Schmidt v. Baizley
Schmidt v. Baizley
Opinion of the Court
An examination of the testimony in this ease convinces us that the findings of fact made by the learned court below were entirely justified, indeed required, by the evidence before the court. We do not see how any other or different findings could have been made with any propriety. The conclusions of law are so necessarily consequent upon such determinations of fact that they cannot be controverted. We are very clearly of opinion that the decree dismissing the bill was correct, and we affirm it upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law expressed in the opinion. It would have been more suitable if the findings had been expressed in separate and numbered clauses so as to present each one independently and distinctly, and such is the usual practice. We do not think, however, that the omission to do this is a cause of reversal, as the findings are expressed .severally, and are easily capable of separate consideration.
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Henry C. Schmidt, Edward A. Schmidt and Frederick W. Schmidt, trading as C. Schmidt & Sons Charles J. Gallagher, trading as Gallagher & Burton Henry B. Grauley, judgment creditors of Alexander Obermeyer and Margaret A. Obermeyer, his wife, in their own behalf and the said Alexander Obermeyer in behalf of his said judgment creditors v. Rudolph R. Baizley and John Baizley
- Cited By
- 4 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Equity—Equity practice—Findings of fact. While it is the better practice for the findings of a court of equity to be expressed in separate and numbered clauses so as to present each one independently and distinctly, an omission to do this is not a ground for reversal, if the findings are expressed severally, and are easily capable of separate consideration. Deed—Fraud—Evidence—Equity. T11 a bill in equity to declare two conveyances of real estate null and void, plaintiffs, who were the grantor, his wife and his judgment creditors, alleged that the deeds were made to the defendants not as absolute conveyances, but in trust to protect the creditors of the grantor. The averments ■of the bill were sustained by the testimony of the grantor and his wife, but they were contradicted by the defendants who averred that the convoyanees had been made in part payment of a debt. The grantor admitted in his testimony that he was largely indebted to the defendants at the date of the conveyances. The evidence showed that the grantor, contemporaneously with the execution of the conveyances, leased the premises from defendants, at a fixed rental; that he paid 'the rental as it matured; that, he afterward executed another lease, and that he subsequently on applying for a liquor license averred under oath that the defendants were the owners of the premises. He also in two statements of account acknowledged the ownership of the defendants, and in other litigation filed two affidavits in which he made averments respecting the purpose for which the deeds were executed wholly inconsistent with the allegations in the bill. Held, that the bill was properly dismissed.