Commonwealth Ex Rel. Hartage v. Hendrick
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Hartage v. Hendrick
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
TMs case is before us upon a petition for babeas corpus of which we are asked to take original jurisdiction. The petition asserts, inter alia, that petitioner has been denied Ms rights under the Eighth Amendment, the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The assertion is grounded on the proposition that Ms constitutional right to nonexcessive bail has been denied because the Constitution must be read “to prohibit bail in excess of what petitioner can afford.” It is also claimed that Ms bail was set “without consideration of individual circumstances pertinent to the probability of his appearance at trial.” The petition states that the issues presented are of vital importance throughout the Commonwealth and should be resolved by this Court. It alleges that this can be accomplished only through the exercise of original jurisdiction, because petitioner’s claim of unconstitutional pretrial detention “will . . . likely become moot before it can fairly be considered by tMs Court if he is compelled to follow the time-consuming appellate route through the Superior Court to tMs Court.” He points out, in support of tMs statement, that this is what occurred in Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 206 (1969).
A responsive answer was filed on behalf of the Commonwealth, placing in issue the principal allegations of the petition, and to this a reply was filed by petitioner. It is clear from these pleadings and the transcripts of the proceedings in the lower court, first at the bail hearing before the committing magistrate, and again at the hearing on the habeas corpus petition, that there were not presented on behalf of petitioner the
On this record, we are unable to agree that petitioner has demonstrated “the futility of the ordinary appellate procedures,” as he puts it, or that original jurisdiction in this Court affords petitioner “the only proper and efficacious relief from his unconstitutional detention.” That there are grave problems in connection with the administration of the bail system may be granted, but the practical necessity of adjudicating the issues in this Court in the first instance has not been sufficiently shown. There is not here the “imperative necessity or apparent reason why expedition is desirable or required,” that this Court normally requires in a habeas corpus proceeding in order to dispense with the benefit of full and adequate consideration by a lower court. Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cloudy, 366 Pa. 282, 287, 77 A. 2d 350 (1951); cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Torrance v. Salzinger, 406 Pa. 268, 177 A. 2d 619, cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962). For us to accept the instant petition on this most meager factual record would be to make it a vehicle for what would be, in effect, an advisory opinion. We think this would be an unwise use of our original jurisdiction powers. We will therefore deny the petition.
In so doing, we do not intend to minimize the seriousness of the problems connected with bail and pretrial detention, particularly as applied to indigents. These problems have been receiving increasing attention from legal writers, concerned organizations, and various governmental bodies,
Petition denied.
Petitioner’s reply to the answer to his habeas corpus petition before us states, additionally, that “Bail hearings for indigents who cannot retain counsel are virtually never adequate.” Petitioner was not represented by counsel but by a law student connected with the Bail Litigation Project of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, which is under the direction of present counsel for petitioner. The bail hearing in the instant ease established only that petitioner had no prior criminal record and that “according to our [defendant’s representative’s] information he can afford very little bail.” In contrast, Rule 4005(a) of our Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: “The amount of bail shall be such as to ensure the presence of the defendant, and shall be determined according to, but not solely upon, the following criteria: (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the stage of the prosecution then existing; (2) The age, residence, employment, financial standing and family status of the defendant; (3) Defendant’s character, reputation and previous criminal history; and (4) Defendant’s mental condition.”
At the habeas corpus hearing below petitioner was represented by his present counsel. The complete transcript of that hearing is as follows: “The Coubt : The above matter came on and was heard before the undersigned on May 13, 1970. Present were David Iiairys [counsel for petitioner] and Martin Belsky [Assistant District Attorney]. Counsel for the petitioner informed the Court that the testimony in this matter had been taken earlier before Judge Reimel, and the testimony was concluded. This was explained to the Court that the only matter before us was the constitutionality of the bail requirements. AVe are here not concerned with any of the testimonial aspects. On the basis of the controlling law, we deny the petition.”
