OPINION

We granted allocatur to determine whether the Commonwealth Court erred in reversing a workers’ compensation judge’s decision, granting Appellant Beatrice Miletti’s fatal claim petition, on the basis that Mrs. Miletti failed to satisfy the requirements of section 301(c)(2) of the Workers’ Compen*415sation Act (Act). 77 P.S. 411(2). For the reasons that follow, we hold that Mrs. Miletti was entitled to fatal claim benefits; thus, we reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court.

Mrs. Miletti is the widow of Cresente Miletti (Decedent). Decedent was a firefighter for Appellee City of McKeesport. Decedent had worked for the City for thirty years before retiring on August 31, 1983. On February 25, 1993, Decedent passed away. Thereafter, Mrs. Miletti filed a fatal claim petition, pursuant to the Act, on September 27, 1993. In her petition, Mrs. Miletti alleged that Decedent suffered and died from interstitial lung disease (ILD) as a result of his employment as a firefighter.2 The City of McKeesport denied the allegations and the parties proceeded to a hearing before a workers’ compensation judge.

At the hearing, Decedent’s physician, Dr. Rahat M. Chaudhry, who is board certified in internal medicine, presented deposition testimony, credited by the workers’ compensation judge, that he began treating Decedent on July 24, 1986 for ILD. In Dr. Chaudhry’s opinion, the ILD was caused by on-the-job inhalation of heat, soot, chemicals, and asbestos and which, in turn, caused Decedent’s death. The workers’ compensation judge further found that on January 13, 1993, Mrs. Miletti’s counsel first notified the City of McKeesport that only as of December 7, 1992, did Dr. Chaudhry identify the cause of Decedent’s chronic respiratory problems as being work-related.3

The workers’ compensation judge granted the fatal claim petition for death from work-related lung disease. Before the *416workers’ compensation judge, the City of McKeesport argued that Mrs. Miletti had failed to establish that Decedent’s disability arose within 300 weeks of Decedent’s last date of occupational exposure as required by section 301(c)(2) of the Act. 77 P.S. § 411(2). However, the workers’ compensation judge rejected this argument and held that Mrs. Miletti had produced unequivocal and credible medical testimony that Decedent was disabled as a result of ILD prior to July 24, 1986 (the date he first received treatment by his physician). Because this date fell within 300 weeks following Decedent’s retirement in August 1983, Decedent established a compensable disability and satisfied the requirements of section 301(c)(2). The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirmed. The Commonwealth Court, en banc, reversed the order of the Board. The court determined that Mrs. Miletti failed to meet the limitations for instituting a fatal claim petition under section 301(c)(2) because Decedent did not file a claim for benefits during his lifetime and his date of death was more than 300 weeks from his last date of employment.

As noted above, we granted allocatur to address whether the Commonwealth Court erred in reversing the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, granting Mrs. Miletti’s fatal claim petition, on the basis that Mrs. Miletti failed to satisfy the mandates of section 301(c)(2) of the Act.4

The relevant section of the Act provides that:

*417The terms “injury,” “personal injury,” and “injury arising in the course of his employment,” as used in this act, shall include, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, occupational disease as defined in section 108 of this act: Provided, That whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease: And provided further, That if the employe’s compensable disability has occurred within such period, his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall likewise be compensable.

77 P.S. § 411(2)(emphasis supplied).

The Commonwealth Court interpreted this provision of the Act and determined that Mrs. Miletti was not entitled to fatal claim benefits. In reaching its conclusion, the Commonwealth Court relied upon its decision in Fortely v. WCAB (J & L Steel Corporation (Buckeye)), 117 Pa.Cmwlth. 356, 543 A.2d 1248 (1988). In Fortely, the Commonwealth Court reviewed section 301(c)(2) and found that this section barred an occupational disease death benefit claim where the decedent had not filed a disability claim during his or her lifetime, and the date of death was more than 300 weeks from the last date of employment. Thus, the Fo'rtely court’s focus in interpreting section 301(c)(2) was on whether a lifetime claim petition was filed and when death occurred.

In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth Court found that Decedent did not seek benefits for his occupational disease during his lifetime. Thus, based upon Fortely, the Commonwealth Court determined that Mrs. Miletti was required to establish that Decedent’s death occurred within 300 weeks *418after his last date of employment.5 As Decedent died over ten years after his retirement as a firefighter, a period in excess of 300 weeks, the Commonwealth Court concluded that Ms. Miletti was not entitled to an award of fatal claim benefits.

We find that the Commonwealth Court’s analysis is inconsistent with the plain language of section 301(c)(2). Based upon the explicit language of the statute, it becomes clear that the proper focal point is whether the decedent’s disability occurred within three hundred weeks of exposure. The Commonwealth Court erroneously concentrated on when death occurred and whether a lifetime disability claim was filed. By doing so, the court failed to give meaning to the express words of the legislature.

