At issue in this appeal is whether producers of natural gas from certain vertical wells are subject to assessment of the yearly impact fee established by Chapter 23 of the Oil and Gas Act ("Act 13"). 1 The vertical wells that are the subject of this proceeding utilize the hydraulic fracturing process, colloquially referred to as "fracking,"

*1058 to extract natural gas through a vertical well bore from the underlying geologic formation known as the Marcellus Shale. At the heart of this dispute is whether an impact fee will be assessed whenever a vertical well's production exceeds an average of 90,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day for even one month of the year, or whether the well must exceed this production threshold in every month of the year, for the fee to be imposed. After careful review, we conclude that, under the relevant provisions of Act 13, the impact fee will be imposed on such wells if their production exceeds 90,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day for even one month of the year, as found by the Public Utility Commission ("PUC"). Therefore, we reverse the Commonwealth Court's order, which had reversed the PUC, and we reinstate the PUC's order.

I. Background

An unconventional natural gas well is defined by Section 2301 of Act 13 as "[a] bore hole drilled or being drilled for the purpose of or to be used for the production of natural gas from an unconventional formation." 58 Pa.C.S. § 2301. Section 2301 describes an unconventional formation as

A geological shale formation existing below the base of the Elk Sandstone or its geologic equivalent stratigraphic interval where natural gas generally cannot be produced at economic flow rates or in economic volumes except by vertical or horizontal well bores stimulated by hydraulic fracture treatments or by using multilateral well bores or other techniques to expose more of the formation to the well bore.

58 Pa.C.S. § 2301. The Marcellus Shale is such an unconventional geologic formation. 2

Structurally, a vertical well, the type of well at issue in this case, is one in which a bore hole is drilled vertically downwards from a point on the land surface until it enters the top of a reservoir of natural gas pooled within an unconventional formation. By contrast, the other type of gas well commonly drilled to extract natural gas - a horizontal well - features a main bore hole drilled vertically downwards from a surface point to the depth of the natural gas reservoir in the formation, with one or more horizontal bore holes branching laterally from the main bore hole into the reservoir. Two or more horizontal bore holes extending laterally from a single vertical bore hole are referred to as multilateral bore holes. Joshi, PETROLEUM ENGINEERING - UPSTREAM - Horizontal and Multilateral Well Technolog y at 2, available at www.eolss.net . 3

*1059 Section 2302 of Act 13 provides for the imposition of an impact fee on every producer of natural gas from an unconventional well "spud" 4 in the Commonwealth where authorized by the County or municipality in which the well is located, if the County in which the well is located passes an ordinance authorizing the imposition of such a fee, or 50 percent of its municipalities pass resolutions authorizing the imposition of such a fee. Id. § 2302. A producer of natural gas from a vertical well must pay an impact fee if the well meets Act 13's definition of a "vertical gas well" - i.e. -- "[a]n unconventional gas well which utilizes hydraulic fracture treatment through a single vertical well bore and produces natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well." Id. § 2301. A "stripper well," in turn, is defined as "an unconventional gas well incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month." Id. 5 The impact fee on vertical gas wells is 20% of the fee imposed on producers from other unconventional gas wells, and vertical gas wells are exempt from assessment of such fees during their 11th through 15th years of production. Id. § 2301, 2302(f).

The impact fees for all unconventional wells are imposed on an annual flat, per-well basis, and calculated using the average annual price of natural gas during the calendar year in which the fee is assessed. Id. § 2302. Producers from unconventional wells are responsible under Section 2303 of Act 13 for self-reporting the amount of a well's production for each calendar year and are obligated to remit any impact fees they owe to the PUC, along with a $50.00 per-well administrative fee.

Section 2302 allows a suspension of the operator's obligation to pay the annual impact fee if, within two years of paying the initial impact fee, the well is capped, or, as is implicated by this appeal, the natural gas produced from the well falls below the statutory limit for stripper wells. If, however, gas production from the well once again rises above the stripper well production limit of 90,000 cubic feet per day during a particular calendar year, then, under Section 2302, the impact fee is re-imposed for that calendar year at the same rate as when payment was suspended. Id. § 2302(b.1). Once a well has ceased production altogether, and has been plugged in accordance with regulations of the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), the producer is no longer required to pay impact fees for the well. Id. § 2302(e).

Because it is relevant to our statutory analysis below, we briefly discuss how the General Assembly has structured the disbursement of the impact fees collected by the PUC. The PUC deposits all impact fee payments from producers into an "Unconventional Gas Well Fund" (the "Fund") in the state treasury. Id. § 2301, 2314. Under Section 2314 of Act 13, 40% of this fund is reserved for annual fixed distributions by the Commission to: county conservation districts for uses consistent with their statutory mission; the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission for review of drilling permits; the DEP for costs associated with administering Act 13; the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency to plan, coordinate, and train for accidents or incidents related to unconventional gas well operations; the Office of State Fire Commissioner *1060 for the development of training and funding programs for first responders and the acquisition of specialized equipment to deal with emergencies arising out of natural gas production from unconventional wells; and to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation for "rail freight assistance." Id. at § 2314(c), (c.1), and (c.2).

The remaining 60 percent of the money in the Fund is expressly reserved for counties and municipalities in which such unconventional gas wells are located, and which have authorized the imposition of an impact fee. Id. §§ 2302, 2314(d). Counties and municipalities are required to use the monies they receive from the Fund "for the following purposes associated with natural gas production from unconventional gas wells within the county or municipality":

(1) Construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of roadways, bridges and public infrastructure.

(2) Water, storm water and sewer systems, including construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair.

(3) Emergency preparedness and public safety, including law enforcement and fire services, hazardous material response, 911, equipment acquisition and other services.

(4) Environmental programs, including trails, parks and recreation, open space, flood plain management, conservation districts and agricultural preservation.

(5) Preservation and reclamation of surface and subsurface waters and water supplies.

(6) Tax reductions, including homestead exclusions.

(7) Projects to increase the availability of safe and affordable housing to residents.

(8) Records management, geographic information systems and information technology.

(9) The delivery of social services.

(10) Judicial services.

(11) For deposit into the county or municipality's capital reserve fund if the funds are used solely for a purpose set forth in this subsection.

(12) Career and technical centers for training of workers in the oil and gas industry.

(13) Local or regional planning initiatives under the act of July 31, 1968 (P.L. 805, No. 247 ), known as the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code.

58 Pa.C.S. § 2314 (g) (footnote omitted).

If money remains in the Fund, after these distributions are made, it is mandatorily transferred to a "Marcellus Legacy Fund," from which 40 percent of the money deposited therein is available to counties to use in repairing or replacing their "at-risk" deteriorated bridges, as well as projects which acquire or maintain lands for "recreational or conservation purposes." Id. § 2315.

II. Factual and Procedural History

Appellee, SBI, drilled, and during the relevant time period covered by this appeal - 2011 and 2012 - operated, a number of unconventional vertical wells in Pennsylvania. After reviewing SBI's annual well production reports for calendar years 2011 and 2012, the PUC's Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement ("I & E") determined that SBI had failed to properly identify on those reports 45 wells as "vertical gas wells," and that SBI failed to remit the requisite impact fees to the PUC for them. In 2014, I & E filed a complaint against SBI, seeking $507,586.00 in past due impact and administrative fees, plus penalties and interest for those wells, as well as requesting that SBI be ordered to pay an additional penalty of $50,000. SBI filed an answer to the complaint, denying liability on the basis of its contention that *1061 the wells produced insufficient quantities of gas to qualify as vertical gas wells and were, in fact, stripper wells, and thus exempt from the impact fee.

The matter was assigned for adjudication to PUC Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") David A. Salapa, who granted leave to intervene to Appellee the Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association ("PIOGA"), an industry trade association representing oil and gas producers. (Hereinafter, we will refer to SBI and PIOGA collectively as Appellees). In those proceedings, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Section 2301's definition of stripper well was unambiguous, and that, under its plain language, if an unconventional well produced 90,000 cubic feet per day of gas, or less, for even a single month in the annual reporting period, then the well was classified as a stripper well and exempt from the impact fee.

In its response, I & E contended that the term "any" in Section 2301's definition of stripper well, i.e. , "incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month," was ambiguous in that "any" can mean either "one or another taken at random," or "every." ALJ Opinion, 2/19/15, at 24. Thus, I & E argued that, because of this ambiguity, it was necessary to resort to the canons of statutory construction enumerated in Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act ("SCA") 6 in order to properly interpret this definition. In I & E's view, application of these factors yielded the conclusion that the objective of the impact fee provisions of Act 13 was "to provide relief to municipalities affected by unconventional gas wells," and that "this objective would be frustrated by exempting active producing wells from paying fees under Act 13 because their production falls below 90,000 [cubic feet] of gas per day for one month out of twelve." ALJ Opinion, 2/19/15, at 25. The ALJ denied Appellees' motion, but did not enter judgment for I & E, inasmuch as it had not made its own motion for summary judgment.

