National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia
National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
The present appeals challenge the validity of an ordinance of December 9, 1952, of the City of Philadelphia and question its applicability to the various taxpayers involved in these proceedings.
It has become a mere platitude to state, what has so often been proclaimed, that courts- are concerned, not with the wisdom of legislation, but with the right of the legislative body to enact it, — not with policy but with poioer.
The ordinance is entitled in part: “An Ordinance to provide revenue by imposing a mercantile license tax on persons engaging in certain businesses, including manufacturing, professions, occupations, trades, vocations, and commercial-activities in the City of Philadelphia.” It levies an annual tax on wholesale and retail dealers or vendors, manufacturers and all other persons engaged in-business, at the rate.'of 3 mills on each dollar of the annual gross volume of business transacted. “Gross volume of business”, is defined to mean, with certain exceptions, gross receipts, including both cash and credit transactions.
In the argument on these appeals an attack was made upon this legislation on the ground that the title of the ordinance is constitutionally defective and that the terms of the ordinance itself are vague and uncertain. Those criticisms, however, were apparently not seriously pressed, and, in any event, they do not merit serious discussion. Another complaint urged was that the ordinance does not limit itself to the scope of the usual mercantile license tax because, it is alleged, such taxes have “historically” been imposed only upon merchants, whereas this ordinance purports to tax also persons otherwise engaged. But, whether that fact be true or not, it is certainly wholly irrelevant because the sole question is whether the City has the power to impose the tax upon such “additional” persons and not whether preceding acts or ordinances have included them.
The Act of August 5,1932, special session 1932, P. L. 45, being the so-called “Sterling Act,” gave authority to the council of any city of the first or second class,
Household Finance Corporation, another of the appellees, claims exemption from the City tax because, as a corporation, it pays annually to the Commonwealth a corporate net income tax under the Act of May 16, 1935, P. L. 208, as reenacted and amended, and, as a foreign corporation, a franchise tax under the Act of June 1, 1889, P. L. 420, as amended.
Household Consumer Discount Company, another of the appellees, claims exemption from the City tax because, as a corporation, it pays annually to the Commonwealth a corporate net income tax under the Act of May 16, 1935, P. L. 208, as reenacted and amended, and, as a domestic corporation, a capital stock tax under the Act of June 1, 1889, P. L. 420, as amended. Both Household Finance Corporation and Household Consumer Discount Company also pay to the School District of Philadelphia an annual tax on gross receipts under the Act of May 23, 1949, P. L. 1669, as reenacted and amended.
The Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, the Western Saving Fund Society of Philadelphia, the Beneficial Saving Fund Society of Philadelphia, and Saving Fund Society of Germantown and its Vicinity, appellees, claim exemption from the City tax because they each pay to the Commonwealth an annual tax on their net earnings or income under the Act of June 1,1889, P. L. 420, as amended. They also pay to the School District of Philadelphia an annual tax on gross receipts under
The court below held that because of these various payments all of these appellees were relieved from payment of the City tax. We are not in accord with this conclusion.
In the first place, as far as the payments made to the School District of Philadelphia are concerned, it is sufficient to say that in McClelland v. Pittsburgh, 358 Pa. 448, 57 A. 2d 846, we held that a tax imposed for the benefit merely of a local political subdivision, and not for general State purposes, is not to be regarded as a State tax within the meaning of that term in the “Tax Anything” Act of June 25, 1947, P. L. 1145, which, as previously stated, contained a limitation on the authority of the municipal legislative body similar to that embodied in the Sterling Act. This ruling was followed in Federal Drug Co. v. Pittsburgh, 358 Pa. 454, 57 A. 2d 849.
