In re Estate of Jackson
Cases that cite this one
20 later published cases cite this decision.
- Singer's Estate (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934)
- American Nat. Ins. v. Scott (Tex. App. 1924)
- Fidelity Trust Co. v. Bobloski (Pa. 1910)
- Lownes Estate (Bucks County Orphans' Court 1954)
- Bagley's Estate (Bedford County Orphans' Court 1943)
- Jackson's Estate (Philadelphia County Orphans' Court 1938)
- Peters v. Peters (Pa. 1932)
- Shaffer v. Hummel (Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas 1930)
- Little's Estate (Pa. Super. Ct. 1927)
- Carter's Estate (Pa. 1916)
- Loughrey's Estate (Pa. 1915)
- Lausell v. American Railroad (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1911)
- Lausell v. American Railroad Co. (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1911)
- McKinley v. Martin (Pa. 1910)
- Long's Estate (Pa. Super. Ct. 1909)
- Hermann's Estate (Pa. 1908)
- Throckmorton v. Thompson (Pa. 1907)
- Richards v. Bentz (Pa. 1905)
- Daniels's Estate (Pa. Super. Ct. 1905)
- McNally v. Metropolitan Life Insurance (Pa. Super. Ct. 1901)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
In the case of Jessup v. Smuck, 16 Pa. 327, relied on by the appellant, the son whose estate was held to be limited was treated in the will as living at a period subsequent to the death of the testator, and the terms in which the contingency and limitation were expressed were considered as repelling the inference that the testator contemplated the death of the first taker before his own. The principle that the devise of a fee absolute in the first instance cannot be reduced to an estate for life unless the intention to do so is clear is recognized in the opinion, and the case is not in conflict with the rule of construction so often stated in our cases from Biddle’s Estate, 28 Pa. 59
This construction, we think, gives effect to the actual intent. The real estate devised by the testator to his daughter was worth about $6,200.- The stock on the farm was owned by the son. The testator’s daughter had always lived with him, and for ten years had had sole charge of his house. Her proportion of the charges imposed, the payment of the legacy to another son-and the maintenance and education of the testator’s grandson, amounted to more than the value of a life estate in one half of the farm, and unless this construction be given she takes nothing of value under the provisions of a will certainly intended to be of substantial benefit to her. The implication arising from the words “ what remains ” is that she had an unlimited power of disposal, which is inconsistent with the existence of a valid limitation over. In the first instance he gives her a vested estate unlimited in point of duration, and that the subsequent provisions were meant to become operative only in the event of her death in his lifetime is quite as probable as any other supposition. There is at least no clear evidence of a contrary intent, and the law regards with disfavor conditions subsequent divesting or reducing a vested estate.
The assignments of error are overruled and the order of the orphans’ court is affirmed at the cost of the appellant.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.