[J-40-2015][M.O. – Todd, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT

DAVID M. SOCKO, : No. 142 MAP 2014 : Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the Superior : Court at No. 1223 MDA 2013, dated : 5/13/14, reconsideration denied 7/8/14 v. : affirming the Order of the Court of : Common Pleas of York County dated : 10/15/12 at No. 2012-SU-001608-44 MID-ATLANTIC SYSTEMS OF CPA, INC., : : Appellant : ARGUED: May 6, 2015

CONCURRING OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: November 18, 2015

I join the majority opinion, subject to the reservation that I have difficulty with the oft-repeated phrase that a seal operates “to import consideration.” Majority Opinion, slip op. at 7. Notably, in the first instance, the common law seal predated by centuries the modern requirement of consideration. See 4 W ILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §8:2 (4th ed. 2015). Although at some point in the development of the pertinent legal landscape, the phrase “import[] consideration” appears to have meant simply that signers undertook their obligations intentionally, as the term “consideration” evolved in its modern sense courts began to suggest that the seal itself “import[ed],” or stood as a presumption of, consideration. See id. However, “[i]t would have been more correct to have said that no consideration was needed for such a document.” Id. I realize that our Court has contributed to the imprecision. See, e.g. Morgan’s Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 629, 136 A.2d 838, 845 n.12 (1957).

Nevertheless, I believe that it would benefit the jurisprudence to clarify the effect of a statement of intention to be bound, per the Uniform Written Obligations Act in its general application, as dispensing with the requirement for consideration rather than supplying it.

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