The ALJ subsequently held a hearing on December 4, 2014, at which he received testimony from a PUC representative as to how the impact fee and attendant penalties were computed for SBI's wells, as well as testimony from the Vice President of SBI in which he related his own understanding of the definition of a stripper well, and admitted his lack of knowledge as to the PUC's contrary interpretation at the time SBI submitted its production reports. Thereafter, on February 19, 2015, the ALJ issued an order sustaining I & E's complaint and its assessment of the back fees, interest, and penalties owed by SBI.

In his opinion accompanying this order, the ALJ framed the central question for his consideration as "whether the gas wells that [SBI] failed to identify in its annual reports to the [PUC] are 'vertical gas wells' subject to Act 13's impact and administrative fees or are 'stripper wells' not subject to Act 13's impact and administrative fees." ALJ Opinion, 2/19/15, at 23. Considering the definition of stripper well in Section 2301, he explained that he found the statutory language to be ambiguous, as evidenced by the fact that the PUC had to issue multiple interpretative orders to explain to producers how the impact fee was to be calculated under Act 13. These successive orders were a tentative "Implementation Order," issued on March 16, 2012, a final Implementation Order issued on May 10, 2012, a "Reconsideration Order" issued on July 19, 2012, a "Clarification Order" issued on December 20, 2012, and a "Proposed Rulemaking Order," issued on October 17, 2013. The ALJ noted that the PUC, in response to producer *1062 inquiries, had explained in its Reconsideration Order that, "if a 'vertical gas well' produced more than 90,000 [cubic feet] per day in any calendar month in a calendar year, that well would be subject to the impact fee." ALJ Opinion, 2/19/15, at 26 (quoting PUC Reconsideration Order, 7/19/12, at 5). The ALJ further observed that the PUC had also stated in its Proposed Rulemaking Order that, even if a vertical gas well only produces quantities of natural gas in excess of that of a stripper well for just one month during a calendar year, the impact fee must be paid for the well. The ALJ concluded that the PUC's interpretation of the statute, as set forth in its interpretative orders, was entitled to "great deference," because it is the administrative agency charged by Act 13 with enforcing and administering it. ALJ Opinion, 2/19/15, at 27. Consequently, the ALJ deemed the PUC's interpretation controlling, and, thus, concluded that it supported I & E's assessment of impact fees, interest, and penalties. 7

Appellees next appealed to the PUC, which issued an opinion upholding the ALJ's ruling. 8 Because a vertical gas well subject to assessment of an impact fee is defined by Section 2301 as producing "natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well," 58 Pa.C.S. § 2301, the PUC viewed the dispositive question as to whether a particular unconventional well is subject to assessment of the impact fee as whether or not the well met Section 2301's definition of a stripper well, i.e. , did not produce more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day in "any calendar month." PUC Opinion, 6/11/15, at 38 (quoting 58 Pa.C.S. § 2301 ).

The PUC agreed with the ALJ that the term "any" as used in the definition of stripper well was not plain. The PUC observed that, according to Black's Law Dictionary, the term "any" has two meanings, " 'all' or 'every' as well as 'some' or 'one.' " Id. at 39 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary at 94 (6th ed. 1990) ). Thus, the PUC considered the phrase "any calendar month" to be susceptible of two reasonable interpretations: The first, "every calendar month" - I & E's suggested interpretation - would relieve the imposition of the fee only if gas production dropped to or below 90,000 cubic feet per day in all calendar months of the reporting year. The second interpretation, offered by SBI and PIOGA - "one calendar month" - would prohibit imposition of the fee if, in just one month out of the year, production dropped to or below the 90,000 cubic foot per day production level, even if the well's production exceeded the 90,000 cubic foot per day level in all other months. Because each of *1063 these interpretations was reasonable, the PUC determined the use of the term "any" was ambiguous.

The PUC, applying the canons of statutory construction in Section 1921(a) of the SCA, 9 observed that "one of the primary purposes" for the imposition and collection of the impact fee was to provide financial assistance to municipalities in which drilling was taking place, and that, to restrict collection of such fees in circumstances where production dropped below the level in just one month out of the year, would thwart that purpose. Id. at 41. Also, the PUC expressed its concern that relieving a producer of having to pay an impact fee based on only one month's reduced production would create an incentive for "unscrupulous producers" to deliberately reduce production at a well during one month of a calendar year to avoid paying the fee for the whole year. Id.

Further, the PUC found that a prior version of the bill which ultimately became Act 13 defined a stripper well as being "incapable of producing more than 90,000 [cubic feet] of gas per day during a calendar month," a definition which more readily aligns with that proposed by Appellees. Id. at 42 (quoting H.B. No. 1950, P.N. 2837 (2011) ). However, during the consideration process, the legislature amended this language and replaced "a" with "any" in the final bill which became Act 13. From the PUC's perspective, this indicates that it was not the legislature's intent to grant an exemption from the impact fee based on only one month's reduced production.

Lastly, noting that this interpretation was consistent with that set forth in its previously issued Reconsideration and Proposed Rulemaking Orders, the PUC disputed Appellees' assertion that I and E's interpretation had been developed solely because of the instant litigation, given that these orders were issued long before this litigation began. For all of these reasons, the PUC adopted the decision of the ALJ, with some slight modifications not relevant to the present appeal, and ordered SBI to pay $390,250 in impact and administrative fees for 2011 and 2012, as well as $11,707.50 in interest and $97,562.50 in penalties for those years - a cumulative total of $499,520. Appellees appealed this order to the Commonwealth Court.

The Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc , reversed in a split, published decision. 10 Snyder Brothers v. PUC , 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa. Cmwlth 2017) ( en banc ). The majority acknowledged that "any" has a multiplicity of dictionary meanings, including those set forth in Webster's Dictionary, which defines "any" as "(1) one: or (2) one, some, or all regardless of quantity; (3) one or more; (4) great, unmeasured or unlimited in amount; and (5) all." Id. at 1023 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976) ). Nevertheless the court found the term "any" as used in the phrase "any month" in the definition of stripper well to be unambiguous.

*1064 According to the majority, the fact that, under Act 13, the impact fee is assessed per calendar year, the most natural reading of "any" in this context is that it means at least one month out of the calendar year. The majority further noted that, as used in the definition of stripper well, "any" modified a singular noun - month - thus, in accordance with grammatical rules, it took on the singular definition of the noun it was modifying and must mean "only one or a singular month." 157 A.3d at 1024 .

The majority found support for this conclusion in Commonwealth v. Davidson , 595 Pa. 1 , 938 A.2d 198 (2007), in which this Court addressed the question of whether a statute criminalizing the possession of various media containing images of child pornography penalized the possession of each image separately, or all of the images as a whole. The statute at issue provided that the law is violated by a person who "knowingly possesses or controls any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer depiction or other material" which depicts a minor "engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act." Davidson , 938 A.2d at 218-19 . Our Court found that the use of the term "any" meant without restriction or limitation; however, because the enumeration of the objects in the statute, i.e. , photograph, computer depiction etc., were all singular in nature, we concluded that this plain language made each separate act of possession of an image appearing in those formats a criminal offense. The Commonwealth Court herein reasoned that the presence of singular nouns in the definition of stripper well likewise supported ascribing to the term "any" its singular meaning - i.e. , "one." So, having found the phrase "incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month" plain and unambiguous, the court ruled that, whenever a gas well cannot produce more than 90,000 cubic feet per day in any one month of a calendar year, it must be classified as a stripper well for that year, and therefore is not subject to annual impact fees.

In arriving at this conclusion, the majority rejected the PUC's argument that its interpretation was consistent with the provision in Act 13 governing when a "restimulated" well 11 was subject to an impact fee under Section 2302(d) of Act 13, 58 Pa.C.S. § 2302(d). That section provides, in relevant part, that a restimulated well is subject to an impact fee for a "substantial increase in production" which it defines as "an increase in production amounting to more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during a calendar month." 58 Pa.C.S. § 2302(d)(3) (emphasis supplied). The majority did not accept the PUC's argument that this provision indicated the legislature intended that any well which has production in excess of 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day for even one calendar month is subject to the impact fee. The majority reasoned that fees for restimulated wells were "a unique brand of fees that are separate and distinct" from impact fees for vertical unconventional gas wells. Snyder Brothers , 157 A.3d at 1025 . 12

Although the majority expressed confidence in its plain meaning interpretation, it conceded that the interpretation offered by the PUC was "at the very least, reasonable."

