Opinion by

If the rule applicable to bituminous mines as laid down in Wolcutt v. Coal & Coke Co., 226 Pa. 204, applies to anthracite mines, then the question whether Johnson was acting in the dual capacity of mine foreman and superintendent was properly submitted to the jury. The learned counsel for appellant insist that there is a distinction between the Act of June 2,1891, P. L. 176, regulating mining operations in the anthracite field, and the Act of May 15, 1893, P. L. 52, relating to bituminous mines, in so far at least as the duties of a mine foreman are prescribed. A careful examination of the two acts has satisfied us that there is no substantial basis for the distinction attempted to be made. It is a distinction without a difference when the purpose to be served by the statutory requirements of each act is taken into consideration. Protection to the health and lives of those employed in mining operations is the primary purpose of both statutes. Indeed, the phraseology and provisions of both acts in many of their essential and important features are almost identical. Difference in mining conditions in the two fields required the legislation to be adapted to the necessities of mining operations existing in each field. Aside from the provisions relating to these different conditions there is but little, if any, real distinction between the anthracite and bituminous acts. As to the protection intended to be afforded to the health and safety of the men so employed, the duties of the mine foreman are practically the same under both statutes. Certainly there are no such distinguishing features as to justify a court in laying down one rule for a mine foreman in the bituminous field, and an entirely different rule for a mine foreman in the anthracite region. After all, this is more a question of fact than of law. Both statutes clearly contemplate that the underground workings shall be under the exclusive charge and supervision of a mine foreman, and when the mine foreman has the exclusive supervision of the inside workings, the owner is relieved from responsibility for anything *652that may .occur in the mines. In other words, the mine foreman with a certificate of competency from the commonwealth, and a knowledge of the statutory duties, imposed upon him, is answerable for the safe conduct of the mining operations. He should be, and in contemplation of law is, the absolute master of the interior workings of the mine over which he has charge as mine foreman. The character of his duties as mine foreman is not necessarily changed because he may hire or discharge men working under him, or suggest where and in what capacity the men shall work, or how the entries shall be driven, or the mines be developed. He may do all of these things and still be acting in his capacity as mine foreman. Indeed, if he is a competent mine foreman, which the law presumes him to be, he is better qualified to do all of these things’ than anyone else. The test is not the particular acts he may do in connection with the underground workings, but whether he has the charge, control and supervision of these workings to the exclusion of any other authority. When he has this exclusive supervision no one can dispute his authority as mine foreman, and even the owner cannot interfere with the performance of his duties. It is the duty of the mine foreman to see that all the statutory requirements intended to safeguard the health and lives of the men are properly enforced. What the law contemplates is not always done and for this reason confusion sometimes arises on account of divided authority. It sometimes happens that the mine owner does not commit the exclusive charge of the interior workings to the mine foreman, but acting through his superintendent undertakes to exercise authority over certain parts of the interior workings without reference to the duties of the mine foreman. When this is done the owner may be held liable for the negligent acts of his superintendent or those acting under his direct authority. Again, mine owners in some instances, presumably to avoid expense, make use of the same person in the dual capacity of superintendent and mine foreman. This *653results in a divided responsibility and may affect the question of liability in negligence cases. It has already led to an exception to the general rule pointed out by this court in Wolcutt v. Coal & Coke Co., supra. It is always safer and wiser for all concerned to follow the statutory rule which requires the underground workings to be in charge of the mine foreman. However, when this is not done, questions of fact arise which must as a rule be determined by a jury. In the case at bar we have concluded that whether Johnson acted in the dual capacity of mine foreman and superintendent was for the jury and we discover no reversible error in its submission. We cannot agree that the Act of May 29, 1901, P. L. 342, changes the status of a mine foreman. There is nothing in the language used to indicate such an intention on the part of the legislature. The questions of negligence, and of contributory negligence, as well as the credibility of the witnesses, were all for the jury.

There are but two assignments of error, one that the learned court below erred in not giving binding instructions for the defendant, and the other in refusing to enter judgment non obstante veredicto for appellant upon the whole record. There is no assignment as to the manner in which the case was submitted to the jury or as to any specific instruction given by the trial judge. We think the case was for the jury and that all the questions involved in the controversy were fairly and impartially submitted.

Judgment affirmed.