Underwood v. Lilly
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Vaughan v. Bowie (Ark. 1875)
- Town of Danville v. Pace (Va. 1874)
- Town of Danville v. Pace (Va. 1874)
- Town of Danville v. Pace (Va. 1874)
- Town of Danville v. Pace (Va. 1874)
- State v. Squires (Iowa 1868)
- Syracuse City Bank v. Davis (New York Supreme Court 1853)
- Lessee of Good v. Zercher (Ohio 1843)
- Parkison v. Bracken (Wis. 1842)
- Simmons v. Inhabitants of Hanover (Mass. 1839)
- Adle v. Sherwood (Pa. 1838)
- In re Koch's Estate (Pa. 1835)
- M'Masters v. Commonwealth (Pa. 1834)
- Tate v. Stooltzfoos (Pa. 1827)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The statement sets out very fully the nature of the plaintiff’s cause of action. It was debt on bond with a penalty, conditioned for payment of the interest on the single sum, to Rebecca M‘Cabe, the widow of Edward M‘Cabe, during her life, and on her death, the principal sum to Samuel Lilly, the plaintiff below, the executor of the said Edward M‘ Ca.be. It then proceeds to state, that two years interest was due at the commencement, and claims judgment for the penalty.
The judgment was entered for the penalty so early as November, 1817. A fieri facias issued to August, 1818, for the penalty and costs, to be released on payment of two instalments and costs. The sheriff returned money made, and paid to plaintiff. To August, 1819, execution issued for two subsequent instalments, and to April, 1S21, for two succeeding ones. The defendant’s land had been sold on venditioni exponas, on these executions, the money raised and paid over to the plaintiff. This writ of error issued to the last term of the court, and after five years acquiescence in these proceedings, by the defendant below, plaintiff in error, we are not only called on to reverse this judgment, but the plaintiff in error asks to have the money paid back again to him by Samuel Lilly, who has paid it over to Mrs. M‘Cabe, the widow of E. M‘Cabe, whose sole subsistence it was. The objections are merely technical, having no relation to the merits, and from which no possible injury could arise to the plaintiff in error, and where if the judgment were reversed, he could not receive any ultimate benefit.
The special causés assigned are, on the argument, reduced to two, which will be best understood by considering them in the following order:
1. Did the plaintiff’s cause of action fall within the statement law?
2. Was the judgment entered two days earlier than was authorized by law, and therefore erroneous ?
And from this another question springs, did the act of 21st Feb- . Vuary, 1822, confirming all judgments that had been so erroneously entered in York county, apply t.o these proceedings ?
The object of the statement act of 25th March, 1806, was, to enable the people, in all plain money demands, arising from contracts
The words of the arbitration act are very comprehensive. “All suits which may be brought for any debt founded on a verbal promise, book account, penal or single bill.” Thus, obligations for payment of money áre directly provided for, not in general, but in express terms. There can be but one action brought on the same obligation; the duty is entire. On a single bill payable by instalments, no action can be brought, until the last day of payment. Not so in promissory notes, or contracts verbal or written, where the action is not debt, but assumpsit, and damages are recovered. ■'Andrews, 370. On a penal bill, or bond conditioned for payment of money at several days, it becomes absolute by not making any of the payments. 1 Wils. 80. But in entering up the judgment the court will take care to protect the party. Judgment is rendered for the penalty, where the condition is for the payment of money by instalments, or principal to become due at
The error in entering the judgment is cured by the confirming act; the constitutionality of this no man can doubt. It impaired no contract, disturbed no vested right, and if there ever was a case in which the legislature ought to stretch forth the strong arm to protect a whole community from an impending evil, caused by mere slips, this was the occasion. Confirming acts are not uncommon; are very useful — deeds acknowledged defectively by feme coverts, have been confirmed,and proceedings and judgments of commissioned justices of the peace, who were not commissioned agreeably to the constitution, or where their power ceased on the division of counties, until a new appointment. This law is free from all the odium to which retrospective laws are generally exposed. It cannot be assimilated to Bedford v. Shilling. Where a law is in its nature a contract, where absolute rights are vested under it, a law retrospecting, even if it were constitutional, would not be extended by any liberal construction, nor would it be construed by any general words, to embrace cases where actions are brought. It would be confined to future actions. Statutes are- prima facie prospective in their operation; and retrospective laws being in their nature odious, it ought never to be presumed the legislature intended to pass them, where the words will admit of any other meaning. But every confirming act is, in its very nature, retrospective. Retrospective laws, which only vary the remedies, devest no right, but merely cure a defect in proceedings otherwise fair, the omission of forma
I could have wished some little time to have thrown my thoughts together in a more connected manner, but as no doubt is entertained, it is thought best for all parties now to give the judgment, least false hopes should be entertained, or groundless apprehensions excited.
Judgment and execution affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.