*1065 Id. at 1026 . Thus, the majority proceeded to engage in its own statutory construction analysis, discounting all of the factors cited by the PUC in its analysis. First, the majority afforded no credence to the PUC's concern that, were Appellees' proffered interpretation adopted, well operators could avoid payment of the fee by simply reducing production in just a single month of a calendar year. The majority found no evidence of record that SBI had ever engaged in such manipulation of well production output. The majority then seemingly questioned the notion of whether any well operators would ever engage in such conduct. The majority suggested that such manipulation if it were to occur, would result in civil fines and penalties.

The majority also rejected the notion that the desire to collect more impact fees for the government was a legitimate basis for liberally construing the statute in the manner employed by the PUC. The majority noted that counties and municipalities were not intended to be the primary beneficiaries of the impact fee as they were only fifth in line to receive money from the impact fees, so it characterized them as mere "incidental" beneficiaries. Id. at 1027 . 13 The majority furthermore suggested that a county, in order to receive revenue from unconventional gas wells, was free to impose its own fees on such wells in an amount equivalent to the assessments payable to the PUC provided for Section 3202. 14 Additionally, the majority discounted the importance of the change in language from "a" to "any" from an earlier version of the bill, due to the absence of any legislative history explaining the reason for the change.

Further, the majority gave scant weight to the PUC's interpretation in its Proposed Rulemaking Order, as, in its view, that order was specifically defining the criteria for vertical gas wells, not stripper wells, and offered "no clarification or meaningful distinction between a vertical gas well and a stripper well." Id. at 1028 n.15. Consequently, the majority viewed the PUC's interpretation as one which was developed as a result of the instant litigation, not as part of the rulemaking process, and thus was not entitled to great deference.

Finally, the majority observed that, because civil penalties may be imposed under Act 13 for failure to pay the impact fee - up to 25 percent of the amount owed - this rendered the statute penal in nature. Thus, because the definitions of stripper well and vertical gas well were, in its view, vague and without meaningful distinction, the majority considered it necessary to apply the rule of lenity and strictly construe these definitions in favor of SBI, so as to avoid finding them unconstitutionally void for vagueness. For all of these reasons, the majority concluded that the term "any" meant "one" and not "all" or "every," and it reversed the Commission's order finding SBI in violation for failing to pay impact fees on the wells at issue.

Judge Wojcik, joined by Judge Cosgrove, filed a dissenting opinion. The dissent agreed with the PUC's interpretation of the statute, based on that body's application of the principles of statutory construction.

*1066 Like the PUC, the dissent found it significant that the word "a" appearing in an earlier version of the definition of stripper well in a prior version of Act 13 considered by the General Assembly was replaced by "any" in the final version of the bill that was passed, and, thus, indicated that the PUC's interpretation was consistent with legislative intent. The dissent found persuasive the PUC's concern that adopting Appellees' suggested construction would hinder the assessment of impact fees which would, in turn, thwart the primary legislative purpose of imposing such fees, which the dissent perceived as giving "relief to municipalities affected by unconventional gas drilling." Id. at 1031 . The dissent agreed with the PUC that Appellees' suggested construction gave drillers an incentive to deliberately reduce production levels in one month in order to avoid paying impact fees for the entire calendar year.

Lastly, the dissent rejected the argument that the statute should be strictly construed in favor of drillers, because, in the dissent's view, the legislative intent in enacting the statute could be determined by application of the principles of statutory construction, particularly the canon which requires substantial deference to the interpretation afforded the statute by the administrative agency which has the responsibility of enforcing it. Consequently, the dissent considered the PUC's prior interpretations set forth in its interpretative orders as entitled to great weight, which deference, in the dissent's view, the majority failed to exercise; hence, the dissent would have upheld the PUC's order and the attendant interest and penalties it imposed.

The PUC petitioned for allowance of appeal, asserting that the Commonwealth Court's finding that the definition of stripper well in Section 2301 was clear and unambiguous was erroneous, and, also, that the court's alternative statutory construction analysis was likewise in error. We granted the petition for allowance of appeal, 15 heard oral argument from the parties on April 11, 2018, and we now address both of the PUC's challenges.

III. Arguments of the Parties

The PUC argues the Commonwealth Court erred by finding that the definition of stripper well was clear and unambiguous, particularly since that court acknowledged that the term "any" had a multiplicity of dictionary meanings, one of which was singular, and one which was plural. Further, the PUC observes that the Commonwealth Court's conclusion is undercut by the fact that it took two years and two en banc oral arguments to decide this question, and as it engaged in an alternative ambiguity analysis in its opinion, which suggests it was not certain about its plain meaning approach. The PUC reiterates its view that the use of the term "any" is ambiguous and, thus, that statutory construction is warranted to choose which of the two arguably reasonable interpretations of that term is the correct one.

The PUC contends that the Commonwealth Court misread the provisions of Act 13. It disputes the Commonwealth Court's conclusion that Section 2302(d)(3) of Act 13, governing impact fees for restimulated wells, is irrelevant in determining whether these wells are subject to an impact fee. The PUC underscores that there is no separate "restimulation fee," as the Commonwealth Court concluded, but rather only one impact fee imposed on all unconventional gas wells that reach specified *1067 production levels. The PUC argues that, because Section 2302(d)(3) requires that an impact fee be assessed in the event that a restimulated well exceeds "90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during a calendar month," PUC Brief at 19 (quoting 58 Pa.C.S. § 2302(d)(3) ), this supports the conclusion that the legislature, as a general matter, conceived of the impact fee as payable for all wells that produce natural gas in an amount exceeding 90,000 cubic feet of gas a day in a single month of the calendar year. The PUC asserts that its construction of the definition of a stripper well is consistent with the legislative intent behind the imposition of the fee, namely, "to mitigate damages due to gas drilling and production, which damages accrue regardless of the ultimate productivity of a particular well." PUC Brief at 19-20.

Next, the PUC points out the Commonwealth Court's interpretation of these sections lead to an absurd and unreasonable result in practice, since, under this interpretation, a well producing, for example, 100,000 cubic feet for every month of a calendar year must pay the fee, whereas a well producing 200,000 cubic feet of gas a day in every month of the year but one, for which production decreases to 90,000 cubic feet of gas a day, would evade payment of the fee, even though the second well's total yearly production would be nearly two times greater than that of the first well. The PUC concludes that all of these factors establish that the language in question is far from clear and unambiguous.

The PUC next assails the Commonwealth Court's application of the relevant statutory construction factors in Section 1921(c) of the SCA. First, the PUC emphasizes that the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that counties and municipalities may impose their own separate assessments on gas wells, as Act 13 allows the imposition of only one impact fee, which is collected and disbursed by the PUC, and the Act contains no provision allowing counties and municipalities to impose their own additional fees. Consequently, there is no alternate source of revenue for the counties and municipalities from drilling activities within their borders.

Indeed, in the PUC's view, this initial erroneous assumption - that the counties and municipalities had the ability to impose their own fees - was the source of the Commonwealth Court's subsequent faulty conclusion that the PUC's statutory construction did not further the primary purpose of its enactment: providing counties and municipalities financial relief to offset the impacts of drilling. The PUC disputes the Commonwealth Court's conclusion that counties and municipalities can be considered merely "incidental beneficiaries" of the impact fee. PUC Brief at 25 (quoting Snyder Brothers , 157 A.3d at 1027 ). The PUC points out that municipalities are entitled to 60% of all revenue remaining in the Fund after the statutorily required fixed disbursements are made to conservation districts and state agencies. Moreover, municipalities may also apply to receive monies from the remaining 40% of the non-disbursed impact fee revenue, which is deposited into the Marcellus Legacy Fund to ameliorate the effects of drilling in their communities.

The PUC also decries the Commonwealth Court's disregard of the change in statutory text as this legislation was being considered, noting that one does not need accompanying legislative history to recognize that a change from "a" to "any" in the definition of stripper well had significance, in and of itself, because it clearly signified that the legislature intended to require well production to drop below the 90,000 cubic foot level in more than a single month in order for it to be classified as a stripper well.

