Opinion by

The learned judge below found the fact of a partnership between plaintiff and the defendant Simpson under the name of Samuel Simpson & Company. There was testimony on which such finding was based, and we have not been convinced that we should reverse it. But it was a finding of a partnership as between the parties, and it by no means follows that a partnership was established as against creditors. The complainant’s son, J. Harry Lyons was burdened with debts from previous business operations which prevented his engaging in *306business in bis own name. The arrangement with defendant whatever it was, was intended to secure to J. Harry Lyons all the benefits of a partnership without its liabilities to his creditors. Whether it was legally valid for that purpose as against such creditors, could only be determined by proceedings to which the creditors were parties. The decree therefore in the suit between plaintiff and defendant that the arrangement was valid and that appellant was answerable as partner to complainant, was not an adjudication as against the attaching creditor, and if the latter should be successful in his suit appellant would be compelled to pay twice. From this risk he has a right to be protected, and the fact that the attachment was based on information given by him did not take away that right. If his belief that J. Harry Lyons and not the complainant was his partner was in good faith, and it is not found to the contrary, then he owed no duty to complainant which made his act one of bad faith, however unfriendly, and it could not deprive him of his right to protection against an attaching creditor with a valid claim.

The decree for an account is affirmed, but is modified so that there shall be no final decree for payment of any balance found due by appellant until the attachments now pending against him as garnishee shall have been finally determined, and in case the plaintiff, after due notice shall neglect or refuse to appear in such attachment proceedings and defend her title, and there shall be a recovery against the appellant, then with leave to the appellant to apply to the court to open the decree and relieve him against any .double liability in such manner as equity may require.