Miller v. Lewistown Electric Light, Heat & Power Co.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Miller v. Lewistown Electric Light, Heat & Power Co., 212 Pa. 593 (Pa. 1905)
62 A. 32; 1905 Pa. LEXIS 669
Brown, Elkin, Fell, Mitchell, Potter

Miller v. Lewistown Electric Light, Heat & Power Co.

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam,

Whether the defendant’s conduct in lowering the lamp or leaving it in charge of a boy while the wires were down was negligent, was a question for the jury. There could be no custom of the defendant which would excuse it for exposing the public to what the jury should find was unnecessary danger.

The question of proximate cause was also for the jury. The fact that the horse was going at a rapid pace was not so unprecedented that the jury might not fairly find that the defendant was bound to anticipate and look out for it, and that the chain of events was continuous up to the injury to plaintiff.

As to the plaintiff’s alleged contributory negligence, a pe*595destrian is not necessarily negligent if he leaves the sidewalk and crosses the street at other than the regular crossings. In so doing he may encounter risks that he would not on the sidewalk, but unless they are manifest it is for the jury not the court to say that his act was negligent.

Judgment affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
Miller v. Lewistown Electric Light, Heat & Power Company
Cited By
5 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
Negligence—Electric light company—Proximate cause—Contributory negligence. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries it appeared that the defendant suspended an arc light in a borough at the intersection of several streets. On the evening of the accident, one, of the defendant’s employees lowered the lamp to repair it, and left it in this position under the charge of a boy while he went to secure a file. In his absence a one-horse sleigh was driven at a x-apid pace around the comer. Plaintiff’s testimony tended to show that the horse struck the wires of the lamp, and that the wires in turn struck him and injured him. When the accident occurred plaintiff was attempting to cross the street at a point other than the regular crossing. Held, that the case was for the jury, and that a judgment and verdict for plaintiff should be sustained. A pedestrian is not necessarily negligent if he leaves a sidewalk and crosses the street at other than the regular crossings. In so doing he may encounter risks that he woxxld not on the sidewalk, but unless they are manifest it is for the juiy, not the court, to say that his act was negligent.