Commonwealth v. Carson
Commonwealth v. Carson
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
The defendants moved to quash the indictment, alleging in support of their motion that it was not authorized by or in conformity with the information, that it did not state in what coqnty the offences were committed, and that the counts were repugnant. The learned court below, without expressing any opinion in regard to these objections, quashed the first count on the ground that it did not state whether the offence charged in it was committed “in the night time or in the day time,” and sustained the second count. It may be inferred from this ruling that the court did not consider the objections tenable, and such an inference would accord with our conclusion based on an examination of the information and the indictment. It is manifest from the brief opinion filed that the court thought the
In drawing an indictment under the statute it is well to use its language, but as “ feloniously ’’ includes “ maliciously ” the substitution of the former for the latter is not fatal to the count in which it appears. There was no misjoinder of counts because the matters charged in the second were a part of the affair to which the first related. The fact that the information did not contain as full and specific a statement of the offence as the indictment did, furnished no ground for quashing the latter or-either count of it. If there was room for surprise an applieacation for time to prepare to meet the graver charge would have been allowed.
The order quashing the first count in the indictment is re versed and a procedendo is awarded.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Commonwealth v. J. M. Carson
- Cited By
- 32 cases
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- Syllabus
- Criminal law — Felonious entry—Indictment—Information—Pleading and practice—Act of April 22, 1863. Under the act of April 22, 1863, §2, P. L. 531, it is not necessary to state, in an indictment for entering a dwelling house with felonious intent, whether the offence was committed in the night time or in the day time. An indictment charged that the defendants “ willfully and feloniously did break and enter the dwelling-house of M. J. Baker, there situate, with intent the goods, chattels and property of M. J. Baker, in the said dwelling-house then and there being, then and there feloniously to steal, take and carry away,” and “ did then and there the goods, chattels and property above mentioned in the said dwelling house, feloniously steal, take and carry away.” Held, (1) that the indictment did not charge the crime of burglary at common law, as it did not show that the felonious breaking was done at night; (2) that the indictment was good under the act of April 22, 1863, P. L. 531; (3) that the fact that the commission of the felony intended was also charged in the count, did not vitiate the count; (4) that it was a good count for larceny; (5) that the use of the word “ feloniously” instead of the word “ maliciously” was not fatal to the count. • In the above case the second count of the indictment charged that the defendants “ did willfully and maliciously break, injure and destroy a certain window,” in the dwelling house of M. J. Baker. Held, that there was no misjoinder of counts, since the matters charged in the second were a part of the affairs to which the first related. The fact that the information upon which an indictment is based does not contain as fulband specific a statement of the offence as the indictment, furnishes no ground for quashing the indictment.