Judge Hoffman’s exhaustive dissenting opinion in Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, supra, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. at 208, summarizes and reviews much of the recent literature, as does Justice Robebts’ dissenting opinion, infra.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
I very strongly favor granting the petition for original jurisdiction and deciding the case and the vitally important issues raised therein on the merits.
Dangerous criminals who are out on bail are jeopardizing the safety and the lives of the law-abiding public by committing additional crimes. This frightening situation is made possible by unrealistic or mollycoddling Judges who release on unrealistic bail prisoners who are accused of ruthless crimes, thus enabling them to further endanger our citizens.
To refer this issue of bail to the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee for further study, with an implied recommendation of major changes in favor of accused criminals, is very, very unwise.
Virtually every Judge is familiar with the subject of bail—the problems created by the present (so-called money-bail) system and its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the necessity of keeping dangerous criminals off the streets. Moreover, this Court is aided, if that is necessary, by numerous recent articles, textbook writings, analyses, reports and recommendations, as well as several Court Opinions, on the issue of bail.
It is important that we (1) forthwith reaffirm our present Rules which were recommended by our Criminal Procedural Rules Committee and adopted by this Court (and made effective) as recently as June 1966, and likewise (2) re-emphasise those gmdelmes and principles which will (a) likely compel a person out on bail to appear for trial, and (b) also properly protect the public against dangerous criminals
Petitioner, who alleges that he can afford very little bail,
Petitioner’s principal contention is that bail for an indigent is Unconstitutional, because it denies to every poor person the Constitutionally ordained “equal protection of the law.” This ignores the facts of life, and would be an unwarranted Procrustean stretch of the Constitution. Poverty and unequal possession of wealth exist in so many phases and fields of life that Courts cannot make mere lack of money, without more, a denial of the equal protection of the law.
The Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Pennsylvania, as well as the presumption of innocence before conviction, require that persons accused of crime can and should be unimprisoned or (as the situation may be) released from imprisonment before trial upon the entry of appropriate bail, which must not be excessive. The money-bail system as it exists today has often been unfair to prisoners, especially to prisoners who are poor, but money bail is not the sole and exclusive hind of bail required by the Constitution. What is Constitutionally required is bail with sufficient sureties, with a proviso that the bail
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: “Excessive
Sections 13 and 14 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provide:
“Section 13. Excessive bail shall not be required. . . .
“Section 14. All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident Or presumption great; . . .”
Furthermore, Rule 4005(a) of our Rules of Criminal Procedure (adopted, I repeat, as recently as June 1, 1966) supplements the Constitutional provision and furnishes clear and adequate guidelines for the determination of reasonable and appropriate bail in every case. This Rule provides:
“The amount of bail shall be such as to ensure the presence of the defendant, and shall be determined according to, but not solely upon, the following criteria: (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the stage of the prosecution then existing; (2) The age, residence, employment, financial standing and family status of the defendant; (3) Defendant’s character, reputation and previous criminal history’, and (4) Defendant’s mental condition.”
Justice Roberts states that “it should be presumed that an accused is entitled to be released on his own recognizance”—meaning no money bail and no sureties. This is contrary to the clear language of the Constitution. He then lists several alternate remedies for pretrial release. For example, Justice Roberts states (1) “an accused could be released into the care of a
In short, I find no merit in any of petitioner’s contentions or in any of the above-mentioned suggested changes in re bail.
The majority Opinion denies the petition for original jurisdiction, and rejects the relief the petitioner asks for, but grants what he does not ask for and does not want. Although undoubtedly unintended, the practical effect of the majority Opinion, and even more so of Justice Roberts’s Opinion, is to create new uncertainty and/or confusion in this field of bail and further jeopardize the safety of our citizens and their protection from dangerous criminals.
For these reasons, I vigorously dissent.
The same dangerous situation is created when dangerous convicted criminals are placed on probation, instead of being realistically sentenced.
In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, the Court speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Bueger, aptly said: “While neither the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack, these factors should be weighed in the balance.”
