Koch v. City of Williamsport
Koch v. City of Williamsport
Opinion of the Court
It was established by evidence which was credible and not contradicted that the plaintiff was deserted by her husband nearly a year before the accident, and that from the time of his desertion of her she received no support from him and had not even seen him. It must therefore be conceded that under the circumstances shown she had an undoubted right to maintain her suit as she had instituted it. The desertion was a sufficient answer to the first, second and seventh specifications.
We are not convinced of error in the admission of Russell’s testimony or in the rejection of the written agreement between Walz and Stead. We therefore dismiss the third and fourth specifications. The defendant’s first and second points were included in the fifth and sixth specifications and the answers to them were satisfactory and free from error. It was clearly stated in the charge to the jury that there was no evidence that the city had actual notice of the obstruction in the street. In the absence of evidence of actual notice it remained to inquire whether the city was properly chargeable with constructive notice. The instructions relating to constructive notice and what constituted it, and to negligence and proximate cause were plain, comprehensive and impartial. Under these instructions and upon the evidence in the case it was for the jury to determine whether the cause of the injury received by the plaintiff was the negligence of the city. The case was fairly tried in the court below. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff and we see no valid reason for reversing the judgment entered thereon.
Judgment affirmed.
Reference
- Cited By
- 4 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Married women—Desertion—Right of a deserted wife to maintain action for personal injuries—Act of June 11, 1879, P. L. 126. Under the act of June 11,1879, a married woman who has been deserted by her husband may maintain a separate action in her own name to recover damages for personal injuries to herself, and if she establishes the fact of desertion at the trial, it is immaterial that she has not averred it in her statement. Negligence—Gity—Obstruction in street—Notice—Evidence. In an action against a city to recover damages for personal injuries caused by an obstruction in a street, it is not improper to admit in evidence as bearing upon the question of notice, the fact that all members of the police force of the city just before the injury complained of were frequently instructed to report obstructions in the street. Negligence—Gity—Obstruction in street—Evidence. In an action against a city to recover damages for personal injuries caused by an obstruction in the street, an agreement between the contractor who placed the material in the street and an adjoining owner for whom the material was to be used, is inadmissible. Negligence—Gity—Obstruction in street—Proximate cause. In an action against a city to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an obstruction in a street, where it appears that the driver of the carriage in which plaintiff was riding drove into the obstruction, and just as he did so, a street car came along and collided with the carriage, it is not improper for the court to charge that it was “ a question of fact for the jury as to what was the proximate cause of the injury in this case; if it were by reason of the stone pile being there, and by reason of that that the driver of the conveyance drove into it just as a street car came along, and it all occurred by reason of the stone pile being there, the city would be liable if it were guilty of negligence.” Plaintiff having been injured by driving in the night-time into a pile of stones, of the presence of which in a public street no warning was given by a light, and the testimony showing that the stones had been in the street for at least three days, the court committed no error in submitting the question to the jury as to whether the city had constructive notice of the obstruction.