Lerch v. Stichter
Cases that cite this one
1 later published case cites this decision.
- Haddington Italian American Club License (Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas 1956)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The 33d section of the act of July, 12, 1842, abolishing imprisonment for debt, directs that a defendant whose body is not subject to be taken, in execution under the act, shall, in order to obtain an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, stay of execution, or an adjournment of the hearing of his case, give a bond or recognizance, “ conditioned that no part of the property of the defendant, which is liable to be taken in execution, shall be removed, secreted, assigned, or in any way disposed of., except for the necessary support of himself or family, until the plaintiffs demand shall be satisfied, or until the expiration of ten days after such plaintiff shall be entitled to have an execution issued on the judgment obtained in such cause, if he shall obtain such judgment;” and if the condition be broken, the act goes on to give the plaintiff a remedy on the bond or recognizance. In the case on hand, such a recognizance was given, for stay of execution after judgment recovered. Before the stipulated stay expired, an execution, at the suit of another creditor, swept away the property of the defendant, and thus baulked the first creditor of his remedy by execution. The court below was of opinion this was no violation of the condition, inasmuch as the second execution was not the act of the defendant. But this determination fails to give full effect to the terms of the recognizance. Literally taken, it prohibits every disposition of the defendant’s goods, (except for necessaries) and we think it plain, this literal meaning is in harmony with the spirit and object of the act. If this were not so, instead of affording protection to the vigilant creditor, as. doubtless was its object, it would almost certainly secure his defeat, where the defendant happened to be insolvent, by exciting the action of other creditors, who would have nothing to do but enter bail for stay of execution, and then issuing process themselves secure the fruit of their stratagem. Or, the debtor himself, prompted by the feeling, too apt to be engendered by the legal pursuit of
The construction intimated is strongly countenanced by the provision of the 35th section, to the effect that after a defendant has given the bond required by the 11th section of the act, “he shall not sell, assign, or dispose of any part of his property, which is not exempt by law from execution,” &c. Here is a marked change of condition, which cannot be ascribed to accident. This in terms makes the bail liable for all interferences with the property levied. Had not a difference been intended, it is impossible to believe this striking change in the language of the same statute could have occurred.
These considerations leave us without doubt that bail for stay of execution under this act, is bound to account for the goods of the defendant, after the expiration of the stay, as against all the world; and if he fail to do so, he must answer in their value; a levy and sale, under subsequent execution, excuses him not.
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.