McCahan v. Wharton

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
McCahan v. Wharton, 121 Pa. 424 (Pa. 1888)
15 A. 615; 1888 Pa. LEXIS 676
Clark, Gordon, Green, Paxson, Sterrett, Trunkey, Williams

McCahan v. Wharton

Opinion of the Court

Opinion,

Mr. Justice Paxson:

We are asked not only to reverse this case without a venire, but also to enter a judgment for the plaintiffs. Just how we are to do this in view of the fact that there was a verdict for the defendants below, we are not informed. There is the further difficulty that this was ap action of covenant, and the narr is not printed in the paper book of plaintiffs in error as required by the rules of court. We do not know, therefore, with any certainty, what breaches of covenant were assigned, nor what the issue was in the court below. We might guess at it, But that is not our province.

We would hesitate to Reverse a case so defectively presented and might well affirm the judgment for this reason. A careful examination of it as presented,,however, fails to disclose any substantial error. It is true the learned judge below fell into a slight inaccuracy in that portion of his charge in which he said that “no other covenant preceding this one required them to develop the iron ore.” This, however, was entirely harmless, as the entire covenants in the lease were submitted to the jury in a manner free frojn objection. If the defendants’ witnesses are to be believed there was not ore enough on the property to justify the defendants in expending any money upon it. There was also evidence that within the time limited the *437defendants .abandoned tlie property and so notified the plaintiffs. It was immaterial that the notice was given to the attorneys of plaintiffs, as one of the plaintiffs admitted, when upon the witness stand, that he had been informed of the notice by the attorney in question. Under these circumstances no question of the authority of the attorney arises, and the plaintiffs’ repudiation of it is not material.

Nor do we think the court committed any error in its construction of that part of the agreement which refers to the failure to give up possession of the premises by July 1, 1884, as evidence that there was sufficient ore on the premises to pay the royalty. The learned judge held this not to be conclusive, but an admission which threw the burden of proof upon the defendants to show that there was not ore there in paying quantities. The defendants assumed this burden and succeeded in convincing the jury that the ore was not there. And if it was not there, the plaintiffs could not be required to pay the royalty, under Muhlenberg v. Henning, 116 Pa. 138, and other cases there cited.

Judgment affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
JOHN McCAHAN v. H. S. WHARTON
Cited By
11 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
1. When the verdict in the court below was for the defendant, the Supreme Court will not reverse the judgment thereon and enter judgment for the plaintiff, especially when the pleadings, showing the issue on which the case was tried, are not furnished. 2. A judgment will not be reversed for a slight inaccuracy in a portion of the charge, when the case was otherwise fairly presented and the testimony adduced showed that the error was harmless. 3. A provision in an ore-lease that if the lessees did not quit possession and surrender the leasehold on or before July 1, 1884, “the very act of their refusing or neglecting to quit possession and surrender this lease is hereby agreed on their part that there is a sufficient quantity of ore on said property to pay the royalty of $1,200 on February 1, 1885,” etc., is not to be held conclusive upon the lessees. 4. Such provision in the lease was to be construed as an admission which threw upon the lessees the burden of proving that there was not ore in paying quantities upon the leasehold, and if not there, the lessees were not liable for the stipulated minimum royalty: Muhlenberg v. Henning, 116 Pa. 138.