In the second place, as to the payments made to the CommonAvealth of capital stock taxes, corporate net income taxes, foreign corporation franchise taxes, and taxes on net earnings or income, it need merely be pointed out that all those taxes have been held, many times, to be property taxes. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Linn, who cited many previous authorities so holding, the capital stock tax was again declared in Murray v. Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 166, 71 A. 2d 280, 284, to be a tax on the property of the corporation, and so likewise (following Blauner’s Inc. v. Philadelphia, 330 Pa. 342, 198 A. 889, and Philadelphia v. Samuels, 338 Pa. 321, 12 A. 2d 79) the corporate net income tax (p. 169, A. p. 286), the franchise tax (p. 170, A. p. 286), and (following Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 187, 181 A. 598, 601) a tax on net earnings or income (p. 175, A. p. 289). On the other hand, the authorities are equally
We hold, therefore, that corporations otherwise sub-' jeet to the city mercantile license tax are not exempt therefrom by reason of the provisions of the Sterling Act merely because they pay property taxes to the Commonwealth. But these appeals require careful consideration of claims to exemption from the tax imposed by the City ordinance based on another reason than that heretofore discussed, namely, the payment to the Commonwealth of alleged “license fees,” the Sterling Act providing that the council of the city shall not have authority to levy a tax on a privilege, transaction, subject or occupation “which is now or may hereafter become subject to a State tax or license fee.” The City earnestly argues that this prohibition should not be held applicable because, it alleges, the City had the power to impose a mercantile license tax under the wide authority granted it by the Act of August 25, 1864, P. L. 1030, which act, it is claimed, is still in force, and the Sterling Act gave the City no additional power in that respect; it is argued that the limitation contained in the Sterling Act on the City’s authority to tax should be deemed applicable only to those powers given by the Sterling Act which had not previously existed, and therefore not to this mercantile license tax. We cannot subscribe to this proposition. Canned to its logical extreme, it would mean that the city could impose many other taxes even though they duplicated, not merely license fees, but revenue-producing taxes of the Com
The real problem in this connection is to determine whether, in any given instance, a charge exacted by the State and designated as a “license fee” is really a license fee, because, as pointed out in Flynn v. Horst, 356 Pa. 20, 27, 29, 51 A. 2d 54, 58, the name given it by the legislature is not controlling. A true license fee is defined in Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 347 Pa. 555, 560, 32 A. 2d 914, 917, as “A charge which is imposed by the sovereign, in the exercise of its police power, upon a person within its jurisdiction for the privilege of performing certain acts and which has for its purpose the defraying of the expense of the regulation of such acts for the benefit of the general public; it is not the equivalent of or in lieu of an excise or a property tax, which is levied by virtue of the government’s taxing power solely for the purpose of raising revenue.” The distinguishing features of a license fee are (1) that it is applicable only to a type of business or occupation which is subject to supervision and regulation by the licensing authority under its police power; (2) that such supervision and regulation are in fact conducted by the licensing authority; (3) that the payment of the fee is a condition upon which the licensee is permitted to transact his business or pursue his occupation; and (4) that the legislative purpose in exacting the charge is to reimburse the licensing authority for the expense of the supervision and regula
Two cases decided by this court make the distinction entirely clear. One is Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Pittsburgh, 360 Pa. 360, 62 A. 2d 49. The Milk Control Law of April 28, 1937, P. L. 417, stated the. purpose of its enactment to be that of regulating and controlling the milk industry in the Commonwealth, for the protection of the public health and welfare, and for the prevention of fraud. It vested in the Milk Control Commission power to supervise, investigate and regulate the entire milk industry of the Commonwealth and provided that they could enter and inspect all places and equipment where milk or any product thereof was being produced, stored, processed or otherwise handled. It required all milk dealers to be licensed and it established-license fees to.be charged by the Commission for milk-dealers on a yearly -basis; these fees ran-through- an - elaborately graded schedule from a charge of-$1.00 if the dealer produced or brought-within the Commonwealth-during the year a daily average not exceeding .20 pounds of-milk to a charge of $5,000 where such-daily average exceeded 1,000,000 pounds. ; In the Pittsburgh Milk Co. case it was held-that these. were true-license feesandthat the appellee .in that case, whose average daily quantity of milk was -between- 25,000. and 50,000 pounds, and who
