Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Girard Trust Co.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Girard Trust Co.
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
This appeal brings before us for construction the second clause of the mortgage of the Delano Land Company to the Girard Trust Company, trustee, dated December 1,
The question here involved, is whether the language of the agreement requires the payment to the trustee of an amount equal to the principal of the bonds, and the interest accrued thereon to such time; or whether it requires the payment of a sum equal to the principal of the bonds, and all the interest which may accrue thereon until the date of their maturity, r If the interpretation first suggested is correct, then the appellant has already made payments sufficient to meet the conditions. If the other suggestion is to be accepted as the proper meaning of the agreement, then a sum largely in excess of that required to pay the bonds at maturity must be paid by appellant to the trustee. The total amount of bonds now outstanding is stated as $1,082,000. It appears from the record that the amount paid in and held by the trustee in the sinking fund, in securities and cash, is now $1,093,655.08. If appellant is compelled to continue further sinking fund payments until the maturity of the bonds in 1932, the additional amount received by the trustee with the accumulated interest thereon, will be,
The decree of the court below dismissing the bill of the plaintiff is reversed; and the bill is reinstated; and it is further ordered and directed that a decree be entered granting to the plaintiff the relief for which it asks in the first and third prayers of the bill, which is in substance, that so long as the trustee has in the sinking fund provided by appellant, securities sufficient to pay all outstanding bonds, and while appellant continues to pay all interest due on such bonds as it accrues, it be relieved from making additional annual payments to the sinking fund; and that so long as these conditions continue, the appellee be enjoined from foreclosing the mortgage for default in the annual sinking fund payments.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority view for the reasons stated in the following excerpt from the opinion of the court below: “On the basis of the conditions existing to-day, the continuance of the payments by the complainant into the sinking fund for a future period of twenty-two years is undoubtedly onerous and apparently unnecessary, but where is there any guarantee that the conditions existing to-day will continue during the next almost quarter century? What may be the market value of the securities in the sinking fund during all of that time? What assurance beyond all question is there of the continuance of the valuation of the coal lands relied upon to-day as a security, upon their assessed valuation of $905,037? If
“It is clear that the trust continues until the bonds are all paid and that those holding them that is 'the registered owners or the legal representatives of the registered owners’ are entitled to hold them until January 1, 1932, and to receive interest thereon from January 1, 1892, at the rate of five per centum per annum, payable in like gold coin, as the principal is to be paid. These payments are to be made without deduction for any tax or taxes which may be payable under any present or future law of the United States of America or of the State of Pennsylvania, .... the company agreeing to pay any such tax or taxes. . . .
“It is the holder of the bonds who is entitled to the security . . . .; the mode prescribed in the said mortage for the recovery of the principal and interest of said bonds being exclusive of all others.
“ The obligation of the complainant beginning with January 1, 1893, and continuing annually thereafter during the continuance of the trust, is to set apart for a sinking fund and pay over to the .... (trustees) .... a sum equal to ten cents per ton for each and every ton of coal of sizes above pea shipped during the preceding year (provided, that in no case shall such sum be less than thirty thousand dollars in any one year), to be appropriated to the purchase of such of the said bonds as
“ Can it be then held that it was the intendment of the parties, that is, of the complainant, of the bondholders to be secured by the mortgage, and of the trustee mortgagee, that the words: 'And when all said bonds shall have been purchased, or when the amount in the hands of the trustee shall be equal to the principal and interest of the bonds then outstanding, the payments into the hands of the party of the second part (the respondent herein) for a sinking fund, as aforesaid, shall cease/ means only the 'interest’ to the date when the amount of the sinking fund equals the amount of the then outstanding principal of the bonds, and that it does not refer to the 'interest’ recited in the first clause, viz.: which is to be paid to the holders of the bonds .... semiannually 'as the same shall become due and payable according to the terms in the said bonds contained and on the days therein respectively mentioned for the payment of the same/ which, as recited in the bonds, is, already shown to be 'interest thereon from the first day of January, 1892, at the rate of five per centum per annum, payable in like gold coin semiannually on the first day of the months of July and January in each year/ until, 'the principal sum of the bond shall become due and payable’ .... on the first day of January, 1932? We cannot so interpret this contract.”
I would affirm the decree as entered.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.