City of Erie v. Brady

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
City of Erie v. Brady, 127 Pa. 169 (Pa. 1889)
17 A. 885; 1889 Pa. LEXIS 1097
McCollum, Mitchell, Paxson, Sterrett, Williams

City of Erie v. Brady

Opinion of the Court

Opinion,

Mr. Justice Mitchell:

The affidavits in these cases are uncandid and evasive, being really affidavits to conclusions of law, carefully stated so as to appear to be facts.

The defence seems to bo without merit either on the facts or the law, but on the affidavits the learned judge was clearly right in refusing judgment, as they contain positive averments, as of facts, of certain matters that if true would be a good defence. The principal of these, which is all we need notice in detail, is the unqualified averment in the supplemental affidavit, paragraph 6, that the councils passed the ordinance *176“ without causing the engineer of the city of Erie to make an estimate of the total cost of such improvement, particularly stating the items and. the cost of each, and causing the same to be attached to said ordinance before and at the time of its passage.”

This, if true, was a good defence. The act of May 1, 1876, P. L. 94, expressly declares that any ordinances authorizing the grading or paving of streets, etc., before compliance with the requirements of the act as to such estimate, etc., shall be void. And this defect is not cured as to the present'claims by the act of May 17, 1887, P. L. 118, as is very satisfactorily shown by the learned judge below.

It appears clearly by the admissions of the argument, both oral and printed, that in fact the provisions of the act of 1876 were complied with formally by the city engineer, but that the estimate made by him was not such an estimate as defendants chose to consider that the law required. It is hardly necessary to say that the proper mode of stating this defence was to set out a copy of the estimate, and an averment or suggestion of its defects, so that the court might determine whether or not it met the requirements of the law. Instead of doing this, the defendants not only assumed the responsibility of swearing to their own conclusions of law, but stated them as positive averments of fact, in the unqualified language already quoted. Such a course cannot be too strongly reprobated. But as this is all we have on the record, notwithstanding the concessions of the argument, the allegation in the affidavit must for the present purposes be taken as true.

The other averments, notably those in relation to the advertisement of the ordinance, and to the change of grade, and the statement that the contract departs from the ordinance by providing for sewers, appear to be equally devoid of truth, and made with equal recklessness, but it is not necessary to discuss them further, as it is clear that on the face of the affidavits there is a good defence, and that is sufficient to prevent judgment.

Order discharging rule for judgment affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
CITY OF ERIE, FOR USE v. JOHN C. BRADY
Cited By
6 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
i • A municipal ordinance providing for the paving and curbing of a city street, enacted subsequently to the aet of May 1, 1876, P. L. 94, is null and void, if before its passage the councils have not caused an estimate to be made of the total cost of such improvement, maps, etc., thereof, and had the same attached to the ordinance, as required by said act. 2. When such an estimate has not been previously made and attached to the ordinance at its passage, the detect is not cured by the provisions of § 2, act of May 17, 1887, P. L. 118, that “ all taxes heretofore levied in any cities of the third, fourth and fifth classes, .... and all assessments, made in pursuance of the ordinances of such cities, are hereby made valid.” 3. When it appeared that in fact the provisions of the act of 1876 were formally complied with by the city engineer, but that the estimate made was not such as the defendant considered sufficient, the proper method to state the defence was to set out a copy of the estimate with an averment of the defects in it.* 4. If, however, the defendant assumed the responsibility of being sworn to matters which were admittedly conclusions of law, but which were stated in unqualified language as positive averments of fact, such a course cannot be too strongly reprobated: per Mr. Justice Mitchell.