A different result was reached in the case of Armour & Company v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 69 A. 2d 405. There the Act of May 28, 1915, P. L. 587, as amended, is labeled, in part, an act to protect the public health by regulating and licensing the manufacture, handling, storage, sale and possession of meat and meat-food products. It provided for examinations by the Department of Agriculture of all establishments where meat-food products were prepared, stored or sold, or in which slaughtering or meat packing was carried on, and it required persons carrying on such operations to obtain an annual license and pay to the department at the time the application for registration and license was filed an annual fee of $10 for each establishment operated. We held that the fee thus exacted was not a true license fee within the meaning of that term in the “Tax Anything” Act of June 25, 1947, P. L. 1145. We said, pp. 113, 114, A. p. 407: “It would be wholly absurd to suppose that the charge of $10 imposed by the 1945 Act was intended by the legislature to constitute a license fee in the sense thus indicated, especially in view of the tremendous size of the industry involved and the elaborate inspections which its regulation requires. On the contrary, the charge is obviously one designed to cover merely the clerical expense of registration and issuance of the license certificate. It is of the same nature as the f 1 permit fee imposed by the Cigarette Tax Act of May 13, 1947, P. L. 215, as to which we said, in Rice Drug Co. v. Pittsburgh, 360 Pa. 240, 244, 61 A. 2d 878, 880, that ‘Clearly the imposition of this nominal charge was not intended to be an excise tax for the privilege of selling cigarettes.’ It is of the same nature also as the annual fee of $2 for a mercantile license prescribed in section 3
In view of these decisions and of the principles therein enunciated it becomes necessary, then, to consider separately the case presented in each of the present appeals to determine whether the fees paid by them to the Commonwealth fall within the Pittsburgh Milk Co. case or the Armour & Co. case,— in other words, whether the fees they pay are, or are not, true license fees within the meaning of that term in the Sterling Act.
In our opinion these charges assimilate the case to the Armour case, for it is difficult to conceive that the merely nominal fee of $2 exacted from an agent or of $10 from a broker, was intended to cover the entire probable cost of properly regulating the business of such agents and brokers — a regulation so necessary and so
National Biscuit Company, appellee in No. 214 January Term 1953, is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of bakery products; as the operator of a bakery it is duly licensed under the Act of May 22, 1933, P. L. 912, as amended. The title of that act states, inter alia, that it is for the purpose of protecting the public health and regulating the inspection, maintenance and operation of bakeries and premises, stores and shops connected therewith, and the manufacture and sale of bakery products. It provides for the maintenance of clean and sanitary bakeries and for the purity and wholesomeness of bakery products. It gives to the Department of Agriculture permission to inspect bakeries and their operation, to forbid the continuance of any violations of the act, and to suspend or revoke the license issued to the bakery. It exacts an annual fee of $5 for bakeries using less than 100 barrels of flour per week, of $10 for bakeries using 100 barrels and less than 200 barrels of flour per week, and $20 for bakeries using 200 barrels or more of flour per week.
We are of opinion that the National Biscuit Company case is similar in nearly all respects to the Armour
The Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, the Western Saving Fund Society of Philadelphia, the Beneficial Saving Fund Society of Philadelphia, and Saving Fund Society of Germantown and Its Vicinity, appellees in No. 216 January Term 1953, are corporations engaged in the business of conducting mutual saving funds. They are subject to the supervision of the Department of Banking of the Commonwealth under the Act of May 15, 1933, P. L. 565, as amended. That Act directs the Department of Banking to examine all such institutions at least once each year including a complete review of their property and the operation of their business, and for that purpose authorizes the Department to examine and investigate their books, papers and affairs. The Department may order them to cease any violation of law or the conduct of their business in an unsafe or unsound manner. Instead of exacting a “license fee” eo nomine, the act provides that all the expenses of the Department of Banking shall be charged to the institutions supervised by the Department in such equitable amounts as
Household Finance Corporation, appellee in No. 215 January Term 1953, is a foreign corporation engaged in the business of making small loans of |300 or less under authority of the Act of June 17, 1915, P. L. 1012, as amended, having 57 small loan offices in the State of which 14 are in the City of Philadelphia. The act provides that the Secretary of Banking shall at least once a year investigate the business and affairs of such corporations in order to ascertain the condition of their business and whether it has been transacted in accordance with law. Such a company must obtain a license from the Secretary of Banking as a condition upon which
The same considerations obviously apply in this instance as in the case of the Saving Fund Societies. Since appellee must pay for whatever expense is incurred by the State in its examinations and investigations of the affairs of, the company, and this in addition to the fee of $100 annually for each of the company’s places of business, which in itself is a substantial and not a mere nominal charge^ it would seem clear that the sums thus paid are -in the nature of true license fees, and therefore that this appellee is exempt from liability under the City’s ordinance imposing the mercantile license tax.
