Sticker v. Overpeck
Sticker v. Overpeck
Opinion of the Court
If there is anything the matter with this ease it is the verdict, and with that we have nothing to do. There was evidence to justify the learned judge in submitting to the jury the question of a substantial compliance with the contract. Such evidence may be generally anticipated, now that the plaintiff is a competent witness. Whether the jury should, under all the evidence in the cause, have found such substantial compliance, was a matter which was for the consideration of the court below upon a motion for a new trial. It does not concern this court; hence we express no opinion upon it. A careful examination of the case fails to disclose error in those portions of the charge contained in the first six assignments. The seventh and eighth assignments allege error in the admission of evidence. As they are not in compliance with the rule of court they have not been considered.
Judgment affirmed.
See Hawes v. O’Reilly, 126 Pa. 440 ; Battles v. Sliney, 126 Pa. 460.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- MARY J. STICKER v. H. M. OVERPECK
- Cited By
- 7 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- (a) In an action on an entire contract, whereby the plaintiff agreed to do the plumbing in the defendant’s houses and to furnish the materials, including specified kinds of closets and heaters, the whole to be done in a workmanlike manner, the evidence as to the plaintiff’s compliance with the contract being conflicting, it was not error for the court to instruct the jury in the general charge and in answer to points: 1. That if the plaintiff acted honestly, and in good faith substantially performed the contract, that was sufficient, and, if in certain minor particulars the contract was not complied with, the jury might deduct from the plaintiff’s damages, the difference between the value of the work as it was turned over to the defendant, and what it would cost to have it completed in strict conformity with the contract. 2. Nor, in such case, was it error to charge, substantially, that, under the plea of set-off the jury might set off against the plaintiff’s claim the loss and damage, if any, occasioned to the defendant by the plaintiff’s default, but that they could not render a verdict for the defendant for an excess of such loss and damage over the plaintiff’s claim, if they should find such excess.