Additionally, the PUC argues that the Commonwealth Court improperly characterized *1068 Act 13 as a penal statute because of its provisions imposing a fine for failure to pay the impact fee. The PUC asserts that the fines and other penalty provisions, see 58 Pa.C.S. §§ 2308 - 2310, are merely enforcement mechanisms to ensure the timely payment of the impact fees by producers, and, therefore, are wholly separate from the portion of the statute at issue in the present case, which sets forth the mechanism for assessment of the fee; hence, the application of the rule of lenity is inapplicable to interpretation of these non-penal provisions. The PUC further notes that, while taxing statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer, this presumption is not applied until all other efforts at statutory construction have proven fruitless; thus, even if the impact fee were to be considered a taxing statute, its use of the term "any" can be readily interpreted using the rules of statutory construction without resort to this presumption.

The PUC asserts, however, that the presumption that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result in enacting a statute is applicable in conducting a proper statutory construction analysis in this matter. The PUC contends that, based on the same reasons discussed in the first part of its brief, its construction avoids the absurd and unreasonable outcome where a producer is able to avoid paying the fee for a well for an entire year based on only one month's reduced production from the well. In the PUC's view, the Commonwealth Court's interpretation, by contrast, would constitute an inducement for operators to manipulate well production so as to avoid payment of the impact fee.

Lastly, the PUC maintains that the Commonwealth Court failed to accord the agency's interpretation the requisite degree of deference to which it was entitled, as it is the administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of the statute, and its interpretation is not clearly erroneous. The PUC disputes the Commonwealth Court's conclusion that it "flip flopped" on the question of what level of production is required for payment of the impact fee, observing that, in 2012 when it first had to interpret the statute and collect the fee, it stated in its Reconsideration Order that, if a vertical gas well exceeded the 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day production level in one month of a calendar year, then it was subject to the yearly impact fee, and it continued to adhere to this interpretation in its 2013 Implementation Order. Further, the PUC denies that it developed this interpretation in anticipation of litigation, noting that its interpretative orders were promulgated far in advance of the litigation. The PUC asserts that, because its interpretation was reasonable, it was entitled to deference and the Commonwealth Court overstepped its role in disregarding this interpretation. The PUC reminds that our Court has consistently reversed the Commonwealth Court for failing to accord administrative agencies the proper degree of deference in interpreting the statutes they are charged with administering.

In response, SBI contends the term "any" as used in the definition of stripper well is clear and unambiguous and means "one," as the Commonwealth Court found. SBI argues that this interpretation is in accord with its common and approved usage, and, thus, the Commonwealth Court properly read the statute as classifying a well as a stripper well if its production falls to or below a daily average of 90,000 cubic feet of gas in "any one month." SBI asserts that, if the legislature intended to require the well be incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day in all months of a calendar year in order to be exempt, it would have used more precise language, such as "every month," "each month," or "all months." SBI Brief *1069 at 11. SBI claims that the PUC is, in essence, interpreting this statutory language to create a presumption that, because a well is capable of exceeding the statutory production cap of 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day in one month of a calendar year, it is capable of doing so in all months. SBI contends there is no predicate factual basis for such an assertion. SBI argues that what the PUC is really doing with its proffered interpretation is attempting to broaden the scope of the definition of a stripper well in order to make more wells subject to the impact fee, and, thus, maximize the amount of revenue it is collecting on behalf of counties and municipalities.

SBI next argues that, even were our Court to consider the term "any" to be ambiguous, application of the rules of statutory construction yields the same conclusion that the definition of "any" means one. First, SBI contends that, because Section 2308(b) of Act 13 imposes substantial penalties on producers who fail to pay the impact fee, it is a penal statute and thus should be narrowly construed under the rule of lenity. SBI renews its prior contention, made before the ALJ and PUC, but not addressed by the Commonwealth Court, that the impact fee is actually a tax, despite not being labelled as such, and, as a result, its terms should be construed in SBI's favor under Section 1928(b)(3) of the SCA, which requires strict construction of statutory "[p]rovisions imposing taxes." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(3). SBI argues that, because the impact fee is a revenue producing measure which generates a large amount of money for counties, and is disproportionately greater than the costs incurred in collection and supervision fees incurred by the PUC in its collection, it must be considered a tax. Additionally, SBI maintains that, because the greatest bulk of the revenue generated by the impact fee is used for a multiplicity of purposes unrelated to defraying the costs incurred by the PUC's regulation of unconventional gas drilling, including possibly the reduction of other taxes, such uses further support the conclusion that the impact fee is really a tax in another guise.

Finally, SBI claims that the PUC's interpretation of the term "any" is entitled to no deference since the Commonwealth Court's interpretation tracks the plain meaning of the term as used in the statute. Moreover, in SBI's view, the PUC's related administrative orders were not enacted according to formal rulemaking procedures which require public notice, the opportunity for public comment, and review of those comments by the Attorney General and the Independent Regulatory Review Commission. 16 Therefore, as mere "non-legislative rules," or agency "pronouncements," they are not entitled to the "particularly high measure of deference" as rules which are the product of the formal rulemaking process. SBI Brief at 24 (quoting Northwestern Youth Services v. DPW , 620 Pa. 140 , 66 A.3d 301 , 310-311 (2013) ). SBI further avers that the PUC's current definition of "any" was developed in response to this litigation, and is at odds with its prior view that "any" meant one, which it took in its prior Proposed Rulemaking Order. SBI notes that, in that order, the PUC interpreted the term "any" as having a singular meaning in discussing when an unconventional well is a vertical gas well - namely, if well production exceeds 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day in any month.

In its response to the PUC, PIOGA argues that the meaning of the term "any"

*1070 must be determined by the context in which it is used in Act 13's definition of stripper well, and when that context is considered, it was clearly meant to have a singular meaning. PIOGA discounts the PUC's reliance on the multiple meanings ascribed to this word enumerated in the dictionary, as, in its view, this means nothing, arguing that, merely because a word is capable of multiple meanings does not indicate that it must have alternative meanings. PIOGA contends that, because the meaning of the term "any" as used in the stripper well definition is clear, the Commonwealth Court's ambiguity analysis is superfluous dicta which this Court should strike, particularly since PIOGA agrees with the PUC that the Commonwealth Court's opinion erroneously stated that counties may independently impose their own fees at the local level.

PIOGA, however, agrees with the Commonwealth Court that maximizing revenue to governmental bodies is not an acceptable statutory construction factor. It also argues that, because there was no explanation from the General Assembly as to why the word "a" in the earlier form of this legislation was changed to "any", this change may not be considered relevant legislative history. PIOGA Brief at 19.

PIOGA further attacks PUC's reliance on its prior interpretative orders to furnish a suitable definition of "any", due to the fact that, in those orders, the PUC was not interpreting the definition of a stripper well, but, rather, was setting forth the production levels required for vertical gas wells to be subject to the impact fee. PIOGA asserts that the PUC gave the term "any" its singular meaning in that context by declaring that, if a vertical gas well produces more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day in any single calendar month of the reporting year, it will be subject to the fee for that year. PIOGA argues that PUC cannot have it both ways by stating in its orders that a vertical well is subject to the impact fee if in any month the production exceeds 90,000 cubic feet of gas a day, which assigns to "any" its singular meaning, while at the same time arguing that, for a well to be classified as a stripper well, its production must fall below the 90,000 cubic feet of gas a day cap in every month of the calendar year, giving "any" a plural meaning. PIOGA asserts that both interpretations cannot be correct. PIOGA also contends that the PUC's interpretation is not entitled to deference inasmuch as this is a purely legal question of statutory interpretation, an area in which the PUC has no special expertise. 17

*1071 IV. Analysis

Because issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. SEPTA v. City of Philadelphia , 627 Pa. 470 , 101 A.3d 79 , 87 (2014). It is axiomatic that, "if the General Assembly defines words that are used in a statute, those definitions are binding." PUC v. Andrew Seder/The Times Leader , 635 Pa. 570 , 139 A.3d 165 , 173 (2016). Our interpretation of the relevant definitional language at issue in this case is guided by the precepts of the SCA, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501 - 1991. Pursuant to the SCA, the overriding object of all statutory interpretation and construction "is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly" in enacting the statute under review. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Correspondingly, we are required to interpret or construe a statute so as to give effect to all of its provisions, "if possible." Id. If statutory language is "clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Thus, when the words of a statute have a plain and unambiguous meaning, it is this meaning which is the paramount indicator of legislative intent.

However, in situations where the words of a statute "are not explicit," the legislature's intent may be determined by considering any of the factors enumerated in Section 1921(c). DEP v. Cumberland Coal , 628 Pa. 17 , 102 A.3d 962 , 975 (2014). These factors are:

(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.

(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.

(3) The mischief to be remedied.

