Spencer v. Spencer
Spencer v. Spencer
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
On June 10,1912, judgment was entered in favor of the executors of Susan Spencer, deceased, against Ambrose L. Spencer, her son, on a judgment note, bearing date July 16, 1897, signed by the latter, which represented debts owing at the time by the defendant to his mother. On a plea of payment, this judgment was opened by the court below, and the issues involved were submitted to a referee, who decided in favor of the defendant. Final judgment was entered accordingly, and the plaintiffs have appealed.
The referee found, inter alia, the following material facts: Two or three years after the death of Susan Spencer, the note in question was discovered in the office of her attorney, where it had been taken with other papers for safe keeping; but whether the note was placed with its custodian before or after the date of the deed to which we are about to refer is not made plain. It appears that the defendant was heavily indebted, in addition to the debts due by him to his mother, and, on January 26, 1898, he conveyed all his real estate to her. The consideration stated in the deed of conveyance was that Mrs. Spencer did “assume and bind herself to pay the following debts, mortgages, judgments and obligations due from and owing by the said Ambrose L. Spencer,” after which a number of débts were enumerated, including the one from the defendant to his mother represented by the note upon which judgment was entered in this case. The deed expressly declares that “the said Susan Spencer hereby covenants and agrees to and with the said Ambrose L. Spencer that she the said Susan Spencer shall and will pay, or cause to be paid, the aforesaid obligation and debts......and, by the acceptance of this indenture, binds herself, her heirs, executors and administrators, to faithfully fulfill the aforesaid covenant and agreement.” Contemporaneously, the defendant executed and delivered to his mother a bill of
The referee further found that the deed and bill of sale covered practically all the property the defendant possessed, and that, by mistake of the scrivener, it also included some lands which he had previously sold and conveyed to others, as well as some to which he never had title; that “on several occasions in 1898 and 1899, after the transfer by the defendant of his property to his mother, Frank E. Spencer, his son, who knew about the giving of the note in suit, as well as the arrangement about its payment, went to his grandmother and asked for the note, but failed to get it. Once she went so far as to hunt for it in her safe, but returned without it, saying that it was probably destroyed, but that it would not cause his father any trouble because he had paid it by turning over his property to her”; finally, that, “after the transfer to her of the property mentioned in the deed and assignment of January 26, 1898, Mrs. Spencer assumed and exercised the rights of ownership over it.”
On the foregoing findings, the referee concluded, as a matter of law, that Mrs. Spencer, by her acceptance of the dfeed, “assumed the payment of said obligation and indebtedness represented by said judgment note of July 16, 1897, and the same thereby became discharged and extinguished,?5 and that the transaction constituted “an accord and satisfaction of said obligation and indebtedness represented by said judgment note”: Savage et al., v. Everman, 70 Pa. 315.
We are not convinced of error in either the findings or
The property transferred by the defendant to his mother was not for the purpose of, or to be used for, the payment of his debts, but was deeded to her in fee, she, in consideration of the conveyance, agreeing to assume payment of such debts; and the evidence as a whole indicates that she took and treated the property as her own, even though she subsequently permitted the defendant to use part of the real estate and surrender to his wife a portion of the personal estate. In conclusion, we agree
The assignments of error are all overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.