Van Horne v. Clark

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Van Horne v. Clark, 126 Pa. 411 (Pa. 1889)
17 A. 642; 1889 Pa. LEXIS 889
McCollum, Mitchell, Paxson, Sterrett, Williams

Van Horne v. Clark

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam:

We are unable to see any valid objection to the competency of Ruth Clark as a witness. It is true, she was the defendant in the ejectment, and her father, from whom she derived title, was dead. She was not called to testify against his title, but in support of it; or, to speak with greater accuracy, to prove the consideration she paid for the land. Neither party to the record is acting in a representative capacity. The plaintiff below was not prejudiced by the death of William J. Clark; if either party was prejudiced, it was the defendant. The case does not come within any of the exceptions of any of the acts of assembly relating to the competency of witnesses, nor do we think it comes within their spirit. The object of our various statutes upon this subject was to produce equality. As was said in Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297: “ Evidently it was the true purpose of the statute to close the mouth of him who is adversary to the deceased assignor.” See Hess v. Gourley, 89 Pa. 195. The witness here was not within the mischief intended to be remedied, and is not therefore excluded by it. The remaining assignments do' not require discussion. There was sufficient evidence of a valuable consideration for the deed to be submitted to the jury.

Judgment affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
C. VAN HORNE v. RUTH CLARK
Cited By
5 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
(a) In an action of ejectment the plaintiff claimed under a sheriff’s deed for the land in dispute sold as the property of the defendant’s father, then deceased. The defendant claimed under a deed from her lather, executed prior to the entry of the judgment on which the sheriff’s sale to the plaintiff was made, the consideration expressed therein being nominal. 1. The defendant was a competent witness, notwithstanding the death of her grantor, to prove that the real consideration for the deed was her personal services rendered at the request of her father, under an express contract with him by which she was to he paid'therefor. 2. Her deed offered in evidence described the tract conveyed by hut three courses and distances, and, though by a different tract number, as containing the same number of aeres as the land in dispute was described in the writ: such deed, with the testimony of witnesses identify the land conveyed with that in dispute, was properly admitted in evidence. 3. The defendant having testified that at the time the deed was made her father agreed to allow her $1.7)0 per week for her services in taking care of him and her mother, and . that the deed was made in payment therefor, her testimony with that of other corroborating testimony was properly submitted to the jury.