Concurring Opinion by

I agree that the judgment of sentence should be affirmed. Appellant’s guilty plea was voluntarily and understanding^ tendered and properly accepted by the trial court. Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 406, 300 A.2d 503 (1973); Pa. R. Crim. P. 319, 319A; ABA Proj*438ect on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Eelating to Pleas of Guilty §§ 1.4-.6 (Approved Draft, 1968); ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Eelating to the Function of the Trial Judge §§ 4.1-.2 (Approved Draft, 1972). Ms plea was entered as a result of a plea bargain, not as the result of an allegedly illegal pretrial confession. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971); Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Mahoney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966).

Opinion by

Ruben Ramos Yelez, while assisted by counsel entered a plea of guilty to murder generally. Contem*436poraneously, the court was informed a plea bargain bad been negotiated by tbe district attorney’s office and counsel for Velez witb tbe appellant’s knowledge and consent. In compliance witb tbe agreement, tbe assistant district attorney then certified tbe offense rose no bigber than murder in tbe second degree and recommended to tbe court that a prison sentence of no less than six and no more than twenty years be imposed. He also moved tbe court to nolle pros two other criminal indictments pending against Velez.

Before accepting tbe plea, tbe court questioned Velez extensively, who affirmatively indicated be understood tbe nature of tbe charge, and approved of tbe plea arrangement; that tbe guilty plea was bis own free act; that be was aware of bis right to trial by jury and understood tbe impact of bis plea, as well as tbe possible consequences.1 Tbe court then accepted tbe plea and, after an evidentiary bearing, entered an adjudication of guilt of murder in tbe second degree and sentenced Velez to prison for a term of six to twenty years. This direct appeal followed. We affirm.

Tbe sole assignment of error is tbe guilty plea was invalid and of no effect because it was motivated by tbe existence of a pretrial confession secured by tbe police at a time when Velez was not aware of bis constitutional rights.

As we have stated several times, in order to successfully attack a guilty plea on tbe ground it was motivated by a confession secured through means constitutionally impermissible, tbe defendant must establish: (1) tbe existence of a constitutionally invalid confession; (2) tbe guilty plea was motivated by tbe confession; and (3) tbe defendant was incompetently advised *437by counsel to plead guilty rather than stand trial. See Commonwealth v. Tolbert, 450 Pa. 149, 299 A. 2d 252 (1973); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 449 Pa. 345, 296 A. 2d 823 (1972); Commonwealth v. Reagen, 447 Pa. 186, 290 A. 2d 241 (1972); and Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 271 A. 2d 481 (1970).2 See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S. Ct. 1458 (1970).

The confession here involved was attacked by a pretrial motion to suppress. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion and found that before the questioning commenced which gave rise to the confession, Velez was fully advised of his constitutional rights as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), and that he understood his rights. Our reading of the suppression hearing record persuades us that the court was amply warranted in arriving at this conclusion.

In view of the above, it is unnecessary to determine whether the confession motivated the guilty plea or whether the advice of counsel to plead guilty was in the range of competence normally required of attorneys representing criminal defendants.

Judgment affirmed.