Opinion by

On February 23, 1960, Stanley J. Harris, trading as W. J. Harris and Son, received notice from the Secretary of Revenue of the withdrawal of his certificate of appointment as the operator of an official inspection station under the provisions of The Vehicle Code. The notice stated that Harris’ privilege to inspect motor vehicles in Pennsylvania was suspended for six months and that the reason for the suspension was “Violation of Section 819, sub-section ‘F’ of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Harris appealed the suspension to the court *600 below wbicb, on bis contemporaneous application, entered a supersedeas to tbe suspension order.

Harris petitioned for a bill of particulars which tbe court refused. A de novo hearing on tbe suspension was then held by tbe court below at wbicb tbe Commonwealth proved that, on two separate occasions, an employee of tbe Harris garage issued and attached a certificate of inspection to an unsafe automobile in violation of Section 819(f) of Tbe Vehicle Code of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, 75 PS §819 (f). Tbe defendant presented no testimony. Thereafter tbe court dismissed tbe appeal and reinstated tbe order of tbe Secretary of Revenue suspending the defendant’s certificate of appointment. Tbe defendant has appealed from the action of tbe court below, assigning error therein in three particulars.

First, tbe appellant contends that bis petition for a bill of particulars should have been granted. However, even if that be so, no reversible error was committed thereby because tbe defendant was not harmed. In bis petition to the court below for an appeal and supersedeas, be alleged facts showing that he was sufficiently apprised of tbe violation upon wbicb tbe suspension of bis certificate of appointment was based. Moreover, be was represented by counsel at tbe bearing who did not plead surprise at tbe introduction of tbe Commonwealth’s evidence. Nor did be ask for a continuance for time to prepare a defense.

Second, tbe appellant argues that tbe decision of tbe court below was in error because tbe Commonwealth did not show that the wrongful acts of Harris’ employee were done with tbe employer’s authorization, knowledge or consent. Section 819(b) of Tbe Vehicle Code provides, “If tbe secretary finds that the provisions of this act are not being complied with, or that tbe business of an official inspection station in connection with tbe . . . inspection of motor vehicles ... is being improper *601 ly conducted, lie shall suspend the certificate of appointment of any such station . . . Provided, however, That if the servant or employee of any such inspection station shall without the authorization, knowledge or consent of his employer, violate any of the provisions of this act in reference to the inspection of vehicles, such violation or violations shall not be the cause of the suspension of the certificate of appointment. .(Emphasis supplied)

Authorization to make official inspections of motor vehicles in Pennsylvania is a privilege and not a right. Section 819(b) of The Vehicle Code is an important and necessary limitation upon such privilege, designed, as it is, to protect against loss of life and injury on the highway. Once a violation of the safety provisions of the Code has taken place, the Secretary of Revenue has not only the power but the duty to suspend the certificate of appointment. The above italicized proviso, relied upon by the appellant, is an exception to the general authority of the Secretary. However, once a violation has been proven by the Commonwealth, the burden is upon the defendant to bring himself within the scope of this exception. This, the defendant in the instant case did not do. He failed to assume his obvious burden in the circumstances and offered no testimony at all.

Our decision on this point renders moot the appellant’s third assignment of error, which need not therefore be discussed.

Order affirmed.