Vail v. Osburn
Vail v. Osburn
Opinion of the Court
This appeal is from the decree of August 10, 1895, continuing the preliminary injunction, theretofore granted, “ without prejudice to the rights of Gleason & Sons,” who were not then parties to the proceeding, but who on August 29, before this appeal was taken, were made parties defendant by amendment of the bill.
The subject-matter of the contract set out in the bill is within the jurisdiction of the court; and, if some of the defendants, nonresidents of the county, have not been regularly served with process, it is not too late to correct the error, if any there be. In the present undeveloped condition of the case we are not prepared to say there was any error in continuing the injunction. In view of this, and of the further fact that new parties defendant have been added, we think a reversal of the decree would be unwarranted. We purposely abstain from any expression of opinion as to the technical questions raised by appellants. In the present state of the case it is neither necessary nor proper that we should do so.
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed, with costs to be paid by appellants.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- George A. Vail, John J. Lapham, Lewis H. Lapham and Samantha V. Lapham, Copartners as H. G. Lapham & Co., and The Elk Tanning Company, a Corporation v. Robert C. Osburn, J. Van Reed and Solomon Shaffer
- Cited By
- 10 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Equity — Jurisdiction—Specific performance. A contract to cut and deliver bark to the owners of a tannery from trees in proximity to the tannery may be specifically enforced by a court of equity, when it appears that the supply of bark in the vicinity is limited, and loss of the bark specified in the contract would cause irreparable loss to the tannery. Equity — Service of process — Act of April 6, 1859, sec. 1, P. L. 387. Where a court of equity has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a contract, but some of the defendants, nonresidents of the county, have not been regularly served with process, on account of the order of court not following the requirements of the act of April 6, 1859, the defect in the order may be corrected after a preliminary injunction has been granted and continued, and an answer filed. Equity — Preliminary injunction — Specific performance. On a bill for the specific performance of a contract to sell bark to the owners of a tannery, the bill charged that the defendants had refused to cany out the contract. The' court granted a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from selling and delivering bark to other parties, and this injunction was subsequently continued. After the date of the order continuing the injunction, a third party who claimed that the defendants had sold the bark to him, intervened in the case. Held, that the decree continuing the injunction should be affirmed.'