Vandever's Appeal
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- Fesmire v. Shannon (Pa. 1891)
- Nowicki, F. v. Righter, K. (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021)
- Deviney v. Lynch (Pa. 1953)
- Herr v. United States Casualty Co. (Pa. 1943)
- Stewart's Estate (Mercer County Orphans' Court 1943)
- Dorrance's Estate (Pa. 1938)
- Coxe v. Kriebel (Pa. 1936)
- Voshake's Estate (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936)
- Klein's Estate (Berks County Orphans' Court 1934)
- Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933)
- Godfrey v. Ziemak (Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas 1932)
- Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St. Elevated R. (7th Cir. 1903)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
When the administration of a trust is vested in co-trustees, they all form but one collective trustee. They must, therefore, execute the duties of the office in their joint capacity. Thus a receipt for money or a certificate of bankruptcy, &c. must receive the joint signature of the whole body; for the power, interest and authority of co-trustees in the subject-matter of the trust being equal and undivided, they cannot like executors act separately, but all must join. Lewin on Trusts 265, (24 Law Lib.); Willis on Trusts 136, (10 Law Lib.); Ex parte Rigby, (19 Vez. 463). And this principle enters into all cases depending on the discretion and judgment of the trustees in contradistinction to acts of a mere ministerial nature. The former requires the concurrence of all the trustees; the latter may be performed by one. The contract in question is without doubt one of the former description, and consequently comes within the general principle. And the only doubt is whether there are circumstances in the case which make it an exception. It may be admitted on the authority of Osborne’s Case, (5 Whart. 267), that if the contract had been made by both the assignees, it would have bound the fund; but the question is whether one of the trustees without any authority from his co-trustee, can bind the estate. And that this cannot be appears from the principles above stated, unless there are some circumstances attending the case which make it an exception from the general rule. The validity of the contract is put on the ground of necessity and the benefit which the fund derived from the agreement. It is said that the act of the assignee in this instance was not so much in furtherance of the trust as to prevent its utter frustration by a sacrifice of the property. The exercise of such a power is inherent in each of the trustees from necessity, and being for the advantage of the cestui que trust, the assent of the co-trustee would, if necessary, be presumed, in order to sustain a procedure essential to the continued existence of the trust, at least in the absence of an express negative, on the ground that it is the duty of each of the trustees to do everything proper and necessary to the promotion of the interest of the cestui que trust, and equity in the absence of proof to the contrary will take it for granted he has so done.
It is not my intention to deny the justice of the abstract principles asserted by the court, but it seems to me they do not apply, because there is no room for the presumption of any acquiescence or consent to the contract; for the proof is that the co-trustee was not present when the agreement was made, nor has any consent, either previous or subsequent, been shown, nor is any pretended to have existed. It is the naked case of one of two trustees making an important contract without any authority whatever from the other to act for him. Nor do we perceive any necessity whatever for the agreement. The co-trustee was in the immediate vicinity
This view of the case makes it unnecessary to consider the objection to the competency of Joseph Phipps.
The decree of the court ordering $500, one year’s rent, to be paid to the estate of Elisha Phipps is reversed.
Decree reversed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.