Graft v. Loucks
Graft v. Loucks
Opinion of the Court
OpinioN,
It is scarcely necessary to add anything to the careful and exhaustive opinion of the learned judge of the court below. He has reviewed all the points of contention, and has discussed fully and justly the entire substance of the testimony.
George Graft, a witness for the plaintiff, who was present at the delivery of the deed, says there were two deeds delivered, one from J. S. Loucks for $125, and one from P. S. Loucks for $150; that they were both presented at the same time, and then adds, “ Graft kept deed of J. S. Loucks, but handed the other back; some talk of the deed not calling for the amount of laud purchased; don’t know what Peter said; ho took the deed, and I think was to make it satisfactory; think Peter was to have it next Saturday.” Jacob S. Loucks, another witness for the plaintiff, and a brother of the defendant, testified that there were two lots sold, one by him for $125, and one by his brother for $150; that he was present when both deeds were delivered; that the purchase money of both lots was deducted from the amount owing to the plaintiff; and then, as to the deed from Peter, said: “ Graft did not keep this deed; handed it back to Peter; claimed deed did not call for lines as they had been located; did not give amount of ground;
On the question of the payment of the purchase money, the testimony is equally clear. The plaintiff had been working for the defendant and his brother, burning for them a large quantity of bricks. The brother testifies that the purchase money for both lots sold to the plaintiff was taken out of the money they owed him. There was no doubt as to how this was in re
It thus appears that the terms of the original contract are established by clear, precise, and indubitable testimony; that the contract was so far executed as that the vendor and others interested in the title, executed, acknowledged, and delivered a deed for the property to the vendee, which was subsequently handed back to the vendor for a temporary purpose, which the vendor has not fulfilled, but bas kept the deed permanently and wrongfully; that the whole of tbe purchase money was paid at the time the deed was tendered and delivered, and yet remains in the possession of the vendor; and, further, that possession of the premises was delivered by the vendor to the vendee, who has ever since retained it. In these circumstances, we have no hesitancy in saying that all the requirements of'the law have been complied with, and that the plaintiff is now entitled to have from the defendant as perfect a deed as the defendant can give him. There is no merit in the allegation of laches. After repeated
Tbe decree of tbe court below is affirmed, and tbe appeal is dismissed at tbe cost of tbe ap- • pellant.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- JACOB L. GRAFT v. PETER S. LOUCKS
- Cited By
- 5 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- [To be reported.] (a) It was found, on bill filed for specific performance, that the terms of a parol contract for the sale of land were established by clear, precise, and indubitable testimony; that it had been so far executed that the purchase money was paid, possession passed, and a deed delivered to the vendee which, for a temporary purpose, was handed back to the vendor, who thereafter wrongfully kept it: 1. Under these circumstances, all the requirements of the law were complied with; and, notwithstanding the taxes had been assessed to and paid by the vendor with the vendee’s assent, and that the vendor had married and the land had risen in value before the bill to enforce the contract was filed, the vendee was entitled to have from the vendor as perfect a deed as the latter could give him. 2. In such case, the handing back of the deed to the vendor having been in April 1, 1873, and the vendee, after repeated unsuccessful efforts in 1874 and 1875 to get his deed again, having filed his bill in March, 1876, there was no merit in an allegation of laches in such filing; and, though there was great delay in the subsequent proceedings, the plaintiff could not be charged therewith when its causes did not appear.