Household Consumer Discount Company, appellee in No. 215 January Term 1953, a subsidiary of Household Finance Corporation, is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of making loans up to $2,000 .under the Consumer Discount Company Act of April 8,1937, P. L. 262, as amended; it has likewise 57 places of business in Pennsylvania including 14 in the City of Philadelphia. The act provides that the Secretary of Banking may at any time investigate the business and affairs of such companies and examine their books and records. In order to transact its business, appellee must obtain a license from the Secretary of Banking, for which it must pay an annual license fee of $100 for each place of business conducted by it. The act provides that all license fees received must be deposited in the State Treasury to the credit of the Banking Department Fund for the use of the Secretary of Banking in administering the act.
Gerald W. Caner, et al., appellants in No. 219 January Term 1953, representing themselves and all other dealers in securities and investment advisers registered under the Pennsylvania Securities Act, and all other members of the Eastern Pennsylvania Group of the Investment Bankers Association of America similarly situated, are engaged in the business of dealing in securities and acting as investment advisers, and are duly licensed as such under the Act of June 21, 1939, P. L. 718, as reenacted and amended. The title of that act states, inter alia, that it is to provide for the registration and regulation of persons in the business of selling and buying securities or advising others as to the value of securities. It provides that dealers and their salesmen, and also investment advisers, must be registered annually in order to permit them to transact their business. There are provisions forbidding certain practices on the part of dealers, their salesmen, and investment advisers. The administration of the provisions of the act is vested in the Pennsylvania Securities Commission, upon whom the duty is imposed to see that the provisions of the act are at all times properly administered and obeyed, and to take such measures and make such investigations as in its opinion will or may detect the violation of any such provisions. The Commission is authorized, after hearing, to revoke the registration of any dealer, salesman or investment adviser if it has reason to believe that the law has been or is about to be violated, or if the dealer, salesman or investment adviser has been guilty of any fraud or fraudulent prac
In the light of the facts thus recited we conclude that the payments thus exacted' of these appellants by the Commonwealth are real “license fees” within the meaning of the Sterling Act.' They are substantial in amount and are imposed as a condition upon the right of the appellants to conduct their business. It is to be noted that dealers are obliged to pay, in addition to their OAvn registration fee, the sum of $15 for every salesman employed by them, and it is reasonable to suppose that the magnitude of the business of such a dealer, and therefore the amount of regulation and examination of his business required, is in likely proportion to the number of salesmen he employs. There would seem in this instance little room for doubt but that the legislative purpose of the fees thus imposed was to reimburse the Commonwealth for the expense of regulating and examining the business and affairs of the licensees. While the charges aré designated in the act as being imposed for “registration certificates,” such nomenclature, as previously stated, is of no moment, since it is the
ORDER
In Appeal No. 234 January Term 1953, the decree of the court below is reversed at the cost of appellee.
In Appeals Nos. 215 and 216, the decree of the court below is affirmed at the cost of appellants.
In Appeal No. 196, the decree of the court below is affirmed at the cost of appellants.
In Appeal No. 219, the decree of the court below is reversed at the cost of appellees.
Incidentally it is of interest to note that the Acts of May 23, 1949, P. L. 1669, and May 10, 3951, P. L. 265, imposing a. similar tax for the purpose of providing revenue for school districts of the first class, are in fact almost as broad as the present ordinance and define “business” and “financial business” in nearly the same language. Also, in the Pittsburgh mercantile license tax which was the subject of discussion in Federal Drug Co. v. Pittsburgh, 358 Pa. 454, 57 A. 2d 849, liability was extended even to persons conducting or operating places of amusement, including theatres, motion picture houses, billiard and pool rooms, baseball and football fields, and a large number of other such places.'
The Act provided that as to cities of the second class it should remain in force only until June 1, 1935.
Similar power was subsequently granted by the so-called “Tax Anything” Act of June 25, 1947, P. L. 1145, as amended, to the duly constituted authorities of certain other political subdivisions óf the Commonwealth, but with' somewhat greater limitátions than those contained in the Sterling Act.
For this same reason the fee of $3 charged in the present City ordinance for each place of business procuring a mercantile license is. obviously a mere registration charge designed to inform the City of the identity of those liable, for the payment of the tax.
