it descended to the heir of B, in exclusion of the issue of A, by the second
These are all the exceptions. I am of opinion, that none of them have been supported, and the judgment should be affirmed.
The first error is not sustained in point of fact; for the locality of Calhoun’s improvement was not put to the jury as a matter of importance in the cause ; nor could the jury, from any thing that was said in this particular, be easily misled.
It is objected, the jury were instructed, that if Armstrong's-right was transferred for a valuable consideration to Dunning; that if Calhoun never settled or improved the land, but relinquished it; knew of Dunning’s payment, and the transfer of Armstrong's right; and acquiesced in Dunning’s claim, and thereby abandoned all right to the land; that then Calhoun would not have a spark of title in law or equity. Who can doubt it? Calhoun claimed under a Blunston’s license; might he not abandon as he could have done, if he had held under a location ? If he never settled, or paid the purchase money under his, license, it would be a clear abandonment. If, then, in consequence of the transfer of Armstrong’s title, Calhoun actually acquiesced in Dunning’s right, and abandoned his own under his license, he extinguished every spark of title that was before in him. But it is said, this abandonment could not affect an after-acquired equity arising from improvements made by- Calhoun, and those claiming under him, from verdicts obtained, and from delay in prosecuting the plaintiffs’ claim. In 1773, Calhoun obtained judgment by default against John Dunning; since when, he and those claiming under him, have made valuable improvements ; and I grant, that Dunning unnecessarily delayed the prosecution of his right. But what equity can that give ? I know of no possession short of the period of the statute of limitations, accompanied or not with improvements, or the expenditure of money or labour, that will'affect the claim of a plaintiff against a trespasser. If Calhoun were, in fact, without title when he obtained possession, yet he was so far a trespasser, though he entered by process of law, that he might be turned out as such in a second ejectment, and be
It is objected, the jury were instructed to consider whether the improvements made by the defendant were not, in fact, a deterioration of the property. If the defendant could, in any event, have derived an equity from the expenditure of money or labour, this would have been error j for such equity would not be affected by adventitious circumstances, such as the increase of the value of timber; and besides, the
It is contended, the decision of the board of property was prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts it recited; and that the jury should have been directed to consider them as true, till they were disproved. But no case has gone that length. The minutes are always read to shew what passed before the board; but to decide that a mere recital of certain facts having been proved to the satisfaction of the board is prima facie evidence of their truth, would be contrary to every rule of evidence, and attended with great danger of injustice. The hearing before the board was either on depositions, or by oral testimony: If on depositions, these, as being the best evidence, should have been produced, or their loss accounted for, and their contents proved : If on oral evidence, the witnesses themselves should have been called, or if they could not be had, then what they deposed before the board might have been ■ given in evidence; but before evidence of what they deposed could be given, it should appear the opposite party had had an opportunity to cross-examine. But I deny that the evidence received any additional weight from having been believed by the board of property. Why take the facts at second hand, when, by mounting a step higher, we can judge for ourselves ? The length of time which elapsed between the decision by the board, and the trial in court, operates against the propriety of leaving the evidence to the jury as prima facie; because it may, on that account, be the more difficult to shew that the witnesses, on whose evidence the board rested its decision, were unworthy of credit, or that the evidence was unfairly taken.
The jury were instructed, that an entry to avoid the statute of limitations must be made by the party claiming, or some one duly authorised by him, for the purpose of taking possession ; and that if they were of opinion, from the evidence,
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.