Lynch v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co.
Lynch v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co.
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
There is a wide distinction even in equity between forfeitures for failure of punctual payment of money where time is of the essence of the contract and where it is not. If parties choose to stipulate for matters as essential, it is not for courts to say they are not so, but in the absence of a clear agreement for materiality courts will look into the nature of the transaction, and be governed by the real bearing of the facts upon the intentions and rights of the parties. Hence it is a settled general rule that where time is not stipulated as essential and a forfeiture for nonpayment of money, or other matter that admits of accurate and full compensation, is provided as a mere penalty whose object is to enforce performance of another and principal obligation, equity will relieve against it, and will not permit it to be used for a different and inequitable purpose. Story, Equity Jur., sec. 1816. In the present case time is not of the essence, for although the nature of oil and gas territory and of contracts affecting them, is such that in general time is essential, yet in the lease in question there is a stipulated rent payable for delay in putting down a well, and no date is expressed for the payment of such rent, it being left to fall due by operation of law at the close of each year. The main purpose of the lease was to have the land tested and developed, and to secure for the lessor the profits of such development. It was his interest therefore to have a producing gas well, for it would immediately nearly double his rental. The appellant paid the rent for several years, postponing the effort to get gas, for reasons not appearing but of which no complaint was made, until July, 1892. It then began drilling, and prosecuted the work in good faith, at a large expense, until it produced gas in paying quantity about the end of August. This as already said was in plaintiff’s interest. He lived on the premises and saw the daily progress of the work. On August 20, when the well was near completion, a year’s rent fell due, and payment was overlooked by the lessee. On August 26, plaintiff told the contractor to take away his machinery, and on the next day gave formal notice of his election to enforce a forfeiture.
As it is quite clear upon the undisputed facts that a court of equity would have enjoined this forfeiture, the judge should have directed the jury as requested in defendant’s third point.
Judgment reversed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Abraham L. Lynch v. Versailles Fuel Gas Company
- Cited By
- 23 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Contract—Time essence of contract—Forfeiture—Equity. Where time is not stipulated as essential and a forfeiture for nonpayment of money, or other matter that admits of accurate and full compensation, is provided as a mere penalty whose object is to enforce performance of another and principal obligation, equity will relieve against it, and will not permit it to be used for a different and inequitable purpose. Time—Lease— Oil lease—Forfeiture—Notice—Estoppel. An oil lease stipulated for rent payable for delay in putting down a well. No time was specified for the payment of this rent, and it accordingly fell due by operation of law at the close of each year. The lessee paid the rent for several years without drilling a well. He then began operations, and at large expense succeeded in obtaining oil in paying quantities. The lessor lived on the land, and saw the work going on. When the rent fell due, the lessee by an oversight failed to pay it. Six days afterwai’ds the lessor notified the contractor to take away the machinery, and on the following day declared his election to forfeit the lease. The lessee expended a considerable sum of money between the time when the rent was due and the time of the attempted forfeiture. There was some evidence that in previous years the rent had not been paid upon the precise day when due, but the evidence was not strong enough to establish a usage between the parties. Held, that under the circumstances of the case the lessor was bound to give notice before declaring a forfeiture, and that his action had been neither prompt nor conscionable.