Lehr v. Beaver
Cases that cite this one
2 later published cases cite this decision.
- Kaiser's Estate (Pa. Super. Ct. 1900)
- Church v. Ruland (Pa. 1870)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The first question presented by this case is, whether the agreement reduced to writing and signed by the plaintiff, be void or not. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the agreement being made with his wife was void, and therefore could have no effect whatever upon his right to demand and receive the money in question. It is no doubt true, that in England, according to the common law, as Littleton says, section 168, “ A man may not grant, nor give his tenements to his wife, during the coverture, for that his wife and he be but one person in the law upon which my Lord Coke observes, 1 Inst. 112, “ This opinion is clear; for by no conveyance, at the common law, a man could, during coverture, either in possession, reversion or remainder, limit an estate to his wife.” And again, in page 3, a, of 1 Inst., he says, “ A feme covert cannot take anything of the gift of her husband.” See also Moyse v. Gyles (2 Vern. 385); Beard v. Beard (3 Atk. 72), where the same principle is recognized and laid down. But this doctrine is not universally true, and must be understood with various limitations; for though a husband cannot, at law, in England, convey to the wife immediately, yet he may give to a trustee for her benefit, and the gift will be good. 1 Inst. 112, a; Bunting v. Lepingwel (4 Co. 29, b.) He may give to his wife by last loill; because such gift cannot take effect till his death, when the coverture is determined. Littleton, sect. 168; and in Lawson
But by the agreement of the plaintiff in the case under consideration, Mr Beaver, the defendant, is named by the plaintiff as the attorney of his wife; and he thereby agrees that one half, to-wit, $600.22J of the instalments due and remaining unpaid of the purchase money, under the sale made by the plaintiff and his wife, of his wife’s land, be considered the money of his wife absolutely for her sole and separate use; she to give him security, such as shall be agreed on by Mr Robert "Woods, and the defendant Mr Beaver, to indemnify the plaintiff against any debts or other claims for her maintenance during the time that he and she should live separate. And he also thereby further agrees that “ the money of the said Mary (meaning his wife), being the half of the said payments (before stated to be $1200.45) so due, be paid, into the hands of John F. Beaver, attorney for the said Mary; to be paid to her on the bond of indemnity aforesaid being delivered to the said R. Woods, Esq.” Although the defendant is spoken of in the agreement as being the attorney of the plaintiff’s wife, yet'he is in fact thereby made her trustee, with full power to collect and receive for her separate use the one-half of the $1200.45, still outstanding and unpaid in the hands of the purchasers of her land. Thus the
Seeing, then, that the agreement was not void, but binding and still in full force, and executory also, as respects all that was to be done on the part or behalf of the wife, the plaintiff, if it has been broken on her part, can only entitle himself to recover by declaring specially on the agreement, showing what were the terms and conditions thereof, as also the breaches of the same. From which the inevitable conclusion is, that he cannot recover here in a general indebitatus assumpsit upon any of the common money counts, which are all that his declaration contains. In a special action, founded upon a breach of the agreement, he would, upon proving the breach, be entitled to recover damages, in amount equal to the value of the loss or injury sustained by reason thereof. But it does not appear from the evidence given on the trial of the cause below, that he has ever been called on to pay, much less paid, any debts or claims created by his wife for her support or maintenance; nor did it even appear that any such existed. It would therefore seem that he has sustained no actual damage. It may therefore be, even in a proper form of action, that he would only be entitled at most to recover nominal damages, because security for indemnity had not been given in due time. But a tender of such security to the plaintiff at any time before a proper suit is brought by him, if no actual damage or loss shall have been sustained by reason of the conduct of his wife in violation of the agreement, wrould certainly defeat a recovery.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.