I note, without passing upon its Constitutionality, that Congress has just passed an Act permitting a Judge to detain without bail a dangerous criminal for sixty days after arrest. See, District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.
Petitioner’s present bail is $3,500.
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 12, Mr. Justice Holmes said (page 46) : “The law does not attempt :o equalize fortune, opportunities or abilities.”
Italics throughout, ours.
Dissenting Opinion
I—Original Jurisdiction
By denying Isaac Hartage’s request
Unlike the majority, I fully believe that the petitioner has demonstrated the futility of attempting to proceed through the “ordinary appellate channels”. The last time the issues raised in the present petition were pursued through the ordinary appellate process, the appeal was rendered moot before this Court could consider it. Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 206, 257 A. 2d 657 (1969). I believe that the test for assuming jurisdiction in the instant case should not be whether this petitioner has fully exhausted his other remedies, but whether he stands a
The problems which attend pretrial incarceration are truly extraordinary, and I fully believe that they deserve an extraordinary response. Literally thousands of indigents, many of them innocent of any wrongdoing, are today languishing behind bars because they cannot afford their money bail. Every day these thousands must undergo a confinement which has been imposed upon them without any determination of their guilt or innocence and without any finding that jailing them is the only method of assuring their future presence in the courtroom. The assertion that “expedition is not desirable or required” is beyond my comprehension; these numbers represent human beings, men who will continue to suffer the rigors of an arbitrary imprisonment because a majority of this Court today refuses to confront this vexing issue. I have every hope that this practice of wholesale indiscriminate pretrial imprisonment will one day cease to exist, but that hope is of little comfort to those who this day remain in our prisons because they cannot purchase their release pending a judicial determination of their guilt or innocence.
I must also express my disagreement with the majority’s assertion that the problem is ripe for the consideration of our Criminal Procedural Rules Committee. The amount and type of bail, and the conditions under which any individual ought to be admitted into bail, are simply not procedural matters. What could
Thus because of the gravity of the problem presented, and because of the practical difficulties of adjudicating the issues raised in this case in any way other than by the grant of original jurisdiction, I would take original jurisdiction and remit the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II—The Right to Bail
Pretrial coercive measures are constitutionally permissible only if used to insure an accused’s presence at subsequent legal proceedings. Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: “All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great.” And the Supreme Court of the United States has held: “The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty. . . . Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond . . . serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive* under the Eighth Amendment ” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5, 72 S. Ct. 1, 3 (1951)
There is little doubt, however, that the money bail system, as currently admimstered in most of this Commonwealth, is not operating in accord with these requirements.
Initially, it should be presumed that an accused is entitled to be released on his own recognizance,
The imprisonment of an accused prior to a determination of guilt is a rather awesome thing: it costs the taxpayers tremendous sums of money;
I would remit this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia for determination of the appropriate pretrial release condition in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion.
Mr. Hartage has filed a petition for habeas corpus, a supporting brief, and a replication to the answer filed by the district attorney, while an amici brief in support of petitioner’s position has been submitted by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Bights Under Law, the Program Council of the Eastern Pennsylvania Conference of the United Methodist Church, the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Christian Conference of Philadelphia, the Episcopal Community Services of the Diocese of Pennsylvania, and the Bepresentative Meeting, the executive of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Beligious Society of Friends.
See also State v. Menillo, 159 Conn. 264, 38 U.S.L.W. 2575 (1970) ; Whitty v. State, 34 Wisc. 2d 278, 149 N.W. 2d 557 (1967) ; People v. Ingram, 34 Ill. 2d 623, 217 N.E. 2d 803 (1966) ; Matera v. Buchanan, 192 So. 2d 18 (Fla. App. 1966) ; Palmer v. District Court, 156 Colo. 284, 398 P. 2d 435 (1965).
