Payne v. Craft
Cases that cite this one
10 later published cases cite this decision.
- Shearer v. Brinley (Pa. 1874)
- Bredin v. Agnew (Pa. 1848)
- Kirk v. Van Horn (Pa. 1920)
- Mineral Railroad & Mining Co. v. Auten (Pa. 1898)
- Hope v. Marshall (Pa. 1881)
- Rodgers v. Riddlesburg Coal & Iron Co. (Pa. 1874)
- Thompson v. Adams (Pa. 1867)
- McLaughlin v. McCumber (Pa. 1859)
- Heaton v. Findlay (Pa. 1849)
- Hays v. Heidelberg (Pa. 1848)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
It is unnecessary to notice, in detail, the numerous bills of exception to evidence, either admitted or rejected by the court, which have been assigned for error in this cause, as they seem to be without even the semblance of any plausible ground for their support. And as regards the questions presented by the case, upon which it turned finally with the jury, the evidence received or rejected by the court could have had but little or no weight in the determination of them. So that the plaintiffs do not appear to have the slightest ground for alleging that even any possible injury may have been done them by the decision of the'court in relation to the evidence which was either admitted or rejected. Whether Juliet Semple had ever been the real owner of the land in dispute was the question, on which the most of the evidence of a loose nature was admitted; but as respects the evidence in relation to this point, the plaintiffs had their full' share of indulgence shown them, for they were allowed to give in evidence the declarations of Juliet Semple when a child, or at least a minor, that the land belonged to her, though she never pretended to exercise any act of ownership or authority over it whatever. And yet the plaintiffs opposed the admission in evidence of the declarations of her father going to show that the land was his, accompanied at the same time by a possession of the land and acts of ownership exercised upon it, even long before it was granted by the commonwealth,'until the day of his death. A general draft of adjoining lands, certified from the Surveyor General’s office, has been admitted in evidence too' often to be now questioned, for the purpose of showing location and boundary. And the same may be said of the field-notes taken or made by deputy-surveyors,
Then the jury having decided, under the evidence given to them, which was abundantly sufficient to warrant their conclusion that the tract warranted in the name of Juliet Semple never did belong to her, but that it was the property of her father, Samuel Semple, who by his last will devised the same in fee to Steel Semple, the ancestor of the plaintiffs; the only remaining question to be considered is whether the debt owing by Steel Semple at the time of his decease to James Ross, which thereby became a lien upon all the real estate of which he died seised, continued to be a lien thereon, or at least on the Juliet Semple tract of land, until it was sold by the sheriff to Mr Ross. Anterior to the Act of 1797, the debts of a debtor upon his dying became immediately a lien, without any limitation, upon all the real estate of which he died seised lying within the State, but by that Act thq lien was limited to seven years, unless the creditor commenced a suit for the recovery thereof within -that period and duly prosecuted the same. If, however, the debt had or did not become payable within the seven years, then the creditor, instead of bringing a suit for the recovery of it, was required by the Act to file within that period, in the office of the Prothonotary of the county where the lands lay, a copy or particular written statement of the bond, covenant, debt, or demand, as the case might be. Here, however, the debt owing to Mr Ross was payable within the seven years after the death of Mr Semple, the debtor, who died in April 1813, and to November Term 1819 Mr Ross commenced an action for the recovery of his debt against the administrators of the deceased, and on the 10th of March 1821 obtained a judgment by confession for the amount thereof; and again on the 22d of August 1822 the administrators, by their attorney W. Forward, agreed that the judgment should be revived without scire facias by the following
W. Forward,
Defendants’ Attorney.”
And afterwards on the 4th of August 1823, a writing of the following effect and tenor was filed: “ James Ross, Esq. v. Wilkins, Baldwin, and Forward, administrators of Steel Semple deceased. Aug. 4th 1823, at the instance and request of the defendants it is agreed, that the year and day shall not begin to run until from and after this date. W. Forward,
Attorney for Defendants.”
And at the same time the following entry was made on the record of the judgment: “Aug. 4th 1823, as per writing filed, it is agreed that the year and day shall not begin to run till this day.
W. Forward,
Attorney for Defendants.”
Then to April Term 1828 a scire facias to revive the judgment was sued out, to which the defendants appeared by their attorney, and confessed a judgment de bonis testatoris. And again on the 8th of December 1831 the defendants confessed a revival of the judgment, by a writing filed to that effect; upon which an alias fieri facias was issued to June Term 1832, by virtue whereof the land in dispute was taken in execution, condemned, and, on a writ of venditioni exponas issued to March Term 1833, was sold by the sheriff to James Ross, Esq., for $950. Now from this recital of the proceeding, it is perfectly clear that the action for the recovery of Mr Ross’s debt was not only commenced by him and duly prosecuted within the seven years, while its lien on the lands held by the debtor at the time of his decease was in full force, but that at no time thereafter until the land was taken in execution and sold under the judgment obtained in the action so brought, were five years suffered to elapse without some proceeding being had on the judgment, or entry being made on the record thereof by the agreement and consent of the parties, showing that the judgment still- remained in full force and unpaid, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have execution of it. The entry of the 4th of August 1823, which has been strongly objected to by the counsel of the plaintiffs in this case, as.wholly insufficient to continue the lien of the debt, we consider amply sufficient for such purpose: it shows most clearly that the debt still remained unpaid and in nowise satisfied, and that the plaintiff was justly entitled to have execution of the judgment in order to obtain payment of it. But it has been argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the directions of the Acts of 1798, 1827 and 1828 for continuing the liens of judgments therein mentioned, ought to have been observed and strictly complied with by Mr Ross, in order to continue the lien of his debt after he had obtained judgment for it. In answer to this, however, it is sufficient to observe that these Acts
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.