Opinion by

In refusing the amendment asked for the court below was entirely right, but for another and quite different reason than that given in the opinion filed by the presiding judge.

Conceding the power of the court to allow a proper and adequate amendment, under the facts presented, the amendment proposed fell short of these conditions. What was asked for was leave to amend by inserting in the original petition the names of the sureties who were expected to join in the - required bond.

The inadequacy of the offer is apparent when it is considered, that being made, the averment that each of the sureties “ is a bona fide owner of real estate in -said county, worth over and above all incumbrances the sum of $2,000 ; that it would sell for that much at public sale, and that the applicant is not *275engaged in the manufacture of vinous, spiritous, malt or brewed liquors,” would stand unverified by the affidavit of petitioner, since, while this statement appeared in the original petition, the names o£ the sureties not being given, it was without meaning and had no place in the jurat of the applicant. Not only so, but for like reason, the certificate of the twelve reputable, qualified electors, “ that they have reason to believe that each and all the statements contained in the petition are true,” would be lacking as well, no such statement of fact appearing in the petition when they certified thereto.

The effect of the proposed amendment being to introduce in the petition other facts than those stated therein, when the jurat and certificate were made, the impropriety of allowing such change need not be discussed.

The case turns on whether any amendment was necessary, or, in other words, whether the application as made was sufficient. In Lis opinion filed the learned judge says: “We would permit this amendment and grant the license if we believed we had the power to do so.” His conclusion that he had not the power rests entirely upon the omission of the names of the sureties from the petition, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant, in the judgment of the court, had complied with every requirement of the law, with the single exception referred to. The language of the court admits of no other meaning. The applicant then had satisfied the court, and in the way pointed out by the statute, that he was free from all legal disability in this connection; that the place to be licensed was necessary for the accommodation of the public, and that the sureties on his bond were sufficient.

The inquiry here is: Did the omission of the names of the sureties from the petition in any way defeat or interfere with the purpose of the statute ? If it did, such omission would necessarily be fatal to the proceeding.

The purpose of the several requirements as to what shall appear in the petition for a license to sell intoxicating liquors, is not the same as to each. Some are manifestly intended to acquaint the public with certain facts with respect to the pending application in advance of the hearing. The publication of these is required to be made in two newspapers to be designated by the court, The fact that publication of the names of *276the sureties is not required suggests that the chief, if not the only, purpose in requiring the names of the sureties to appear in the petition was to aid the court in finally passing upon the adequacy of the bond that is necessary in all cases, since it is expressly provided that the license shall not issue until the applicant shall have executed a bond in the penal sum of $2,000, with two sufficient sureties to be approved by the court. With the names of the sureties appearing, and their sufficiency attested by the oath of the applicant, and the certificate of the required number of reputable electors, in the absence of anything to excite doubt or suspicion or contest, the court ordinarily can feel satisfied in approving the bond without inquiring further.

The importance of such requirement, in aid of the court, will be readily understood by those whose duty it is to pass upon such questions. If it be said that the sufficiency of the bond being proper matter for exception, as much as any other fact set out in the petition, the requirement in this particular can be none the less for public information, the answer is, it may be, but, that information was not to be gained by publication, but by inspection of the papers filed. The law must so contemplate, otherwise it would have required publication of the names of the sureties.

Now an inspection of the papers filed in this case could not have failed to disclose the names of the sureties. The bond was filed with the application, perfected by the signatures of the sureties. Under such circumstances how can it be said that any essential requirement of the statute was omitted ?

It .results that the omission of the names of the sureties from the petition, under the peculiar facts in this case, was not a substantial defect and, therefore, ought not to have defeated the application.

The appeal is therefore dismissed, and for the reasons above stated.

The order of the Superior Court is affirmed.

dissenting:

It will be observed that the majority of the court agrees with the court of quarter sessions in refusing the application for an amendment of the petition for the license, and thereby reverses *277the judgment of the Superior Court on that question. This result accords with all the prior decisions of this court, and of the well-considered cases of the quarter sessions throughout the state.