Concurring in Part
Opinion by
Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part:
I concur in the illuminating opinion of the Chief Justice as to the validity of the ordinance. The sole concern of this Court is the power of the City Council to malee and enforce enactments. With the wisdom of the ordinance we are not judicially concerned.
I dissent, however, in Appeal No. 196 of J. Alden Tifft et al., Insurance Agents and Brokers. The Act of May 17, 1921, P. L. 789, as amended, 40 PS 1 et seq., empowers the Insurance Commissioner to examine and investigate the affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance. Section 211 of that Act, 40 PS 49, imposes a fee of $10. for insurance brokers and $25. for license in the name of a copartnership or corporation, and a fee of $2. for an agent’s license for each company. I disagree with the majority conclusion that because the individual charges are relatively small, this charge is not a “true license fee”. The report of the Insurance Commissioner discloses that in the biennial period of 1949 and 1951 the amount of the agents’ and brokers’ licenses amounted to $836,923.27, while the
I also disagree with the ruling that the fees exacted of bakeries under the provisions of the Act of May 22, 1933, P. L. 912, as amended, 43 PS 403 et seq., are not true license fees. The distinction between amounts which are merely designed to cover the cost of registration and those which are true license fees intended to defray a substantial portion of the cost of regulation was first introduced into our law in Rice Drug Company v. Pittsburgh, 360 Pa. 240, 61 A. 2d 878, wherein we said (p: 243, 244): “There-is no merit in appellant’s contention that the payment of a fee of One Dollar under the State Cigarette Tax Act, in order to secure a permit to sell cigarettes, is a payment for the privilege of selling cigarettes, wherefore the City, mercantile tax: duplicates the State tax. Obviously the legislature intended, by the use of these words, to inform the Commonwealth of the identity of the sellers of cigarettes who would-be liable-for the payment of the tax. Clearly the imposition
Our most recent decision on this point is Armour and Company v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 69 A. 2d 405. We there decided that the Act of May 28, 1915, P. L. 587, as amended, 31 PS 461 et seq., which required meat packers to pay a flat fee of $10. for each establishment, imposed a mere registration charge. Mr. Chief Justice (then Justice) Steen distinguished the milk control fees by saying (p. 114) : . . that fee was a graded one imposed upon milk dealers according to the average quantity of milk daily received or produced by them, ranging from a minimum of $1 to a maximum of $5,000, thus indicating that it was intended by way of reimbursement for the expense of supervision and regulation of the milk industry, the burden being placed upon the dealers in the proportions in which the magnitude of their respective business operations required such supervision.” (Italics mine)
It thus appears that the controlling consideration in each case was the intent of the Legislature: did it intend the fee.-to cover only registration costs or the expense of regulation as well? We have thus far recognized two indicia of this intent; a) Is the fee so small that it could not possibly defray the expense of regulation; and b)‘ is the i&e graduated so that large companies requiring greater regulation pay more?
It seems to me that the application of these two 'tests requires, a conclusion that the bakeries pay “real” license
The second test of legislative intent mentioned above is more helpful in the present instance. The Legislature has established some difference in fees paid depending on quantity of business done. I do not believe that we should introduce further uncertainty into this field of the law by reaching a different result from that in the Pittsburgh Milk case, supra, by recognizing a difference in degree of graduation of the tax. The important thing is that the Legislature has made some attempt to correlate the size of the fee to the cost of regulation. This is enough to indicate an intent to impose a real license rather than a registration fee. . It is immaterial that the fees exacted may not cover the entire cost of regulation. I therefore dissent in Appeal No. 214.
While the authority of this Court is so circumscribed, speaking for myself alone, I have the temerity to suggest the dire consequences which, in my opinion, are certain to follow the enforcement of this ordinance. It superimposes upon an already heavy property tax what is termed a “mercantile license tax”, i. e., an excise tax, for the privilege of doing business and practicing professions, occupations, etc. within the City. Such tax is imposed “. . . on persons engaging in certain businesses, including manufacturing, professions, occupations, trades, vocations, and commercial activities. . .”. The scope of the tax is so inclusive that it approaches
The Act of 1947, facetiously termed the “Tax Anything Act”, granted to all other political subdivisions in the Commonwealth the same taxation authority that the Sterling Act conferred on Philadelphia. It is reasonable to suppose that this ordinance, which is now validated, will immediately be followed by all other political subdivisions. The “Tax Anything Act” will then surely be known as the “Tax Everything Act”. If such taxation is thus extended throughout the Commonwealth, there will be a speedy general exodus of business from the Commonwealth. Such tax ordinances and enactments will not prove, I am certain, the anticipated tax “horn of plenty”, but on the contrary will result in the opening of a Pandora’s box releasing economic ills which cannot be recaptured, to the irreparable injury to the City and the Commonwealth.
