Union Type Foundry v. Kittanning Ins.
Union Type Foundry v. Kittanning Ins.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION,
The plaintiff was thrown out of court on the merest technicality. It claims to have been incorporated in June, 1884, under the laws of the state of Illinois, and has been doing business since that time in the city of Chicago. On May 7, 1887, it procured a policy of insurance from the defendant company on its property, for the term of one year. This policy was issued to the “ Union Type Foundry,” that being the plaintiff’s corporate name. The premium money was paid by a check drawn in the name of the “ Union Type Foundry,” payable to the Kittanning Insurance Company. A fire occurred in January, 1888, by which the property insured was destroyed. In all the correspondence and intercourse between the plaintiff and the insurance company, in consequence of the fire, the plaintiff was known only as the “ Union Type Foundry.” The defendant failing to make good the loss, a suit was finally commenced against it in the name of the “ Union Type Foundry.” To this suit the defendant put in an affidavit, alleging as the only
The first, second, and seventh assignments of error are sustained. The remaining assignments are not important in our view of the case.
The judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- UNION TYPE FOUNDRY v. KITTANNING INS. CO.
- Cited By
- 4 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- [To be reported.] (a) The defendant, an insurance company, issued a fire policy to “the Union Type Foundry.” In an action brought in that name on the policy, the company filed an affidavit of defence setting up a failure to furnish proper proofs of loss, and afterwards pleaded “ non-assumpsit, payment, payment with leave and the facts contained in affidavit of de-fence : ” 1. After a compulsory arbitration under § 8, aot of June 16, 1836, P. L. 719, an appeal from the award, and several continuances of the case, it was too late to file upon the trial a plea of nul tiel corporation, thereby for the first time questioning the legal existence of the plaintiff, and such plea ought not to have been allowed: Murphy v. Chase, 103 Pa. 260. 2. Whether, in an action brought by a corporation since the passage of the procedure act of May 25, 1887, P. L. 271, the statutory plea of non-assumpsit will put the plaintiff to formal proof of incorporation, when the want of incorporation is not pleaded by the defendant, or not in proper time, adhuc sub judice.*