(4) The object to be attained.

(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.

(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.

(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.

(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).

Further, the SCA establishes specific presumptions applicable to the interpretation and construction of all statutes which are aids in determining legislative intent. Three of these presumptions are apposite to the case at bar: (1) "the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable," (2) "the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain," and (3) "the General Assembly intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1), (2), and (5).

We begin by noting that, despite the parties' and the Commonwealth Court's primary focus in their arguments on the proper interpretation of the definition of "stripper well" in Section 2301, it is not that definition, standing alone, which is dispositive of the central question in this case. As recognized by the ALJ in this matter, the fundamental issue raised by I & E's investigation and complaint, and which was the subject of his adjudication that triggered the subsequent appellate proceedings below, was "whether the gas wells that [SBI] failed to identify in its annual reports to the Commission are 'vertical gas wells' subject to Act 13's impact and administrative fees or are 'stripper wells' not subject to Act 13's impact and administrative fees." ALJ Opinion, 2/19/15, at 23. Consequently, the pivotal question presented by this appeal remains whether the 45 unconventional vertical wells at issue meet Section 2301's definition of "vertical gas well," as alleged by the PUC, and are subject to the assessment of an impact fee; thus, it is the definition of "stripper *1072 well," as it has been incorporated and utilized in the definition of "vertical gas well," which is controlling of our resolution of this question.

As noted, Section 2301 defines a "vertical gas well" as "an unconventional gas well which ... produces natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well." 58 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (emphasis added). A "stripper well," in turn, is "an unconventional gas well incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month." Id. Accordingly, in order for SBI's wells to have qualified as vertical gas wells during the calendar years 2011 and 2012, they must have produced natural gas in excess of the production ceiling which categorizes a well as a stripper well - in other words, they must have produced "more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month." 18 Id. In making the determination of whether the wells in question exceeded this production level, we are required to interpret the word "any" as used in the relevant production time frame - namely, "any calendar month."

The word "any," which is not otherwise defined by Act 13, nor by the SCA, 19 has two commonly accepted alternative meanings in the English language which are diametrically opposed. Black's Law Dictionary recognizes this "diversity of meaning," which is dependent on the context in which "any" is used in a statute, as well as the statute's overarching subject; thus, "any" could mean " 'all' or 'every,' as well as 'one.' " Black's Law Dictionary 94 (6th ed. 1991). This definitional dichotomy is also recognized by dictionaries of the English Language. See Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 96 (2001) (defining "any" as "one," and, alternatively, as "every," or "all"); The American Heritage Dictionary 117 (2nd. coll. ed. 1982) (enumerating varying definitions of "any" to include "one or another without restriction or exception," or "[t]he whole amount of; all").

Our Court's jurisprudence has also held that the term "any" can have either of these two divergent meanings, depending on how it is used in a particular statute. Compare Commonwealth v. Heller , 219 Pa. 65 , 67 A. 925 , 926 (1907) (interpreting terms "any city" in statutory enactment which enabled cities of the third class which owned water, gas, or electrical facilities to establish a department for the provision of these services to their citizens, as referring to individual third class cities which met this ownership criteria, not all third class cities which have such facilities within their borders; " 'any city' ... primarily refers to cities individually. It may include all, but does not necessarily do so.") with In re Estate of Belefski , 413 Pa. 365 , 196 A.2d 850 , 851, 855 (1964) (holding that statute which provided that amounts payable from Commonwealth Retirement Fund for public employees were "exempt from any State or municipal tax," included all taxes such as the Pennsylvania inheritance tax; "[t]he word 'any' is generally *1073 used in the sense of 'all' or 'every' and its meaning is most comprehensive."). Thus, we consider the meaning of the term "any" to be wholly dependent on the context in which it is used in the particular statute under review. See generally In re Estate of Wilner , 636 Pa. 277 , 142 A.3d 796 , 804-05 (2016) ("[L]egislative words are to be read in their context and not in isolation."); O'Rourke v. Commonwealth , 566 Pa. 161 , 778 A.2d 1194 , 1201 (2001) (same); accord Heller Benat v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 191 Pa.Super. 547 , 159 A.2d 23 , 25 (1960) ("[T]he word 'any' is not susceptible of a categorical definition meaning 'all' or 'every' ... The significance of the word 'any' is discoverable in its context."), affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court opinion , Benat v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association , 402 Pa. 208 , 166 A.2d 880 (1961).

If a statutory term, when read in context with the overall statutory framework in which it appears, has at least two reasonable interpretations, then the term is ambiguous. A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police , 636 Pa. 403 , 143 A.3d 896 , 906 (2016). Because the alternative definitions of "any" are equally plausible, and as neither is absurd or unreasonable on its face, we find that "any," as used in this context, is ambiguous. Trust Under Agreement of Taylor , 640 Pa. 629 , 164 A.3d 1147 , 1156 (2017) ; see also McGrath v. Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, State Board of Nursing , 643 Pa. 281 , 173 A.3d 656 , 662 n. 8 (2017) ("[T]he 'not explicit' prerequisite of [ 1 Pa.C.S. 1921(c) ] logically applies where ... any reading of the statute's plain text raises non-trivial interpretive difficulties." (emphasis original) ). Hence, we resort to the statutory construction factors enumerated in Section 1921(c) of the SCA is necessary to determine the proper construction of this term.

Turning to these factors, we first find "[t]he occasion and necessity for the statute;" the circumstances under which it was enacted;" and "the object to be attained," as well as the legislative history of Act 13, to be particularly helpful in discerning the relevant legislative intent behind the enactment of the impact fee. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(1), (2), (4), and (7). 20

*1074 Contrary to the characterization of the Commonwealth Court, counties and municipalities are no mere "incidental" beneficiaries of the impact fee. Rather, as the legislative history and statutory structure of this provision demonstrates, they are the primary intended beneficiaries of this fee. As our Court has previously observed, the process of drilling and operating an unconventional gas well utilizing the fracking process - an industrial land use - has significant effects on the communities in which it occurs. In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth , 623 Pa. 564 , 83 A.3d 901 , 979 (2013), a plurality of our Court noted that communities in which such well drilling and extraction occur suffer "environmental and habitability costs associated with this particular industrial use: air, water, and soil pollution; persistent noise, lighting, and heavy vehicle traffic; and the building of facilities incongruous with the surrounding landscape." Justice Baer, concurring separately in that seminal case, also detailed the significant deleterious aspects of the various activities attendant to unconventional well drilling and operation: "these industrial-like operations include blasting of rock and other material, noise from the running of diesel engines, sometimes nonstop for days, traffic from construction vehicles, tankers, and other heavy-duty machinery, the storage of hazardous materials, constant bright lighting at night, and the potential for life-and property-threatening explosions and gas well blowouts." Id. at 1005 (Baer, J., concurring).

The legislative debates which occurred during the adoption of Act 13 indicate the General Assembly was cognizant of how the myriad activities associated with the drilling and production operations of unconventional gas wells would have negative repercussions on a municipality's physical infrastructure, thereby causing their governments to incur increased costs to maintain or upgrade that infrastructure, as well as necessitate that those bodies make added expenditures for the provision of public services to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their populace. Statements made by proponents of the impact fee provisions of Act 13 during these debates highlight the fact that the impact fee was specifically intended to enable local municipalities to ameliorate these effects.

As then-Representative now Speaker Turzai, a leading sponsor of this measure, eloquently observed:

Through the impact fee, in the first year alone, $190 million is going to be taken and returned to our local communities for the impacts that occur. By year 5, it will be $400 million annually. And in the first 10 years, it is $3 billion.

* * *

Impact fees generally, and this one in particular, are used to provide for a number of uncompensated costs currently being absorbed by local communities in the State. These include the ability to fund upgrades to affected roads and bridges, water and sewer systems, which are being strained, admittedly by increased usage.

* * *

Another important feature tied to the impacts is the fact that as the price of natural gas rises, this will likely equal additional drilling, which will, in turn, mean higher impacts to address. So there should be more revenues to address those higher impacts. The sliding-scale approach, based on the per Mcf (1,000 cubic feet) development of the natural gas, is a commonsense mechanism. It is still an impact fee nonetheless.

It is also important to note that impact fees differ in that they are historically authorized through a State's authority to protect the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens, and that is exactly what we *1075 are doing in this prime legislation. The impact fee we are addressing is designed to provide for infrastructure improvements based upon direct impacts, which have created a strain throughout the State, and to provide services that are vital to the health, welfare, and safety of each and every Pennsylvania citizen.