For these reasons, while I feel impelled to concur in the validity of the ordinance, I venture the suggestion that if the City persists in enforcing this ordinance as now written, there should be appropriate legislation limiting the broad powers now possessed by the municipality.
Concurring in Part
Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part :
, The Sterling--Act prohibits the City of Philadelphia from levying or collecting “any tax on a privilege, transaction, subject, or, occupation or on personal property which is now or may hereafter become subject to [1] a state tax' or [2.]. a license fee.”
The Chief. Justice has ably expounded the law with respect to the meaning of the words “license fee” as used in the Sterling Act. I agree with his. construction of this license fee prohibition and of the application thereof to the cases of The Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, The Western Saving Fund Society, The Beneficial Saving Fund Society,-and The Saving Fund Society of Qermantoion; Household Finance Corporation, Household Consumer Discount. Company, Comer, et al., Tifft, et al., and National Biscuit Company. ■ However, I disagree with.the majority opinion so far as it deals with corporations which pay to the State of Pennsylvania a corporate net income tax.
As recently as 1950 this Court flatly and unanimously decided in Murray v. Phila., 364 Pa. 157, 71 A. 2d 280, that the Sterling Act prohibited Philadelphia from levying a tax on the net profits or net income of (every person, including) a corporation, domiciled in Philadelphia because the State taxed (when we look beneath the form and surface to the substance, i.e., to the realities) the net income of a corporation. We there said: “In construing the Act, it is immaterial that state taxes have been referred to as. excise or franchise taxes or by any other adjective; the reality controls. The fact that this tax [the corporate net income tax] is paid to the state conclusively shows that the city has no jurisdiction to tax the corporate income.”
But even if we close our eyes to reality and assume that this Philadelphia Ordinance does not, in reality and in its operations and practical effect, impose an income tax on corporate income, but merely an “excise” tax for the privilege of doing business (measured by the corporate income) the City is still prohibited because, irrespective of what the City tax is called or is determined to be, it is a replica of and identical with the corporate net income tax and consequently taxes the same “privilege”, i.e., the privilege of doing business in Philadelphia, and the same subject, i.e., corporate income, as the State does. This fundamental fact was overlooked by the majority opinion which became enmeshed in attempting to distinguish “excise” taxes from “property” taxes, and fell into the basic error of adopting and applying one test for the Act, i.e., the “realities” test, and an entirely different test, i.e., the nomenclature test, for the Ordinance.
In order to determine whether the City is attempting to tax a “privilege” or a “subject” which has already been taxed by the State and is therefore prohibited, we must first examine the legislative intent as disclosed by the Sterling Act, the Corporate Net Income Tax Act, and by the City Ordinance.
The Corporate Net Income Tax Act by its very terms is “An Act to provide revenue . . .by imposing an excise tax... on the net income of certain corporations . , . .”
The Ordinance, which it is frankly admitted is intended to produce $17,000,000. annually, further provides, in imposing a 3 mills tax on each dollar of the annual gross volume of business, that “ ‘Gross Volume of Business’ means gross receipts and shall include both cash and credit transactions. ... or ... In the Alternative at the option of the [taxpayer] at the rate of two (2) per centum of the annual gross volume of business transacted by such person less the cost of goods and less the cost of labor. .. .” This unquestionably means in the case of a corporation, 3 mills on the corporate gross income or 2% of the corporate net income. When it is realized that this tax is imposed upon virtually every person, partnership, manufacturer, profession, trade and corporation engaged in business in Philadelphia, it is clear to every layman and, I believe, to every careful analyst, that the tax is in reality and actuality not a genuine mercantile license tax, but a gross income taco (or, in the alternative, a net income tax) on individuals and corporations engaged in business in Philadelphia.
