In re: A.J.R.-H. and I.G.R.-H. Apl of KJR Mother
Opinion
` Fa=~=f'fa~=k lN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVAN|A
NllDDLE DlSTRlCT |N RE: A.J.R.~H. AND |.G.R.-H. § NO. 38 l\/lAP 2017 : Appea| from the Order of Superior
APPEAL OF: K.J.R., l\/lOTHER : Court at No. 1564 MDA 2016 dated ' May 1, 2017 Affirming the Decree of the Berl<s County Court of Common
Pleas, Orphans’ Court, dated August
23, 2016 at Nos. 84695 and 84696.
ARGUEDZ |\/|arch 6, 2018
CONCURR|NG OP|N|ON
JUST|CE BAER DEC|DED:July18, 2018 l join the l\/lajority’s well~reasoned conclusion that the orphans’ court erred by admitting into evidence the 167 exhibits offered by Berks County Chi|dren and Youth Services (“CYS”) at the hearing to terminate involuntarily the parental rights of K.J.R. (“l\/|other”) to her daughters A.J.R.-|-l and l.G.R.-H. As the l\/lajority adept|y explains, the exhibits were hearsay that failed to satisfy the business records exception to the prohibition against the admission of hearsay evidence |Vlajority Opinion at 15-22. |n addition, l concur with the l\/|ajority’s determination that the orphans’ court’s error was harmful to l\/lother, necessitating a new hearing to adjudicate CYS’s petition to terminate l\/lother’s parental rights. /d. at 22-30. However, l write separately because l would employ a different harmless error standard than the standard utilized by the l\/|ajority when evaluating the error that occurred during the termination hearing.
Regarding the standard that an appellate court should apply when determining whether an error that occurred during a termination proceeding was harmless, the l\/lajority states that in In re Sanders Chi/dren, 312 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa. 1973), this Court held that where “an erroneous evidentiary ruling could potentially have affected the decision to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child, an error is not harmless and the parent is entitled to a new hearing and decision.”1 l\/lajority Opinion at 22. l respectfully disagree with the l\/lajority that the Court announced a harmless error standard in ln re Sanders Children which we are bound to follow. To be sure, in that opinion, the Court determined that the erroneous admission of evidence during the termination hearing required a new termination proceedingl However, in my view, the Court did not articulate a distinct harmless error standard for purposes of evaluating errors that occur during termination proceedings2 l\/|oreover, my research indicates that this Court has never articulated such a standard |n addressing whether the orphans’ court committed a harmful error in this case, l\/lother and CYS agree as to what they believe to be the appropriate harmless error standard in the termination setting. However, without analysis or explanation, they both
Commonwealth \/. Burno, 154 A.3d 764, 796 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). As l will discuss in more detail below, given the significant rights at stake in termination proceedings, l believe that the Court should adopt a modified version of the criminal “harmless error” standard for purposes of evaluating whether an error that occurred in a termination proceeding requires an appellate court to vacate a decree involuntarily terminating parental rights and remand the case for a new hearing. important competing interests and rights are in play when an appellate court concludes that an error occurred during a criminal tria|. On the one hand, severe consequences flow from a criminal conviction and sentence For example, when a criminal conviction leads to a sentence of incarceration, the defendant is substantially deprived of his constitutionally recognized interest in liberty. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (explaining that, “given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine [J-10-2018] [l\/lO: Donohue, J.] - 3 him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution”). Thus, when an error adversely affects a fact-finder’s decision to convict a defendant, our system of justice mandates that the defendant receive the fair trial to which he is entitled See, e.g., Commonwea/th v. Story, 383 A.2d 155 (Pa. 1978) (awarding a defendant a new trial because the trial court improperly allowed the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence harmful testimony regarding the victim’s reputation). On the other hand, however, there is a societal interest in the finality of criminal proceedingsl Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 576 (Pa. 2008). Consequent|y, “[i]f a trial error does not deprive the defendant of the fundamentals of a fair tria|, his conviction will not be reversed.” Commonwea/th v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 135 (Pa. 2008).
Due to these competing interests and rights, when an appellate court concludes that an error was committed during the prosecution of a defendant, it is necessary for the court to assess whether the error harmed the defendant to such a degree that he was deprived of a fair trial. Given the importance of such an assessment, this Court endeavored to articulate a clear standard for determining whether an error was harmless in Commonwea/th v. Sto/y, supra ln so doing, the Story Court initially explored the proper “standard of proof” that a court should apply when examining the harmfulness of an error that was committed in a criminal trial.3 Story, 383 A.2d at 162-64. We concluded that the proper standard of proof was “beyond a reasonable doubt” because “this standard is commensurate with the standard of proof in criminal trials that an accused cannot be convicted unless the trier of
The Story Court then turned its attention to addressing the definition of harmlessnessl Although the Court adopted the general “standard that an error cannot be held harmless unless the appellate court determines that the error could not have contributed to the verdict,” it observed that “the principle that an error is harmless if it did not contribute to the verdict only sets the stage for the harmless error inquiry.” /d. at 164. Accordingly, the Court sought to provide a thorough standard to apply when evaluating the harmfulness of a trial error. /d. at 164-69.
