Auel v. White
Cases that cite this one
43 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Waddle v. Nelkin (Pa. 1986)
- Gregorich v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974)
- Barney v. Foradas (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
- Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972)
- Mehra v. Bentz (District Court, E.D. New York 1975)
- Cheng v. Septa & MV Transportation, Inc. (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)
- Sweigert v. Mazer (Pa. 1963)
- Hoffman v. Mogil (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
- Sinclair by Sinclair v. Block (Pa. 1993)
- Bressler v. YOGURT (Pa. 1990)
- Rice v. Shuman (Pa. 1986)
- Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp. (Pa. 1968)
- Hodge v. Me-Bee Co. (Pa. 1968)
- Nugent v. Quam (S.D. 1967)
- Ridgway National Bank, Guardian of the Estate of Robert Aiello, a Mental Incompetent v. North American Van Lines, Inc., an Indiana Corporation (3d Cir. 1964)
- Paul Klink, Administrator of the Estate of Mona McCauley Deceased v. Nancy L. Harrison (3d Cir. 1964)
- Shuman v. Nolfi (Pa. 1960)
- Geiger v. Schneyer (Pa. 1959)
- Lopez v. Gukenback (Pa. 1958)
- Marks v. Swayne (Pa. 1997)
- Holmgren v. Rocco Farms Foods, Inc. (District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 1976)
- McQuay v. Schertle (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)
- Vihlidal v. Braun (Pa. 1988)
- Brannan v. Lankenau Hospital (Pa. 1980)
- Roshan L. Mehra, as Administrator of the Goods, Chattels and Credits Which Were of Rajinder K. Mehra v. Roberta Bentz and Rudolph J. Bentz (2d Cir. 1976)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
This is an appeal from an order refusing to take off a nonsuit entered in an action of trespass for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian when struck by defendant’s automobile. The defendant’s motion for compulsory nonsuit was predicated both upon the failure to prove negligence and upon plaintiff’s contributory negligence. The court en banc based its decision solely on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence. We agree with the action taken by the court below, but we do so for a different reason.
Viewing the evidence adduced on behalf of plaintiff as true; reading it in the light most favorable to him; giving him the benefit of every reasonable inference that a jury might derive from the evidence and resolving all doubts, if any, in his favor as we are required to do in considering the entry of a compulsory nonsuit,
By reason of the injuries inflicted the plaintiff was rendered mentally incompetent. At the time of trial there was testimony that since the date of the accident plaintiff had no conception of his surrounding circumstances, was not able to transact business of any kind and did not appreciate the fact that he was involved in litigation. After interrogation the court was satisfied of his incompeteney and appointed a guardian ad litem. Inasmuch as the defendant was the only eye Avitness to the actual happening of the accident the plaintiff called him as for cross-examination and, consequently, most of the facts as outlined above were testified to by the defendant. There Avas also testimony by the plaintiff’s sister and brothei*-in-laAv aaTlo had visited the scene a short time after the accident that defendant shoAved them the dent in his left front fender and stated that “I didn’t see that man until I hit him.” In addition to the foregoing facts defendant testified that there were cars parked on both sides of the street and that a car travelling in the opposite direction passed him seconds before the collision. A police officer summoned to the scene of the accident testified that he didn’t observe any cars on the south side of the road, but that if there were any, there Avould only be room for one or two opposite the point Avhere the accident happened because of a large driveAvay in front of the dairy.
It Avas the plaintiff’s contention in the court beloAV and in this Court that since the plaintiff had traversed 34-% feet of the Avidth of the street to the point of collision, defendant should have seen him, and the
However, even if the jury could find from the evidence that the defendant was at fault in failing to observe the plaintiff the same evidence renders more manifest plaintiff’s default in failing to see the defendant’s approaching vehicle. It is well established that where a pedestrian traverses a street at other than a regular crossing he is bound to exercise a higher degree of care for his own -safety than would be the case were he crossing at an intersection: Harris v. DeFelice, 379 Pa. 469, 475, 109 A. 2d 174; Rucheski v. Wisswesser et al., 355 Pa. 400, 50 A. 2d 291. The reason for the rule is apparent for he is crossing at a place where vehicular traffic could not be expected to anticipate a pedestrian: Schweitzer et al. v. Scranton Bus Company, 344 Pa. 249, 26 A. 2d 156. It is equally well settled that it is the duty of a pedestrian to look before he undertakes a street crossing and to continue to look as he proceeds and such duty is particularly incumbent upon one who traverses a street between intersections: Aaron v. Strausser, 360 Pa. 82, 59 A. 2d 910. Since
In appellant’s history of the case and in the brief of his counsel it is stated that “. . . the plaintiff was struck within two (2) feet north of the middle of the forty-five (45) foot road” and “Just as he [plaintiff]
Since the plaintiff’s evidence clearly revealed contributory negligence, the judgment of compulsory non-suit was properly entered.
Order and judgment affirmed.
Malone, Executor v. Marano, 326 Pa. 316, 318; Kimble v. Wilson et al., 352 Pa. 275; Kallman v. Triangle Hotel Co. of Pennsylvania et al., 357 Pa. 39, 42; Szukics v. Ruch, 367 Pa. 646.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
The rationalization in the Majority Opinion leads irresistibly to the conclusion that a jury could find the defendant negligent and the plaintiff free of contributory negligence. The conclusion, however, refused to take the step which would remove the nonsuit entered in the Court below. I would take that step. As we said in the case of Nugent v. Joerger, 387 Pa. 330, 332: “Whether, and to what extent, a pedestrian and an automobilist obey the rules which, in a double adherence, would skirt every danger and avert collision, is a question of fact for the jury to decide.”
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.