Murray v. Phila. reiterated the law that “the practical operation of the two taxes is controlling”', and the city’s power to tax must be strictly construed against the city. Nevertheless, the majority opinion, after holding that the corporate net income tax, in spite of calling itself an “excise” tax, is in reality a “property” tax, completely ignores the aforesaid legal principles and holds that the City tax which uses identical language with the Act is an “excise” tax and is not a tax on the income of a corporation. I repeat: How unrealistic, how impractical can we be?
Let’s examine a little more closely just what the Philadelphia Ordinance attempts to tax and what is the practical operation of this City tax upon corporate income. The Ordinance first “apes” the historical mercantile license tax by taxing dealers and vendors at the rate of 3 mills on their gross volume of business or gross receipts, which are defined to be one and the same. It then immediately shows its real nature and true colors by taxing every manufacturer, every corporation, and, with a few exceptions, every person engaged in business in Philadelphia 3 mills on the annual gross (receipts or) income, or in certain cases alternatively, 2% on their net income. This is not a real or true or genuine mercantile license tax on vendors, dealers or merchants for the privilege of selling goods, wares or merchandise or engaging in kindred businesses as are most, if not all, of the genuine mercantile taxes imposed by municipal
The majority opinion assumes that this City tax is a real mercantile license tax in spite of the fact that it taxes nearly every man, woman, child, profession, partnership and corporation doing business in Philadelphia, and asserts that such' a tax is technically an excise tax, and the corporate net income tax is technically a property tax and therefore there is no duplication. Whether we approach this question from a technical or a nontechnical point of view is immaterial, for irrespective of whether the corporate net income tax is denominated or is held to be an excise tax Or a property tax, if the Commonwealth' imposes a tax on a corporation for the privilege of doing business, the City is prohibited from imposing a tax on a corporation for the privilege of doing business, or if the State imposes a tax on the same (property'of) subject which the City attempts to tax, i:¿.,;in<3ome Of á •corporation, "the" City’s tax is'clearly and 'specifically prohibited by the Sterling Act.
The only distinction "between the Act and the' Ordinance is-that-the -City’s measuring-r od-or tax -is .gross as
When the legislature prohibited Philadelphia from taxing any “privilege” or any “subject” which was taxed by the State, in order to preserve the sources of the State’s income, they were not talking Greek — they were not thinking of what was or was not an excise tax, or what was or was not a property tax which even this Court cannot consistently determine — they were talking plain, clear English which every member of the legislature and at least every layman could understand. When the Supreme Court vacillates from one case to another as to whether the corporate net income tax is an excise tax or a property tax, it would seem unreasonable to hold that the legislature was referring to these taxes when it used the words “privilege” or “subject”.
The majority opinion says that the corporate net income tax
It clearly follows, if the realities of the Philadelphia tax are analyzed and carefully considered, that the City’s so-called mercantile license tax is in reality and in its operation and practical effect, not a mercantile
The effect of the majority opinion will, in my judgment, open wide the door to many taxes which have heretofore been held invalid and will make meaningless and nullify many of the provisions of the Constitution. For example, if the Constitution or a statute prohibits the taxing of a particular subject, all a municipality or a legislature has to do is to call the tax a mercantile license tax or an excise tax and then measure it by the prohibited subject. Could anything show more clearly the basic weakness of the majority opinion or the dire results which can flow therefrom?
Italics throughout, ours.
So far as corporate net income tax is concerned, this Court more frequently held that it was an excise tax for the privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania. See: Com. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 363 Pa. 299, 69 A. 2d 410; Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 184 A. 37; Com. v. Warner Bros., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A. 2d 62; Com. v. Electrolux Corp., 362 Pa. 333, 67 A. 2d 105;. Com. v. Bayuk Cigars Co., 345 Pa. 348, 28 A. 2d 134; Com. v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 336 Pa. 200, 8 A. 2d 404. The distinction or'Hue of demarcation between a privilege tax, ah-excise tax and k property'tax, which in. the'last analysis mu.st. be..deter rained by the incidents and the nature and legal effect of the Act rather..than by-the name.by.which.it is-described,-is so nebulous, flexible and fluctuating, that the decisions on this point throughout the endrq
Reference
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- National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, Appellant
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