Dietrich v. Dietrich
Opinion of the Court
I have so often been accused of an attachment to v .common law principles and forms in preference -to local practice, .that it gives me pleasure to testify, in this instance, a paramount .respect for our own precedents. This court had flattered itself that the law was settled by Bovard v. Wallace, and Nussear v. Arnold, (which is this very case,) if not in conformity to common law ^analogies, at least .consistently with justice and reason; and even ■were my opinion of the fitness of those decisions changed, I would, to avoid the mischiefs which are inevitably produced by overturning the solemn decisions of the court of the last resort, for theoretic reasons, adhere-to the known landmarks of the. law by which courts and counsel may proceed with safety and certainty. I ana happy .to say my brother Smith concurs with me in opinion, that the admissions of Henry Dietrich, a principal devisee, and party to the feigned issue, were erroneously received; and, the court being equally divided on this point, the authority of the cases to which I have referred, is, as yet, untouched. On the remaining point, I would, for the sake of unanimity, be inclined to yield the opinion I expressed in Pipher v. Lodge, 16 Serg. & Rawle, 214, as the authorities are nearly balanced on the question, whether the sufficiency of evidence to lay a ground for the introduction of a depo_.sition, can be re-examined on a writ of error; but as Judge Smith holds out on this point also, I am inclined to say the judgment .ought to be reversed on both points.
‘The two first bills of exception were in this court argued together, but an attempt was made to draw a distinction between them, by reading the part within brackets, without the ■words “ to prove,” and considering the rest of the sentence as a statement of facts admitted, and by using the words, “but at the same time the court overruled the said deposition,” as conveying the idea that although the court allowed them in words to prove the allegation in brackets, yet in fact, they decided without hearing such facts proved; beyond ¡a doubt the deposition was offered the second time for the purpose of accompanying it with the jrecprd of the issue in which it was taken: — because to enable
In the first view, the principal part of the argument was founded on reading the first sentence of the act of assembly as far as the words “ made part of the proceedings in the case:” and to be sure, if no other words had followed, the argument was strong. The act contemplates two classes of cases, one where on caveat, the whole •matter is heard and decided by the Register’s Court, without the intervention of a jury, and here all the testimony must be reduced to writing, and forms part of the proceedings, and if an appeal be -taken, goes up as part of the cause.
The other class is where the weight and effect of the evidence is •not submitted to the Register’s Court, but to a jury; and as there the mode of proceeding is by examination of witnesses, in presence of the jury, and their finding is conclusive on the facts submitted, the testimony given before them, does not go up on appeal, nor is it known to the superior court. Suppose the testimony of the witnesses to the will is reduced to writing in the Register’s Court, and from this testimony it would appear to be a valid will, yet an issue is directed, and on the whole evidence the jury find it is not the •will of the testator; those depositions are not within the words of the act of assembly, and if sent up on an appeal, must be considered as no part of the record, -or an immaterial part.
In ordinary cases the witnesses go before the Register, and make oath, that they saw the testator execute and deliver the paper as his last will and testament, and that he was of sound mind. These affidavits are endorsed on the will, and letters testamentary are granted to the executors. In giving copies of the will, it was usual, and at one time was thought necessary, to give copies of these affidavits. It was, however, long ago decided that a copy of the will, and a copy of the record, that it was on such day proved and approved, was sufficient. This certificate of the proof, and that it was approved, is the real and true probate, and what makes it evidence in any, and every court. If the affidavits of the •witnesses are added, along with this certificate, they are often called the probate, and read along with it, though the witnesses are standing in the court, where the will is offered in evidence; and k
The next two bills of exceptions were argued together, and they present the question, whether, in such an issue, the declarations or admissions of the principal devisee in the alleged will, and who is sole plaintiff in the cause, can be given in evidence 1 Perhaps the decisions of this court, on this point, have been peculiar to this state,
The case of Nussear v. Arnold, 13 Serg. & Rawle, 323, is still stronger. The question there was, whether the declarations of a devisee, who was carrying on the cause, and whose agent was the plaintiff, in the feigned issue, should be given in evidence. And in the argument and decision it seems to be taken for granted, that if the devisee had been a party, there would have been no dispute. The objection that these admissions may effect the rights of other devisees, has not been of so much avail in other courts. In 17 Johns. 335, and 18 Johns. 330, the recital in a deed, and the parol'declarátions of one of several lessors in ejectment, were admitted, although they might effect the other lessors.
The admission of sanity or insanity by a devisee is one thing, the repeated admission that a man of ninety years of age was childish, and becoming more so every day, is another and stronger matter, when the fact trying is whether the very person who made this declaration or admission, did not at that very time, or soon after, procure the will to be made by misrepresentation and imposition on this weakness. The cases cited prove the general position, that the declarations of a party on record, and who has an interest in the cause trying, are in all cases-evidence. We think therefore, that as well the cases in this court,(which always except the case where devisee is not a party to the' suit,) .as the uniform current of authorities, require that we affirm the decision of the Common Pleas on these two bills.
The last bill of exceptions was not insisted on. The declarations of a married woman in the presence of her husband, or when acting as his agent, are evidence against him, but generally they are not.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.