Since any discussion of bail would be incomplete without some mention of “preventive detention,” I feel it necessary to note that pretrial detention for any purpose other than insuring the presence of the accused at trial would appear to be precluded by the above cited constitutional and decisional authorities. In the least any system of “preventive detention” would require full scale adversary hearings to be even arguably constitutional. This would add a heavy, unwise and unnecessary burden to our already crowded criminal court docket, and would seriously impair the ability of our criminal courts to achieve the proper solution to the problem— a swift and speedy trial. Why should we interpose these preliminary procedures, with their extensive and costly pretrial hearings, and thereby divert substantial judicial, prosecutorial and defense manpower from the prompt disposition of criminal cases? Further, I do not see how even these pretrial adversary hearings can accomplish their goal, which is the differentiation between those accuseds who are likely to commit further crimes, and those who are not. Such distinctions are not, in my opinion, easily made with any degree of accuracy.
See Bail Project of the Philadelphia Bar Foundation, Progress Report, February 9, 1966 to September 8, 1967 (1967) ; Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959 (1965) ; Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1954).
See generally, The Challenge of Crime In a Free Society, President’s Crime Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, 131 (1968) ; American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pretrial Be-lease, Approved Draft, 1968.
See the Bail Beform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §3146 (1970) ; American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pretrial Belease, 5.1 and Commentary at 5.1(a), Approved Draft, 1968.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick, 438 Pa. 435, 265 A. 2d 348 (1970).
The American Bar Association recommends that the posting of any required bail bonds be administered by the courts rather than by professional bail bondsmen. Such a system would have considerable flexibility, since the judicial officer fixing the bail could require either an unsecured bond, or a bond secured in full by cash or other property, or, and this would be the most common type of bail, the execution of an unsecured bond for the full amount of the bail accompanied by cash or property equal in worth to ten percent of the full amount of the bail. In this last variety of bail the down payment, less an appropriate administrative fee, should be returned at the conclusion of the proceedings if the accused has not failed to fulfill the conditions of his release. American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pretrial Release, §5.3 and Commentary, Approved Draft, 1968.
The advantages of such a system are obvious, since the accused would stand to recover most of his ten percent “down payment” if he complied with the conditions of his release, rather than forfeit the entire amount regardless of future performance, as is the case where professional bondsmen are used. The “skip rate” under such a system is actually lower than that achieved by professional bondsmen (perhaps because the possibility of regaining some of the money actually paid for the bond exists). And, further, the professional bondsmen very rarely perform the function, retrieving the elusive accused, for which they are theoretically paid. The FBI and the police are the people who really pick up those who fail to appear, and the bonds, even then, are rarely forfeited.
The federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §3146, provides, inter alia:
“(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. When such a determination is made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods of release, impose the first of the following conditions of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no single condition gives that assurance, any combination of the
“(b) In determining which conditions of release will reasonably assure appearance, the judicial officer shall, on the basis of available information, take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused’s family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.”
The Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, which dealt exclusively with those accused who could not afford the bail set in the normal course of their proceedings, achieved a “skip-rate” of less than seven-tenths of one percent, clearly demonstrating that bail is hardly the most effective method of assuring an accused’s subsequent appearance. Freed and Wald, Bail in the United States: 1964, A Report to the Rational Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, 29, 62 (1964). The success of the various bail projects in achieving low “skip rates” indicates largely that the lack of adequate notice is the single most common cause of failure to appear.
In Philadelphia alone, the cost of pretrial incarceration is over $5,000,000 per year (1,484 prisoners awaiting trial each day at a cost of $8.10 per man per day). Complaint in Mandamus, in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate et al., filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Trial Division, Civil Section, at No. 3084, June Term, 1970.
Last year about 28% of the clients of the Defender Association of Philadelphia who were incarcerated prior to trial (“prison cases”) were discharged of all criminal liability. See Directors of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, 34th Annual Report, June 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968, p. 20 (1968). Over half of the Philadelphia Bail Project clients were discharged of all criminal liability, Bail Project of the Philadelphia Bar Foundation, Progress Report, February 9, 1966 to September 8, 1967, p. 20 (1967), and “. . . fewer than one-half of one percent . . . were ultimately required to serve
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