House Legislative Journal 210-11 (Feb. 8, 2012); see also Id. at 208 (Remarks by Representative Reed, a cosponsor of Act 13) (noting that the first key component of the conference committee report which became Act 13 was the impact fee "that over the next decade will bring $3 billion to our local communities across this Commonwealth to offset the impacts of the industry on our citizens " (emphasis added) ). 21 ^, 22

Accordingly, the General Assembly structured the impact fee in a manner to ensure that it would provide counties and municipalities with a sufficient revenue stream to meet their additional drilling-related needs by making these governmental entities the primary recipients of the monies the PUC collects through the fee. As noted by the PUC, counties and municipalities are entitled to the largest portion of the monies which this fee generates, given that they are allocated 60% of the revenues paid by producers into the Fund, and they are the entities designated to receive the largest percentage share of any remainder funds transferred from the Fund to the Marcellus Legacy Fund. 58 Pa.C.S. §§ 2314 & 2315. The overarching legislative purpose of assuring that counties and municipalities will be able to rectify the adverse consequences of unconventional drilling activities within their communities is further evidenced by the fact that the General Assembly specifically restricted the use of these funds to "purposes associated with natural gas production from unconventional gas wells," 58 Pa.C.S. § 2314(g), thereby safeguarding against their depletion for unrelated purposes.

Consequently, given the evident intent of the legislature that the impact fee provide an adequate and stable source of revenue for counties and municipalities to offset the adverse effects of unconventional gas well production, which, as the PUC highlights, are omnipresent and do not vary with the fluctuations in well production, see PUC Brief at 19-20, a construction *1076 which best effectuates this purpose is favored. Thus, an interpretation of "any calendar month" in the definition of a stripper well, as incorporated into the definition of "vertical gas well," to mean "each and every" calendar month during the reporting year is most consonant with this purpose, as it relieves producers of the obligation to pay the fee only if their well or wells produce 90,000 cubic feet per day or less of natural gas for each and every calendar month of the year. 23 As the PUC argues, this will result in more producers paying the impact fee - exactly what the General Assembly intended. See generally PUC Brief at 26 (characterizing the overall legislative intent in enacting the stripper well provisions of Act 13 as "to capture more wells and fees").

Second, this construction is consistent with the overall legislative design of the provisions of Act 13 governing when other types of unconventional gas wells, namely, "nonproducing unconventional gas wells" and "restimulated unconventional gas wells," are subject to assessment of an impact fee. 24 As we have previously emphasized, "[w]hen construing one section of a statute, courts must read that section not by itself, but with reference to, and in light of, the other sections." Trust Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1155 . Stated another way, "[s]tatutory language must be read in context, 'together and in conjunction' with the remaining statutory language." Id .; see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2) (presuming that the "General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain."). Thus, we must read all of the impact fee assessment provisions set forth in Section 2302 in conjunction with one another and strive to give effect to all of them. Allegheny Sportsmen's League v. Rendell , 580 Pa. 149 , 860 A.2d 10 , 18 (2004).

Section 2302(b.1), governing "nonproducing unconventional gas wells," provides that if a well which has begun paying the impact fee is capped, or "does not produce natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well within two years after paying the initial fee, then the fee shall be suspended." 58 Pa.C.S. § 2302(b.1). However, it also specifies that "[t]he fee shall be reinstated for a calendar year during which the unconventional gas well produces natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well." Id. § 2302(b.1)(1). Thus, this statutory language, and the use of the phrase "during which," mandates payment of the impact fee for any nonproducing unconventional gas well whenever at some point during a calendar year it produces natural gas in *1077 quantities greater than a stripper well, which means, as discussed above, producing "more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month." Therefore, we interpret this section as establishing that a nonproducing unconventional well will meet this criteria, and thus be required to pay the impact fee, if it produces more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day at any point during the calendar year, even if it is only for one month. This supports a conclusion that the legislature intended that an impact fee is due and payable whenever any unconventional gas well produces more than 90,000 cubic feet per day of natural gas for even one month of a calendar year.

Likewise, the manner in which an impact fee is imposed for a restimulated unconventional gas well supports this construction. Section 2302(d), 25 setting forth the manner of calculating impact fees for such wells, provides that, if an unconventional gas well, which was drilled more than 10 years ago and was producing natural gas in a volume less than that of a stripper well, is restimulated 26 and, as a result, experiences a "substantial increase in production" - defined as "amounting to more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during a calendar month"- it becomes subject to assessment of the impact fee. 58 Pa.C.S. § 2302(d)(2), (3) (emphasis added). Thus, under this provision, a restimulated unconventional gas well will be subject to the imposition of an impact fee whenever it exceeds 90,000 cubic feet a day of natural gas production for even a single calendar month. Our construction, therefore, renders all of the provisions of Act 13 governing the imposition of impact fees on various types of unconventional gas wells harmonious with one another.

Third, this construction is in accord with the PUC's interpretation of the relevant statutory language set forth in its prior administrative orders. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(8) (interpretations of statutory language by the administrative agency tasked with its implementation may be considered in construing its meaning). Herein, the PUC has faithfully adhered to its construction since it was first called upon in 2012 to interpret the impact fee provisions of Act 13 in response to inquiries and comments from natural gas producers.

In a Reconsideration Order issued in July 2012, disposing of a reconsideration petition filed by producers regarding the PUC's treatment of vertical gas wells in an Initial Tentative Implementation Order promulgated earlier that year, the PUC noted:

*1078 [A] vertical gas well derives its status based on production levels. These production levels are determined per day during any calendar month. If a vertical gas well qualifies as such, via production levels, during any calendar month in a calendar year, that well will be subject to the impact fee.

PUC Reconsideration Order, 7/19/12, at 4.

Once more, in December 2012, the PUC again addressed the subject of when a vertical well is subject to assessment of an impact fee, this time in response to queries regarding a well that is "spud," or first drilled, in a particular calendar year, but later plugged during that same year. In a Clarification Order, the PUC stated:

In the case of a vertical unconventional gas well, the fee is triggered and accrues at the moment the well meets minimum production criteria in a given calendar year. If a vertical well is later plugged during a year in which it had met that minimum production level, the fee is nonetheless payable since it had accrued upon that well meeting the production criteria set forth in Section 2301.

PUC Clarification Order, 12/20/12, at 9 (emphasis original).

Almost a year later, the PUC reiterated the same principle, yet again, in a Proposed Rulemaking Order:

[V]ertical gas wells derive their status based on production levels. Those production levels are determined per day during any calendar month. 58 Pa.C.S. § 2301. If a vertical gas well qualifies as a vertical gas well, via production levels, during any calendar month in a calendar year, that well will be subject to the impact fee. 58 Pa.C.S §§ 2301, 2392(f).

In order for the Commission to determine whether a vertical gas well is subject to the impact fee, producers must verify certain production information for the corresponding reporting year to the Commission to ensure that a particular well qualifies as a vertical gas well and is therefore subject to the fee. All vertical gas wells on the Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) spud list as of December 31 of each year will be subject to the fee for that year unless the producer verifies to the Commission that a particular well did not produce natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well during any calendar month in the reporting year. This means that even if a vertical gas well produces natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well in only one month of a calendar year, that vertical well will be subject to the fee for that year. Producers must verify on their annual producer report forms filed with the Commission, by April 1 of each year, certain production level information for all vertical gas wells for which a fee is not due.

Proposed Rulemaking Order, 10/17/13, at 7-8 (emphasis original) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 27

Moreover, the PUC has advanced sound policy reasons supporting its interpretation which were accorded no weight by the Commonwealth Court. 28 The PUC concluded *1079 that, if a producer were able to avoid paying the impact fee for a vertical well based solely on one month during which its output fell to that of a stripper well, this would be an incentive for producers to manipulate a well's production to avoid payment of the impact fee. To be clear, there is no indication in the record that SBI engaged in this kind of behavior. Nonetheless, we defer to the PUC's judgment that, as a general matter, this is a legitimate administrative concern.

