Commonwealth v. Hulings

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Commonwealth v. Hulings, 129 Pa. 317 (Pa. 1889)
18 A. 138; 1889 Pa. LEXIS 957
Clark, Ctjriam, Green, McCollum, Mitchell, Paxson, Sterrett, Williams

Commonwealth v. Hulings

Opinion of the Court

Per Ctjriam :

The first three specifications of error are to the findings of fact by the learned judge below. As this was a reference under the act of 1874, the findings of fact by the court are not reviewable here, further than the finding of a jury is reviewable upon a writ of error in a common law proceeding: Jamison v. Collins, 83 Pa. 359; Lee v. Keys, 88 Pa. 175; Brown v. Dempsey, 95 Pa. 243; Commonwealth v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 104 Pa. 89; Bradlee v. Whitney, 108 Pa. 362. In such cases we can only hear and determine questions of law arising upon bills of exception to the rulings of the judge relating to the evidence or law.

With these questions of fact out of the case there is nothing left of any importance. It certainly was not error for the court to hold (see fourth assignment) that the delay of these proceedings for over five years after the destruction of the bridge, was a reason why a chancellor should hesitate to interfere with the defendant’s franchise, and, when considered with the other facts in the cas'e,; a conclusive reason why he should not do so. We find nothing which would have justified the -learned judge below in entering a judgment for the commonwealth upon the quo warranto.

Judgment affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
COMMONWEALTH v. M. HULINGS
Cited By
6 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
1. Where a cause is submitted to the decision of the court, under the act of April 22, 1874, P. L. 109, the findings of fact are notreviewable, and the Supreme Court can hear and determine only questions arising upon bills of exception to the rulings of the trial judge, relating to the evidence, or to the law.* (a) Hulings, Simcox and Stone were the owners of a ferry franchise, and in 1878, Simcox, for himself and Hulings, agreed to aid in establishing a toll-bridge company, and in consideration of one fifth of its capital stock, to discontinue the ferry when the bridge was opened, reserving the right to re-establish if the bridge should be destroyed in two years. (b) The toll-bridge company opened their bridge in 1879, and kept it open until its destruction in February, 1881, during which time the ferry was not operated, the boats and rope being removed; but the ferry was re-opened soon after the bridge was destroyed, and in December, 1886, a proceeding by quo warranto was instituted to test the right to continue the use of the franchise. 2. In such case, it was not error for the court to hold that the delay to institute the quo warranto proceedings for over five years after the reopening of the ferry, and the fact, inter alia, that there was nothing in the case to show that since then it had failed to supply the needs of the public, entitled the defendants to judgment in their favor.