The rales of statutory construction require that when the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). The meaning of the words of the statute is unmistakable. Section 301(c)(2) specifically permits fatal claim benefits so long as the disability occurred within 300 weeks of exposure.

Indeed, as Judge Alexander F. Barbieri (now deceased) explains in his venerable treatise on workers’ compensation:

if ‘the employee’s compensable disability has occurred within such period, his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall likewise be compensable.’ The effect of this is that, if the disability occurs within the 300 weeks’ period, the employee’s death thereafter, no matter how long after, even if beyond the period of 300 weeks, is compensable because the disease was compensable during the employee’s lifetime.

Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation and Occupational Disease, § 7.32(2)(Bisel 1999). Contrary to the Commonwealth Court’s analysis, the statute’s mandate is clear: if a disability occurs within 300 weeks of exposure, an employee’s subse*419quent death is compensable.6 See Penn Steel Foundry and Machine Co. v. WCAB (Wagner), 122 Pa.Cmwlth. 171, 551 A.2d 653 (1988).

A second rule of statutory construction leads us to the same conclusion. The rules of statutory construction require that every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). As noted above, the critical language for purposes of this appeal is that if the employee’s “compensable disability had occurred "within such period, his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall likewise be compensable.” 77 P.S. 411(2). This statement by the General Assembly is rendered meaningless and is superfluous unless one interprets it to apply only to deaths occurring beyond the 300 week period. The situation where death occurs within the 300 week period is already addressed by the preceding sentence:

whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease.

77 P.S. § 411(2).

As demonstrated by reading these sentences, the time of death and the filing of a lifetime claim petition are irrelevant to a determination of the timeliness of a fatal claim petition.7 Again, it is whether disability occurred within 300 weeks of exposure.

*420In the case sub judice, the evidence, as found by the finder of fact, establishes that Decedent was disabled as a result of work-related interstitial fibrosis prior to July 1986. As this date falls within the 300 week period following Decedent’s last date of employment, i.e., the date of his last occupational exposure, his widow, Mrs. Miletti, is entitled to benefits pursuant to 77 P.S. § 411(2).

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. While I, too, sympathize with the unfortunate unfolding of events that preclude Mrs. Miletti from collecting death benefits on behalf of her husband, no amount of sympathy can overcome the constraints of the operative statute of repose.

Dispositive of this matter is the application of § 301(c)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), which states in pertinent part:

(2) The terms “injury,” “personal injury” and “injury arising in the course of employment,” shall include occupational disease as defined in section 108 of this act1— Provided, *421That whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease: And provided further, That if employe’s compensable disability had occurred within such period, his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall likewise be compensable....

77 P.S. § 411(2)(emphasis added).

Section 301(c)(2) is a statute of repose because it requires that the compensable disease or death “oecur[ ] within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment.” A statute of repose “bars a suit a fixed number of years after the defendant acts in some way ... even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered an injury.” Blacks Law Dictionary 1423 (7th ed. 1999). Thus,

A statute of repose ... limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered. Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim, the period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a, came of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.

Id. (citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4 at 20-21 (1987)(emphasis added)).

Here, the controlling statute designates the last date of employment in a hazardous occupation as the specific event (i.e. employer/defendant exposes employe/plaintiff to workplace hazards) that initiates the period of repose. The period ends three hundred weeks later “regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted” thereby “limitfingj the time within which an action may be brought. ” Thus, where no lifetime benefits were filed, this statute of repose allows a claimant a 800-week window during which his death must occur from an occupational *422disease. The enactment of this statute reflects the legislature’s concern that an employer be provided timely notice and protection from stale claims, thereby preventing speculation over whether a disease is work-related years after an exposure occurred. Sporio v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Songer Construction), 553 Pa. 44, 50, 717 A.2d 525, 528 (1998). Thus, a claim under § 301(c)(2) expires within 300 weeks of a claimant’s last exposure whether or not an occupational disease manifests or death occurs.

By applying the discovery rule, the majority opinion unravels the entire legislative scheme of restricting a compensable cause of action under this statute.2 Therefore, contrary to the majority opinion, I find the discovery rule has no application in regard to the running of this statute. Rather, I would find that since no lifetime benefits wére claimed, in order to be compensable, decedent’s death would have to occur within 300 weeks of his last exposure.3

Here, because Mrs. Miletti’s husband died more than 300 weeks after his last exposure without timely filing for lifetime benefits, her claim is not compensable, and § 301(c)(2) prevents her from recovering his death benefits.