Gish v. Brown
Gish v. Brown
Opinion of the Court
If the deed of March 4, 1882, from John S. Gish to his son Henry B. Gish, the plaintiff, for the land in controversy, had been admitted without competent evidence of its execution and delivery, there would be some merit in the first specification of error, but such was not the fact. The execution of the deed was not seriously questioned, and the testimony as to its delivery, as claimed by the plaintiff, was quite sufficient to justify the submission of that question to the jury. There was, therefore no error in admitting the deed in connection with the testimony as to those facts. Nor was there any error in admitting the testimony complained of in the second to fourth specifications inclusive. It requires no argument to show that it was both competent and relevant to the issue. It tended to show title in the plaintiff.
Without reciting or summarizing the testimony referred to, it is sufficient to say that it was fairly submitted to the jury, with full, correct and adequate instructions as to its effect, etc., and the verdict has, by necessary implication, established the facts that the deed in question was duly executed and properly delivered.
There is no error in the learned judge’s answer to defendant’s third point for charge, referred to in the fifth and sixth specifications; nor, in that part of his charge recited in the seventh specification. The eighth specification is not according to rule and is therefore dismissed.
We find nothing in either of the assignments of error that requires extended comment.
Judgment affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- H. B. Gish v. Jacob Brown
- Cited By
- 13 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Ejectment—Deed—Delivery—Evidence. A deed to the plaintiff by his father is properly admissible in evidence in an action of ejectment, where it has been proved that it was properly executed and delivered by the father in his lifetime to a friend, with words indicating an intent to convey the land to his son, and that after the father’s death the person having the custody of the deed gave it to his attorney,1 who delivered it to plaintiff. Where the grantor delivers a deed to a third person with absolute direction to hold until the grantor’s death, and then to deliver the deed to the grantee, who is grantor’s son, a delivery to the son by the custodian of the deed after the grantor’s death will pass title to the son. Practice, S. 0.—Assignments of error—Evidence. An assignment of error to the exclusion of testimony will not be considered where the assignment fails to set forth the offer, the objections thereto, and the ruling of the court thereon.