Kaylor v. Cornwall Railroad
Kaylor v. Cornwall Railroad
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
In disposing of the assignments of error which relate to the court’s refusal to give binding instructions in favor of the defendant, it is only necessary to advert to a feature of the case, overlooked in the argument, yet quite sufficient in itself to have compelled a submission of the case to the jury. Since the several propositions advanced upon the argument in support of these assignments were framed without reference to this important and qualifying feature of the case, they may be regarded as abstract, requiring no discussion here. Whether a presumption of negligence arises from the mere fact, disassociated from all others in the case, that the telegraph pole with which the plaintiff came in contact was so erected and maintained that between it and the top of the car upon which the plaintiff was engaged, there was a space of only fifteen inches; or whether,
The plaintiff, a brakeman in defendant’s employ, was, immediately before the accident occurred, in his proper place on top of a freight car. To discharge a duty which required promptness and alacrity on his part, viz : to turn the switch and signal approaching trains, — a duty so important in its relation' to the safety of the public and his coemployees, that no peril to himself, arising out of the usual and ordinary conditions, would have excused his disregard of it — he attempted to alight from the moving train, by means of an iron ladder attached for this purpose to the side of the car. While so attempting he was carried violently against a telegraph pole at the side, with the result that he was seriously injured. A like ladder was on the other side of the car where no telegraph poles were to be encountered. Except for these telegraph poles, both sides, under ordinary and usual conditions, were alike with respect to convenience and safety in alighting. There was no rule or regulation requiring the one to be used rather than the other, the employee being free to choose either, determining for himself according to conditions existing at the time. On the day of the accident, when the plaintiff reached the point where he attempted to alight, he encountered unusual and extraordinary conditions, which, according to his testimony, put him to the choice between two methods of alighting, both of which were manifestly dangerous. The defendant company at this point had been relaying its tracks, and had deposited the old rails which had been replaced, in _ the open space at the side of the track on which there were no poles. Plaintiff knew this fact, for on a previous occasion, when these rails were under his observation, he attempted to alight on that side, had fallen on them, and been injured by them. When the accident here complained of'
The record gives no support to the remaining assignment of error. Whether the evidence sought to be elicited from the witness, Dr. Gloninger, would or would not have been competent, need not be considered. The record shows that the witness was interrupted in his answer to the question by a timely objection which prevented him from repeating anything that had been told him by the plaintiff.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
Reference
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- Kaylor v. Cornwall Railroad Company
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- Negligence — Railroads—Master and servant — Brakeman—Choice between dangers. In an action by a brakeman against a railroad company, his employer, to recover damages for personal injuries, it appeared that the plaintiff, in the performance of a duty absolutely necessary, started to alight from a moving train by means of an iron ladder attached for this purpose to the side of a freight car. While so attempting he was carried violently against a telegraph pole which was fifteen inches from the side of the car. The evidence established that except for the telegraph poles on one side, both sides of the car were alike under ordinary conditions, with respect to convenience and safety in alighting. It appeared, however, that the company had been relaying its tracks, and had deposited the old rails on the side of the track on which there were no poles. The plaintiff knew of this fact, and also saw at the time of the accident that the rails were covered with snow. He testified that it was the additional danger resulting from the rails being concealed by the snow that determined him to attempt to alight from the other side, since the danger there was open and exposed and was susceptible of some sort of measurement. Held, that the case was for the jury, and that a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff should be sustained. Evidence — Witness—Hearsay. Where a witness who was about to repeat something that the plaintiff said to him, was interrupted by an objection which prevented him from answering, the Supreme Court will not consider whether the evidence sought to be elicited from him was or was not competent.