Opinion by

This is the fourth time the subject of this litigation has been presented in this court. 1 The question is whether three notes made by and secured by a mortgage given by defendant telephone company to Jerome K. Packard November 1, 1927, are valid. The mortgagor-maker alleges want of consideration in violation of Article XYI, section 7, of the Constitution. The first suit was a bill by the mortgagor against Packard’s administrator for the cancellation of the notes and the satisfaction of the mortgage on the ground stated. The bill was dismissed: Bradford County Telephone Co. v. Young, 329 Pa. 433, 198 A. 96. The second suit was by scire facias issued by the mortgagee’s administrator to recover on the mortgage; in defense, the mortgagor alleged the same ground of invalidity which had been set up in the former suit. Belated questions were considered and the record was remitted to afford plaintiff opportunity to show that, in the circumstances apparently existing, the notes and mortgage represented distribution of defendant’s surplus sufficient to support the obligations: Young v. Bradford County Telephone Co., 341 Pa. 394, pp. 398 et seq., 19 A. 2d 134. The third proceeding followed after the record was remitted. The *92 learned court below, on plaintiff’s application in tbe sci. fá. ■ proceeding, ordered that “. . . tbe defendant ■ disclose to-tbe plaintiff tbe office or place where plaintiff, bis counsel and accountant may examine tbe books, records and inventories relating to tbe financial affairs of tbe defendant company from its beginning to tbe execution of tbe mortgage in question, and allow plaintiff to examine and make copies of sucb of same as be desires, and especially to exbibit to plaintiff and allow bim to examine and copy tbe following:

“(a) Tbe minute books of tbe defendant company;

“(b) Tbe journal or journals of tbe defendant company;

“(c) Tbe ledgers of tbe defendant company;

“(d) Each and all of the inventories of tbe defendant company from its beginning to tbe giving of the mortgage in question. . .” Defendant appealed from that interlocutory order and, no statute providing for sdch"'appeal, it was quashed.

Packard’s administrator then filed a bill, tbe fourth proceeding, alleging tbe creation of tbe obligations, default, tbe issue of tbe scire facias to foreclose, and averring tbe need of documents in defendant’s possession. After preliminary objections were overruled, defendant answered on tbe merits. Plaintiff then filed tbe petition which resulted in tbe order assigned for error on tbe present appeal. In argument, it was stated that this petition was filed to enforce tbe right granted by Equity Rule No. 35. 2 By the order appealed from “. . . tbe *93 defendant is required and directed to permit plaintiff’s counsel to examine at its office where the books, inventories, records and papers are kept so much of the same as will enable the plaintiff to properly amend his bill by giving a more accurate and definite description of the particular books, records, inventories and papers sought by the bill for discovery.”

The record does not call for discussion of the scope of Equity Rule 35. The order is too general to be allowed and at the same time too indefinite to be enforced. 3 Judging from the record which was considered in the case reported in 341 Pa. 394, 399, 19 A. 2d 134, there should be no difficulty in sufficiently describing relevant documents apparently adequate to make out a prima facie case. The plaintiff is entitled to have that evidence and defendant may be required to produce it. The information furnished to the Public Service Commission 4 which we must assume to be an accurate statement of the facts, goes far, if not all the way — a matter we leave open until it is argued in this court — toward establishing, as admissions, a prima facie case for the plaintiff. Certainly that evidence suggests pertinent interrogatories which might have been made part of the bill (cf. Yorkshire Worsted Mills v. Nat. Transit Co., 325 Pa. 427, 190 A. 897) and which would have required disclosure of relevant matter without the subsequent proceedings by rule to show cause leading to the order now complained of. We must also add that we have no doubt if the parties go to trial on the scire facias and by subpoena duces tecum require the production of the. evidence referred to above, the documents will be produced *94 at the trial and that, if time for their examination or for the subpoena of additional evidence becomes desirable, the learned trial judge will suspend the trial as often as is necessary while the examination is in progress and, meanwhile, will supervise the examination and adequately protect the rights of both parties.

The appeal, being from an interlocutory order, is quashed.