This court, however, affirms the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that no amendment of the petition was necessary, and that the application in its incomplete form was sufficient to warrant the quarter sessions in granting the license. In other words, the majority of the court holds that a license may be granted on a petition which omits the averment of some of the facts which the statute declares it “ shall contain.” This position of the court, in my judgment, cannot be sustained, either on principle or by precedent. It is at variance with the settled practice of every license court of the state. It also violates that provision of sec. 13 of the act of March 21,1806, 1 Purd. 77, which provides that “ in all cases where .... anything is directed to be done by any act or acts of assembly of this commonwealth, the directions of the said acts shall be strictly pursued.”

The Act of May 13, 1887, P. L. 108,1 Purd. 1226, requires the applicant to file a petition and the facts which it shall contain are required by section five to be set out in ten separate and distinct paragraphs. The section provides in its ninth paragraph, inter alia, as follows: “ Said petition shall contain .... Ninth. The names of no less than two reputable freeholders of the county where the liquor is to be sold, who will be his, her or their sureties on the bond which is required, and a statement that each of said sureties is a bona fide owner of real estate in said county worth, over and above all incumbrances, the sum of two thousand dollars, and that it would sell for that much at public sale, and that he is not engaged in the manufacture of spirituous, vinous, malt or brewed liquors.” The petition presented to the quarter sessions to obtain this license omitted to state the names of two reputable freeholders of the county who would become sureties on the bond which the licensee is required to give. The effect of this omission, as correctly held by the majority of the court, was to leave out of the petition all the facts which the ninth paragraph of section five declares it shall contain. Ten days after the day fixed by rule of court for the hearing of the applica*278tion, the applicant ashed leave to amend his petition “ by writing therein in paragraph nine, the names of his sureties, to wit: H. S. Swarner and A. C. Sterner.” This was refused by the quarter sessions and its action is approved by this court. But this court holds'that the license should have been granted on the petition as it was filed, notwithstanding it failed to set forth the facts required by the ninth paragraph of section five of the act of 1887. It will be observed that it is the positive mandate of the statute that the names of the bondsmen and the other facts stated in paragraph nine shall be set forth in the petition. These are facts which the statute imperatively requires the applicant to include in his petition. They are, therefore, jurisdictional facts and their omission from the petition is fatal to the application. If an applicant may neglect or refuse to include in his petition the facts required by the ninth paragraph of the fifth section of the act, he may omit any other facts which the statute requires he shall state in order to confer authority on the quarter sessions to grant the license. So far as it affects the question here involved, it is wholly immaterial what purpose actuated the legislature in requiring the names of the bondsmen and the other facts mentioned in the paragraph to be inserted in the petition. It would not be difficult to show, if necessary, that it is a wise provision and that there are abundant reasons why they should be included in the petition. But it is sufficient to say that the law which authorizes the court to grant the license — and in the absence of a statutory provision no license can be granted in this state — requires the applicant to file a petition, and positively and unequivocally says that “ said petition shall contain ” the facts set out in paragraph nine of section five of the act of 1887.

I regard this decision of the court as most unfortunate. It strikes down the plain requirements of the statute which the legislature, in obedience to the sentiment of the state, enacted, as its title shows, “ to restrain and regulate the sale ” of intoxicating liquors. Step by step the people of the commonwealth, through their representatives, have imposed greater restrictions upon the sale of liquors, and the settled policy of the state, as shown by the legislative enactments upon the subject, has ever been “ to restrain ” the liquor traffic. The present law is the most stringent legislation enacted since we became a *279commonwealth. Recognizing the unquestioned evils of intemperance and desiring to abate them, as far as possible, the act provides certain specific and stringent regulations, deemed necessary to carry out the purpose in view, with which the applicant must comply before he can be authorized by the court to engage in the traffic. It also imposes severe penalties upon those who sell or furnish liquors contrary to its provisions. In the face of this legislation and its obvious purpose, this court by its decision annuls the imperative command of the statute and thereby defeats the clearly expressed will of the people of the commonwealth. This is not judicial interpretation; it is the assumption by the court of legislative authority which has been conferred by the constitution solely upon another and co-ordinate branch of the government. It in effect repeals one of the most wholesome provisions of a statute ordained for the purpose of regulating a traffic which, uncontrolled, is subversive of the morals of the people and endangers the peace and good order of the commonwealth.

I would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, and affirm the order of the court of quarter sessions refusing to grant the license.

I join in this dissent. Potter, J.