Order

And Now, this 29th day of June, 1973, upon consideration of the within petition, it appearing from the record that the Commonwealth failed to introduce any evidence in the trial court pursuant to Eules 4002 or 4005 of the Pennsylvania Eules of Criminal Procedure and failed to file an answer in opposition to the within petition before this Court, and it further appearing that no findings of fact *434were made by tbe trial court, tbe matter is remanded to tbe Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County with instructions to conduct a bearing and make proper findings under Eule 4005 of tbe Pennsylvania Eules of Criminal Procedure.

Dissenting Opinion by

I am unalterably opposed to tbe Order made tbis day, June 29,1973, by a majority of tbis Court because I do not believe that a person charged with murder is entitled to any bail.

I have steadfastly refused to follow tbe mandate of tbis Court in Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A. 2d 829 (1972), and do not believe that tbe decision of a majority of tbe United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972), upon wbicb Truesdale is based, requires that persons charged with murder are entitled to bail. Moreover, to set up, as does Truesdale, tbe requirement, as a prerequisite to tbe grant of bail, that tbe courts determine tbe likelihood that a person charged with murder will appear when required is to impose on courts a burden wbicb cannot be sustained with even tbe slightest degree of certainty.

In tbe instant ease, we have a striking example of tbe disastrous effect of Truesdale.

I will not free on bail and return to tbe streets a person charged with murder. Needless to say, I would not grant bail to a person convicted of murder but not yet sentenced or a person convicted of murder and sentenced who has an appeal pending from such sentence.

I regret that our Court in Truesdale and its progeny has adopted a view wbicb treats so liberally tbe rights of those accused of murder and so lightly tbe rights of society.