Bryce's Estate
Bryce's Estate
Opinion of the Court
Opinion bt
John Bryce died August 3, 1888, leaving to survive him a widow, Mary Bryce, and four children: Charles K., Robert D., John P. and Ida, who subsequently became the wife of A. C. Shaw. By his will, dated November 16, 1887, he made the following disposition of his residuary estate: “All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, of whatsoever kind or nature, and wheresoever situated or found I do hereby devise and bequeath unto my said wife, Mary Bryce, to have and to hold the same for and during the term of her natural life for her sole use and benefit, [with full power and authority by her will to allot and divide the same, (including my shares or interest in the firm of Bryce, Higbee and Company heretofore devised to my said wife for life) equally, as hereinafter set forth, to and among my four children^ their heirs and assigns, viz: Charles K. Bryce, Robert D. Bryce, John P. Bryce and Ida Bryce, to have and to hold the same to them and their heirs forever. That is to say, my wife in making said equal distribution by her will shall take into' consideration the value at the time of my death of the property hereinbefore specifically devised and bequeathed to my three sons, and shall first give to my daughter, Ida Bryce, her heirs and assigns, property of equal value to that given to each of my said sons, and shall then divide the remainder into four shares as nearly equal as she in the exercise of her best judgment can, giving to each of my said children a share. It being my intention that all of my said children shall eventually as nearly as pos
The intention of the testator, as clearly expressed in the quoted clause of his will was that, upon the death of his widow, his residuary estate, to be enjoyed by her for life, should be divided equally among his four children, whom he named, and, unless the power to allot and divide which he gave to his widow made the interest of each child a contingent one at the time of his death, it undoubtedly then vested. What was the power given to the widow? It was not to appoint generally, and it was not even to appoint to a particular class, for the testator himself had directed where his residuary estate should go. It was a power which merely authorized her to make equal division among the four beneficiaries named by her husband or “their heirs and assigns.” Instead of so allotting and dividing the estate, she, by her will, divided it into three parts, but, as she was utterly without authority to do this, there was no valid exercise of the limited power given to her. She undertook to exclude the estate of the deceased son, but there is nothing in the will of the testator to indicate, even by implication, his intention that the power which he gave her was to be changed or enlarged in the event of the death of any one of the children during her lifetime. On the contrary, he provided in express terms for such a contingency when he directed that his estate should be divided equally among his four children, “their heirs and assigns.” Each child derived title immediately from him, the donor of the limited power given to their mother, and it was his bounty — not hers —that was to be distributed at her death: Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277. Her stewardship over the estate was limited to allotting and dividing it equally among the four children, to each of whom the father had given an interest in it, which vested at the time of his death. This was the correct view of the learned president judge of the court below. The as
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- Wills — Construction—Power of appointment — Invalid exercise of power — Tested and contingent interests. Testator died leaving to survive him a widow and four children, and by will gave his residuary estate to his wife for life, “with full power and authority by her will to allot and divide the same...... equally as hereinafter set forth, to and among my four children, their heirs and assigns,” naming them. Testator further provided that if his wife should die intestate, his property should go to his four named children equally. One of the said children died in the lifetime of the widow, leaving no issue surviving him, and the widow by will appointed the estate which her husband had left to the three living children. Held, the appointment was invalid, as there was a vested interest in all four of the children, and one share should be awarded to the representatives of the deceased child.