The Court then discussed, in detail, circumstances in which an appellate court can deem an error to have been harmless and, thus, should not disturb a defendant’s conviction or sentence As this Court recently explained, [t]his lengthy discussion [in Stoly] has been abbreviated and repeatedly articulated in subsequent cases as follows:
Harm|ess error exists if the state proves either: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the- erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so oven/vhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
Commonwea/th v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 493 (Pa` 2018). ln summary, the Story Court concluded that, when an appellate court determines that an error occurred during a criminal trial, the Commonwea|th bears the burden of persuading the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. The Commonwea|th must concentrate its argument on demonstrating that the error in question meets one or several of the three prongs of the Story standard lf an appellate court determines that the Commonwea|th has met its burden, then the court should deem the error harmless However, if the court concludes that the Commonwea|th failed in this regard, then it should grant the defendant a new trial.
Turning now to the termination of parental rights, just like in a criminal appeal, important competing interests and rights are in play when an appellate court concludes that an error occurred in a proceeding that culminated in the termination of a parent’s rights. For the parent, the trial court’s decree permanently extinguishes the fundamental rights that the parent enjoyed with respect to her child. See, e.g., Hil/er v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 883 (Pa. 2006) (explaining that the United States Supreme Court has “recognized the existence of a constitutionally protected right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”). Thus, when an error negatively impacts a court’s decision to terminate parental rights, our system of justice affords the parent a new hearing. See, e.g., /n re Sanders Childrer), supra However, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” /n re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251l 269 [J-10-2018] [l\/|O: Donohue, J.] - 6 (Pa. 2013). Recognizing this reality, our society strives “to expedite children’s placement in permanent, safe, stable, and loving homes” ld. Consistent with these goals, appellate courts should affirm decrees terminating parental rights when non-prejudicial errors occur during termination proceedings
Given the high stakes at issue when a court terminates parental rights, it is incumbent for this Court to provide to the bench and bar a more focused standard for examining whether an error that occurred during a termination hearing was harmless ln my view, the paradigm employed in Story provides an appropriate starting point for courts to assess whether an error that occurred during a termination proceeding was harmless Accordingly, utilizing Story as a springboard, l set forth below what l believe to be an appropriate harmless error standard for purposes of appeals from decrees that terminate parental rights
With respect to the proper standard of proof, it is well~sett|ed that, “in a proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to establish by ‘clear and convincing’ evidence the existence of grounds for doing so.” Il/latter of Adoption of G.T.M., 483 A.2d 1355, 1356 (Pa. 1984) (citing, inter alia, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). Accordingly, l would employ the “c|ear and convincing” standard of proof for purposes of a harmless error analysis in the termination setting. Further, consistent with the principle that the beneficiary of the error bears the burden of establishing that the error caused no injury, supra at 5 n.3, the petitioning party in termination cases, including a county agency such as CYS, should [J-10-2018] [l\/lO: Donohue, J.] - 7 generally carry the requisite burden of persuading the appellate court that any trial error was harmless,~‘§'6
As to the exact harmless error test to apply in the termination context, l believe that a slightly modified version of the three areas of inquiry provided in Story in criminal cases offers a suitable framework by which an appellate court can measure whether a trial error adversely impacted the fact-finder’s conclusion that a parent’s rights should be terminated See Story, 383 A.2d at 164 (stating that the “principle that an error is harmless if it did not contribute to the verdict only sets the stage for the harmless error inquiry"). Specifically, harmless error exists in the termination setting if the petitioning party adequately demonstrates that: (1) the error did not prejudice the parent or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence that termination of parental rights was proper was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the fact- finder’s determination
Applying this test to the matter sub judice, l conclude that CYS has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the orphans’ court’s error was harmless As noted above, CYS invokes the above-stated criminal harmless error test. CYS’s Brief at 16-17. Yet, CYS incorrectly suggests that it is l\/lother’s burden to prove that she was harmed by the
However, the l\/lajority’s painstaking summary of the record belies CYS’s position as the prejudicial effect caused by the erroneous admission of the 167 exhibits is pervasive l\/lajority Opinion at 22-30. lndeed, the l\/lajority Opinion cogently demonstrates that the error in this case could not be deemed harmless under any of the prongs of the Story harmless error analysis, as it is manifest that “the inadmissible exhibits provided the foundation for the orphans’ court to find clear and convincing evidence in support of termination under subsections (a) and (b) of the termination statute.” Id at 29. For these reasons l would: (1) vacate the Superior Court's judgment; (2) vacate the trial court decrees terminating l\/lother’s rights; and (3) remand the matter for a new hearing on CYS’s petition to terminate l\/lother’s parental rights. [J-10-2018] [l\/lO: Donohue, J.] - 9
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