Wright's Estate
Wright's Estate
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
The testator, William Wright, by his last will bearing date 14th December, 1866, gave his entire residuary estate in trust for his daughter, Mrs. Martha Conway, for life. This direction follows:
“And from and immediately after the decease of my said daughter the said trust to go and vest in her child or children who shall then be living, and the issue of any one or more who may have deceased, their several and respective heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, share and share alike, as tenants in common, freed from all trusts. The issue of any deceased child or children, however, if more than one, to take only such share or shares as the parent or parents would have been entitled to if living.”
Of the several codicils which follow we are concerned only with the second, executed some two years after the original will, and which reads as follows:
*108 “Whereas, in and by my said will, after directing the payment of my debts, and making certain specific bequests, I have given and devised all my residuary estate
Three of the grandchildren survived the determination of the life estate, namely, William W. Conway, Thomas A. Conway, since deceased, and here represented by Ellen Conway his executrix, and Martha Conway,' wife of W. Spencer Harvey. Another grandchild, Sallie W. Conway, survived the testator but died before the determination of the life estate. She it was to whom the testator by the codicil to his will gave the premises No. 850 on west side of Seventh street, Philadelphia. By her last will Sallie W. Conway devised her entire estate to her sister Martha W. Harvey above named. Mrs Harvey claiming under this devise title to the said premises sold and conveyed the same to Leah M. Katz, who thereupon mortgaged the same to the said Martha W. Harvey and the Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives in the sum of $5,250.00. William W. Conway, a surviving son of the life tenant, and Ella Conway, executrix of the will of Thomas A. Conway also a son who survived the life tenant, but since deceased, claiming that the gift over upon the death of the life tenant, Martha W. Conway, was limited to those of her children surviving this event; that Sallie W. having predeceased her mother the entire estate vested in the three surviving children William W., Thomas and Martha W.; and claiming further that the real estate devised by testator to Sallie W., and which it is agreed is of the value of $5,550.00 remained part of the residuary estate for the purpose of computation and distribution under the will, and that Sallie W., taking no share therein, for the reason that she had not survived, said real estate is chargeable in their favor with two-thirds of the value, the sum of $1,750.00 to each of them, presented their petition to the Orphans’ Court setting forth their several claims as we have stated them, praying that a decree be entered accordingly. The matter wás regularly proceeded with and resulted in a decree
The consideration that prevailed with the court was the conclusion reached that any other disposition of the matter than that made, would be “contrary to the general and controlling intention of the testator which was to provide for an equality of distribution per stirpes among the grandchildren and the issue of deceased grandchildren living at the death of the life .tenant.” With this conclusion, so far as it relates to the purpose and intention of the testator with respect to the gift in remainder, we entirely agree. By repeated expressions in his will the testator makes it too clear for dispute that the gift over after the determination of the particular estate was to the remaindermen as tenants in common. The error of the court was in subjecting to this scheme of equality other property than that which belonged to the residuary estate. By the codicil above recited testator takes from the residuary estate in which it had been placed by the original will that certain piece of real estate which by the codicil he devises to his granddaughter, Sallie W. This was a direct and immediate gift of so much of his estate to this particular grandchild, dependent on nothing, contingent on nothing, and therefore an indefeasible title to so much of the estate vested immediately upon the death of the testator in Sallie W. There is nothing in the codicil to warrant an inference that the devise to her was an abridgment of her right to participate in the remainder of his estate in the event that she survived her mother'; but the codicil makes it clear that in case she should survive, and be one of the takers, then and in that event, the scheme of equality should operate; and to this end he directs an appraisement of both residuary estate and the property devised to Sallie W., to ascertain the proportion the gift to Sallie W. bore to her full equal share in the whole, making the devise to her subject to a charge in favor of
It follows that the real estate devised to Sallie W. was subject to charge only in case of a contingency that never arose, and the decree here entered must be reversed. It is accordingly so ordered.
Reference
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Wills — Specific devises — Residuary clauses — Construction—Intention. A testator bequeathed his residuary estate in trust for the benefit of his daughter for her life and directed that upon her death “said trust to go to and vest in her child or children who shall then be living and the issue of any one or more who may have deceased, their......heirs, etc., freed from all trusts, the issue of any deceased child or children, however, if more than one to take only such share as the parent or parents would have been entitled to if living.” By codicil testator devised a house and lot to a granddaughter in fee simple and directed that upon the termination of the life estate the house and lot and the residuary estate should be separately valued and the united value be taken as the basis of an equal distribution among the grandchildren and if the valuation of the house and lot were less than a grandchild’s equal share of the whole estate, such granddaughter should be entitled to receive such an amount from the rest of the estate as would make her share equal to that of the other grandchildren, but if the house and lot should be greater in value than an equal share of the estate, the excess in value which she had received should be a charge thereupon in favor of the other grandchildren. The granddaughter survived the' testator, but died before the termination of the life estate having devised the house and lot by will; the surviving grandchildren claimed that the house and lot remained part of the testator’s residuary estate for the purposes of computation and distribution and was subject to a charge in their favor, being of greater value than their respective shares of the residuary estate. Held, that the provision for the valuation and appraisement of the house and lot, and of the residuary estate was to take effect only in the event that the granddaughter to whom the house and lot were devised should survive the life tenant; that by her death her interest in the residuary estate was divested and that her interest in the house and lot could not be charged in favor of the surviving grandchildren.