Indeed, the record in this matter furnishes support for the PUC's conclusion that varying a well's production is an ability its operator possesses. As acknowledged by SBI's Vice President, reductions in well output are within the operator's control, and they may occur as the result of something as benign as routine maintenance activities. N.T. ALJ Hearing, 12/4/14, at 84. Consequently, the PUC's interpretation ensures stability in the impact fee assessment process. The contrary interpretation advanced by Appellees would lead to an unreasonable result, as it would permit well operators who have enjoyed robust production from their wells for the majority of a calendar year to avoid paying the impact fees to the municipalities merely because of the happenstance of one month's diminished production. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(6) (the consequences of a particular interpretation may be considered in any statutory construction analysis); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (the legislature "does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable."). Moreover, such an interpretation would impermissibly favor the private financial interests of producers over the public interest of counties and municipalities in having sufficient fiscal capabilities to protect their residents from the deleterious effects of unconventional drilling activities. This would contravene the SCA's presumption that the intent of the General Assembly in enacting legislation is "to favor the public interest as against any private interest." Vitac Corporation v. W.C.A.B. (Rozanc) , 578 Pa. 574 , 854 A.2d 481 , 485 (2004) (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(5) ). It was, therefore, error for the Commonwealth Court to summarily disregard the PUC's interpretation. See Alpha Auto Sales v. Department of State , 537 Pa. 353 , 644 A.2d 153 , 155 (1994) (holding that because the administrative agency had rendered "a sensible construction of the statute in question supported by cogent policy considerations," it was error for the Commonwealth Court to ignore it).

In conclusion, for all of the aforementioned reasons, we hold that, under Act 13, an unconventional vertical well is a "vertical gas well" subject to assessment of an impact fee for a calendar year whenever that well's natural gas production exceeds 90,000 cubic feet per day in at least one calendar month of that year. Because it is undisputed that the wells at issue in this case met this criteria, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court which set aside the PUC's assessment to SBI of impact fees for the 2011 and 2012 reporting years.

Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 29

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Donohue and Dougherty join the opinion.

Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion in which Justice Baer joins.

Justice Mundy files a dissenting opinion.

*1080 CONCURRING OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT

I join in today's result, which the learned Majority reaches by way of an exemplary analysis and opinion. Elsewhere, I have discussed the maddening complexities that can arise when we are called upon to construe the short yet elusive term "any." See Commonwealth v. Ricker , 642 Pa. 367 , 170 A.3d 494 , 510-13 (2017) (Wecht, J., dissenting). Because "any" is manifestly ambiguous as codified in the definition of "Stripper well" provided at Section 2301 of Act 13, 1 we must resort to our familiar enterprise of statutory interpretation.

The Majority faithfully recites and applies several factors listed in the Statutory Construction Act 2 as guides for ascertaining legislative intent when the General Assembly's words "are not explicit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). As part of that analysis, the Majority performs a close and careful reading of the relevant statutory provisions within the context of the "statutory structure," Maj. Op. at 1074, 1075-76, and "the overall legislative design," Id. at 1076. As the Majority astutely recognizes, Act 13 is designed to provide relief to municipalities impacted by unconventional wells. Id. at 1075-76.

Section 2314 establishes the Unconventional Gas Well Fund ("Fund"), into which the Public Utility Commission ("PUC") deposits all impact fee payments collected from unconventional natural gas producers. The statute also details the authorized disbursements from the Fund. The Fund is largely reserved for counties and municipalities which have elected to impose an impact fee, see 58 Pa.C.S. §§ 2314(d), 2302(a.3), and must be used specifically to offset or address the impact of unconventional gas wells in those localities. Id. § 2314(g). The Marcellus Legacy Fund, which separately retains a portion of impact fees remaining after required disbursements from the Fund, is largely available for use by counties and municipalities as well. Id. § 2315.

These provisions demonstrate that the purpose of Act 13 is to afford relief to municipalities in order to mitigate the effects of unconventional gas wells. The provisions of Act 13 supply the context necessary to construe the legislature's use of the word "any" at issue in this case. The objective of Act 13 would be frustrated by exempting active wells from paying impact fees upon the happenstance that production levels fall below the requisite threshold in a single month out of twelve. Moreover, although there has been no suggestion that Snyder Brothers, Inc., ("SBI") intentionally lowered production in order to avoid paying the impact fee, the interpretation that SBI suggests would incentivize unscrupulous producers to reduce well production in a single month of the year in order to avoid the statutory payment obligation, thereby thwarting the object of Act 13.

As the Majority observes, it is consistent with the overall legislative design of Act 13 to construe "any" within the definition of *1081 stripper well to mean that the impact fee is waived only for wells that "produce 90,000 cubic feet per day or less of natural gas for each and every calendar month of the year." Maj. Op. at 1076. The Act requires producers to pay the impact fee for "restimulated unconventional gas wells" that produce in excess of "90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during a calendar month." 58 Pa.C.S. § 2302(d)(3). This provision parallels the definition of stripper well at issue in this case, and indicates the General Assembly's intent to impose the impact fee on wells that exceed the threshold level of production in one month of a calendar year and to exempt marginal, low-producing wells. Similarly, a "nonproducing unconventional gas well," see Id. § 2302(b.1), is one that produces natural gas below the threshold established for a stripper well within two years of paying the impact fee. For such wells, the impact fee is suspended, but will be reinstated "for a calendar year during which the unconventional gas well produces natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well." Id. § 2302(b.1)(1). As the learned Majority recognizes, this tells us that the General Assembly intended to impose the impact fee upon nonproducing wells whenever such wells produce quantities in excess of 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day for even one month in the calendar year.

From my perspective, this statutory analysis does the lion's share of the work needed to discern the legislative intent and to decide this appeal. I have concerns with two other interpretive tools that the Majority uses, as I explain below.

Our lawmakers have told us that, "[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters " eight factors. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) (emphasis added). 3 This provision does not require courts to consider any particular factor, nor does it constrain courts' ability to look elsewhere to discern legislative intent. I write separately to urge a disciplined circumspection-and a healthy skepticism-when courts resort to the last two of the enumerated factors: "[t]he contemporaneous legislative history" (factor 7) and "[l]egislative and administrative interpretations of such statute" (factor 8). See Id. § 1921(c)(7), (8). 4

In surveying the legislative history, the Majority embarks diligently upon a review of "earlier versions" of the legislation that became Act 13, versions apparently left behind in the drafting or negotiating process, but whose abandonment, rejection, or desuetude I cannot reliably ascribe to any uniform or discernible cause. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 1070 & n.17, 1072 n.19. Pressing on in its quest for meaning within the legislative history, the Majority seeks "contemporaneous explanation in the committee report," and, finding none, seeks enlightenment in the "floor debate," including extensive *1082 quotation of an "eloquent[ ] observ[ation]" by "a leading sponsor of th[e] measure." Id. at 1072 n.19, 1074-75, 1075 n.21.

As a general matter, I am skeptical about the utility of examining draft bills, committee reports, and floor statements to discern correctly each legislator's own subjective motivations, much less the collective intent of the entire body. Indeed, while both parties here cite to the legislative history of Act 13, they draw opposite conclusions from it. Compare Brief for Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Association (PIOGA) at 19-20, 20 n.21 (arguing that a committee report and fiscal note contemporaneous with the development of Act 13 establish that stripper wells were always intended to be exempt from the impact fee), with Brief for PUC at 26 (asserting that the language used in a legislative draft indicates that the General Assembly intended to capture more wells and fees). 5 I do not agree that parsing the legislative history of Act 13's provisions reveals a definitive answer to the question before us today. Indeed, I am uncertain that doing so is bound to lead us to a correct assessment of the General Assembly's intent in the first place.

Even if I believed that legislative history could be helpful in resolving the present dispute, I would not know where to begin. Should I review the House Legislative Journal or the Senate Legislative Journal? Should I consider the statements of all Act 13 sponsors, or only the "leading" sponsors, or perhaps only those whose observations strike me as "eloquent"? Should I, like the Majority, review committee reports as well? This last category seems to me a rabbit hole that is especially dark, winding, and deep. 6

*1083 Doubtless, a diligent attorney who mines all of these sources could uncover some material that supports the arguments of SBI and PIOGA, some that supports the arguments of the PUC, and some that is ambiguous enough to support either (or indeed "any," if one can forgive the usage) argument. This strikes me as an obvious instance when using legislative history to discern the General Assembly's intent is, to paraphrase the late Judge Harold Leventhal of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, "the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends." Conroy v. Aniskoff , 507 U.S. 511 , 519, 113 S.Ct. 1562 , 123 L.Ed.2d 229 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Although the Statutory Construction Act allows us to consider legislative history as an interpretive tool, its use may distort "the voice of the statute itself." 7 I perceive a need for a healthy caution, skepticism, and discipline with respect to courts' reliance upon legislative history.

