The doctrine of charitable uses is inapplicable to a question like the present. Had the ancestor of the plaintiffs conveyed the property as a gratuity to be used in a particular way, they might have had a plausible case on the cessation of the user; but he conveyed it for its value, by an absolute deed, to persons who executed a declaration of trust, not for his benefit, but to vest the equitable ownership in the county. After that, it is impossible to conceive of a dormant interest in him. The two deeds, though executed at the same time, were as diverse as if the latter were a conveyance of the legal title to a stranger, with whom the grantor in the first could not be in privity. There could be no resulting trust, for every part and particle of the grantor’s estate, legal or equitable, present or prospective, had passed from him and was paid for. Nor was the estate granted a base fee. It was unclogged with conditions or limitations. The ancestor received a full consideration for it; and the plaintiffs cannot rescind the bargain.

Judgment affirmed.