Cash v. Tozer
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Mengel v. New Tripoli National Bank (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944)
- Hinderman v. Fisher (Pa. Super. Ct. 1910)
- Geo. W. McAlpin Co. v. Finsterwald (Ohio 1898)
- Faull v. Cooke (Or. 1890)
- DeFrehn v. Leitenberger (Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas 1875)
- St. Bartholomew's Church v. Wood (Pa. 1869)
- Kelly v. Creen (Pa. 1867)
- Emley v. Drum (Pa. 1860)
- Ryan v. Casey (Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas 1859)
- Shields v. Miltenberger (Pa. 1850)
- Morgan v. Doe (Ala. 1849)
- King v. Gunnison (Pa. 1846)
- Braddee v. Brownfield (Pa. 1841)
- Lessee of Murphy v. M'Cleary (Pa. 1802)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Whether the defendants below were released from their purchase by unnecessary delay in the completion of it, w'hich kept them, as it is supposed, out of the possession and care of the property till a great part of it was destroyed, does not sufficiently appear from the special plea, which was the subject of the demurrer, and which stated the fact of destruction, but no more. Enough to show the sale incurably defective in another respect appeared in trying the issue of fact; and it would be useless to inquire into anything beside.
The foundation of the judgment on which the premises were sold, was a bond and warrant sealed by a partner in the ñame of his firm; which consequently bound no one but himself. It was entered by the prothonotary, pursuant to the statute, without the agency of an attorney; and as there was no appearance for the other partners, they were not parties to the judgment, nor bound by it. But they subsequently became parties, by an agreement of their counsel, to a judgment of revival by scire facias, which is, by our practice—unlike what it is elsewhere—not an award of execution on the original judgment, but itself an original judgment; and so far all was regular. The original warrant contained a power to waive condemnation; but there was at first no waiver by any one; and it is to be remembered that it is the separate estate of one of the partners who were originally not bound, which was subsequently sold. A fieri facias, however, was issued on the revived judgment, to May Term 1837, on which the sheriff returned that he had seized the premises in execution, and having offered them for sale on the 8th of May, the return day of the writ, had adjourned the sale from day to day, till he sold them to the defendants on the 11th; and he further returned a written agree
The forty-fifth section of the revised Act of 1836, directs that on the written waiver of an inquisition by a defendant whose real estate is seized in execution, the sheriff “shall proceed to sell such estate on the writ of fieri facias before the return day thereof, without any further writ.” it had been a sanctioned practice to sell after the return day of the venditioni exponas, while the writ remained actually in the sheriff’s hands; and did the object appear to be no more than to put the fieri facias on a level with that writ, we would be bound to say the legislature had done no more by enactment in regard to the one, than the courts had done by decision in regard to the other. The supposed advantage, however, of selling at the ensuing court, would not induce us again to sanction a practice so anomalous, even were it a matter of first impression, and unregulated by any statutory provision. But the advantage of the practice was less real than imaginary. That those who wish to purchase, will attend a sale as readily in vacation as in term time, is proved by the practice which obtains in some of our counties, of selling with advantage on the premises ; while, on the other hand, it is evident that to sell in the presence of a crowd of indifferent spectators attracted to the spot by accident or curiosity, can add little to the bidding. But the statute has left nothing to interpretation; and we are consequently to be governed by the words of it, which are peremptory that the sheriff shall sell before the return day of the writ; consequently a sale after it is of no more force than if it were made without judgment or execution. In truth, the matter stood so at the common law, which the statute has only restored. The object was doubtless to put an end to the illegitimate practice that had crept in;
Another objection to the sale has been made on a supposition that it was void by the Statute of Frauds; which it is unnecessary to consider. There was also an exception to the sheriff’s return as evidence of the sale, which was clearly untenable, the very point having been decided in Hyskill v. Givin, (7 Serg. & Rawle 369) for reasons which it is unnecessary to repeat. Such a return is unquestionable evidence between third persons; and in this instance, where the creditors are the only parties beneficially concerned, and the name of the sheriff is used merely as a trustee, he is in effect a stranger. He was an instrument of the law, and had no motive to falsify; for had there been in fact no sale, it would have been just as easy for him to exonerate himself from further responsibility by returning the land unsold for want of bidders.
But the most important question is, whether an inquiry into the defects of the sale is barred by the acknowledgment of the deed. I had entertained a notion that this was settled in the affirmative by repeated decisions; but I am surprised to find how little foundation there is for it. The first case on the subject is Duncan v. Robeson, (2 Yeates 455) in which it was ruled at Nisi Prius that a sheriff’s deed, acknowledged after ejectment brought, precludes no objection to the sale that might have been made at the time of acknowledgment; and the same thing was repeated in Moorhead v. Pearce, (id. 458) from which is to be inferred an opinion that some objections are proper for one occasion and some for another ; but no classification was attempted or distinction drawn. Next came Knight v. Morris, (4 Yeates 341) in which a sheriff’s deed had been acknowledged after objection made; yet a subsequent purchaser on another judgment, and in trust for the creditors, was allowed to show, on the trial of an ejectment, that the sale was collusive. Mr Justice Yeates, who ruled the point, and than whom no man was better acquainted with the practice and customs of the state, declared the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to a case of the sort; that no more had been determined by the execution court than the admissibility of the deed to acknowledgment; that the overruling of the objections to if, gave the deed no greater validity or effect than if it had been acknowledged without opposition; and that the validity of sheriffs’ sales had always been open to impeachment after acknowledgment, and left to rest on their original fairness. No judge has since directly expressed an opinion on the subject; but there are
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.