The Majority also affords significant-indeed substantial-deference to the PUC's interpretation of the statute. Maj. Op. at 1077-79. I recognize that the General Assembly has told us that we "may" do this where the statute is ambiguous. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(8). 8 I confess that I generally am disinclined to avail myself of this discretionary authority. Set aside agency rulemaking power, which is robust, and which is entitled to a healthy judicial respect. See generally Bucks Cty. Servs., Inc. v. Phila. Parking Auth., --- Pa. ----, 195 A.3d 218 , 242 (2018) (Wecht, J. concurring). Consider instead this idea of consigning or offloading to an administrative agency the power to tell us what a law means. The General Assembly tells us what a law is. When that law is less than clear, we must perform our interpretive duty. In cases involving ambiguous statutory language, the interpretation suggested by an agency charged with administering the statute may be considered, but "the meaning of a statute is essentially a question of law for the court." Phila. Suburban Corp. v. Cmwlth., Bd. of Fin. & Revenue , 535 Pa. 298 , 635 A.2d 116 , 118 (1993) (quoting Girard Sch. Dist. v. Pittenger , 481 Pa. 91 , 392 A.2d 261 , 263 (1978) ). Statutory interpretation is an important part of the work that we do. We do not subcontract that interpretive enterprise to administrative agencies.

Finally, I offer a word of caution with regard to the Majority's reliance on "policy." See Maj. Op. at 1078-79. The only relevant policy-based concern entertained by a court engaging in statutory (as distinct from common law) construction is the *1084 policy evinced by the statute, established by the legislative branch of our government. It is a legislative function to establish policy, and a judicial function to find and then apply that policy, subject always to constitutional limitations. Program Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Dauphin Cty. Gen. Auth. , 593 Pa. 184 , 928 A.2d 1013 , 1017-18 (2007) ; see also Weaver v. Harpster , 601 Pa. 488 , 975 A.2d 555 , 563 (2009) ("[I]t is for the legislature to formulate the public policies of the Commonwealth."). 9

In any event, though I would foreswear resort here to legislative history or agency-legal advice, I nonetheless arrive at the same destination as the Majority. A review of Act 13's provisions, in context, demonstrates that "any" means any one month. The PUC's interpretation was correct; the Commonwealth Court's was not. If this is not what the General Assembly meant by "any," then the General Assembly should amend Act 13. As always, it has the power to do so.

Justice Baer joins this concurring opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

The Majority goes to great lengths to explain why the legislature's use of the word "any" in the definition of "stripper well" under Act 13 really means "each and every," contrary to the plain text the General Assembly employed in drafting the definition. By deeming the stand-alone term "any" ambiguous, under the guise of gleaning legislative intent pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act, the Majority is able to assign to the phrase "any calendar month" a meaning that the legislature plainly did not intend. Because I do not view the relevant statutory text to be ambiguous, resort to the factors enumerated in the Statutory Construction Act to discern legislative intent is not appropriate. Accordingly, I dissent.

Statutory construction analyses begin with the recognition of certain fundamental principles. Specifically, courts must first recognize that the plain language of the statute is the best indicator of legislative intent. Commonwealth by Shapiro v. Golden Gate Nat'l Senior Care LLC. , --- Pa. ----, 194 A.3d 1010 (2018). Further, "[w]ords and phrases ordinarily should be understood according to their common and approved usage." Id. (citation omitted). Significantly, "when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to the plain language, and we cannot ignore the text of the statute in pursuit of its spirit." Id. (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921 ). "It is only when statutory text is determined to be ambiguous that we may go beyond the text and look to other considerations to discern legislative intent." A.S. v. Pa. State Police , 636 Pa. 403 , 143 A.3d 896 , 903 (2016). Thus, despite what may be an interpretation that advances the policy considerations that underlie enactment of a statute, courts are constrained to first adhere to the plain language of a statute and interpret the law in accordance therewith. It is not the role of the judiciary to divine the intentions of the General Assembly when the text of the statute is unambiguous, as I conclude the use of the word "any" is in the phrase "any calendar month." Indeed, the task of rectifying deficiencies in statutory language is one for *1085 the legislature. Com., Office of Governor v. Donahue , 626 Pa. 437 , 98 A.3d 1223 , 1240 (2014).

"Ordinarily, a word's usage accords with its dictionary definition. In law, as in life however, the same words, placed in different contexts sometimes mean different things." Commonwealth v. Giulian , 636 Pa. 207 , 141 A.3d 1262 , 1268 (2016) (citation omitted); see Majority Opinion at 1073 (recognizing the term " 'any' to be wholly dependent on the context in which it is used in the particular statute under review").

Act 13 defines the term "stripper well" as follows:

An unconventional gas well incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month, including production from all zones and multilateral well bores at a single well, without regard to whether the production is separately metered.

58 Pa.C.S. § 2301. "Vertical gas well" is defined by reference to a stripper well, as follows:

An unconventional gas well which utilizes hydraulic fracture treatment through a single vertical well bore and produces natural gas in quantities greater than that of a stripper well.

Id. Vertical gas wells are subject to impact fees; stripper wells are not.

The Commonwealth Court looked to the term "any" and ascribed to the word its most common usage:

Viewing the plain language of the statutory provision in a common sense fashion, we agree with Petitioners that the word "any" in the definition of "stripper well" is unambiguous and it clearly and plainly means what it says -- "any month." Pursuant to subsections 2302(b) and (f) of Act 13, the impact fees are imposed for the "calendar year." Because a calendar year is a definite class consisting of twelve individual months, the most natural way to construe "any" is to interpret it to mean at least "one" month out of the year, no matter what or which month ("during any calendar month"). This reading is bolstered by the fact that "any" is located within a prepositional phrase and modifies the singular noun, "calendar month," which signifies that only one or a singular month is contemplated in the grammatical schemes. See William A. Sabin, The Gregg Reference Manual 238, 259 (9th ed. 2001) (stating the term "any" is a singular when it modifies a singular noun). Notably, section 2301 of Act 13 does not say "in any calendar month [s] ," which would tend to suggest that the General Assembly intended "any" to be the equivalent of "every" or "all" months.

Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n , 157 A.3d 1018 , 1023-24 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc).

The Majority asserts that the word "any" has alternative meanings dependent on the context. Majority Opinion at 1072. It continues that the word could mean " 'all' or 'every,' as well as 'one,' " and concludes, because there are two reasonable interpretations of the term, it is ambiguous. Id. at 1072-73 . The word "any," standing alone, may indeed be ambiguous, but it does not stand alone in the definition of "stripper well", and the Majority's conclusion fails to account for its use in the context of the phrase "any calendar month." Viewing the phrase in the appropriate context, "any calendar month," as the Commonwealth Court correctly observed, plainly means any of the twelve months in the relevant reporting period, not all months or each and every month. Thus, if an unconventional gas well is incapable of producing 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day in any calendar month, i.e. , one single month, it is a stripper well and not subject to the imposition of the fee.

*1086 Had the legislature intended the construction the Majority adopts, it easily could have drafted the provision differently using the words the Majority engrafts onto the definition: "An unconventional gas well incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during each and every calendar month...."

The Majority's treatment of the language in the definition of "stripper well" also fails to give effect to the use of the word "incapable." The Majority recognizes that stripper well is defined in terms of its capability to produce 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day in any month, rather than the actual production of the well but concludes the distinction is not relevant. See Majority Opinion at 1072 n. 18. I disagree. The General Assembly chose to define stripper well as one "incapable of producing" the threshold amount of gas per day. 1 It did not ground the definition in terms of what the well actually produced. See 58 Pa.C.S. § 2301. The Majority's construction assumes that if a well produces 90,000 cubic feet of gas in one month, it is capable of producing the same amount each and every month. This assumption reads the "incapable" requirement out of the definition and is contrary to the principles of statutory construction. See Giulian , 141 A.3d at 1268 .

Courts construing statutes must adhere to the statute as written, and likewise be mindful of what is not written. See Id. The legislature did not draft the definition of stripper well to equate to a well "that does not produce" the threshold amount in "each and every month" despite the Majority's interpretation to the contrary. Rather, it defined stripper well as one " incapable of producing more than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during any calendar month ." 58 Pa.C.S § 2301 (emphasis added). This Court may not amend the statute but instead must examine the statute as drafted by the legislature." Holland v. Marcy , 584 Pa. 195 , 883 A.2d 449 , 456-57 (2005). Moreover, "we have stressed courts should not add, by interpretation, a requirement not included by the General Assembly." Giulian, 141 A.3d at 1268 (citation omitted). The holding today contravenes the plain text the General Assembly chose to define a "stripper well" in an effort to broaden the imposition of impact fees under what the Majority believes is the intent of Act 13. 2

*1087 Because I conclude the Commonwealth Court correctly held that the term "any" as used in the phrase "any calendar month" in the definition of stripper well plainly and unambiguously means "one," I dissent. 3