[J-25-2021]
                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                WESTERN DISTRICT

   BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.


 SHARLEEN M. RELLICK-SMITH,                         :   No. 23 WAP 2020
                                                    :
                       Appellant                    :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                    :   Superior Court entered March 31,
                                                    :   2020 at No. 919 WDA 2019,
                v.                                  :   affirming the Order of the Court of
                                                    :   Common Pleas of Indiana County
                                                    :   entered March 25, 2019 at No. 32-
 BETTY J. RELLICK AND KIMBERLY V.                   :   14-0490.
 VASIL,                                             :
                                                    :   ARGUED: April 14, 2021
                       Appellees                    :


              OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT


JUSTICE TODD                                                DECIDED: OCTOBER 20, 2021

       In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether the Superior Court erred in

affirming an order of the trial court that permitted the appellees to file an amended answer

to include the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, which a different trial court judge

previously ruled was waived. As we conclude that the second trial judge’s order violated

the coordinate jurisdiction rule in this regard, we hold that the Superior Court erred in

affirming his order, and, accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court’s decision, vacate in

part the trial judge’s order, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

       On August 6, 2006, Rose Rellick (hereinafter, “Decedent”),1 purchased two

Certificates of Deposit (“CDs”), listing as co-owners herself; her sister, Betty J. Rellick;

1 Decedent died on December 20, 2012.
and the daughters of her deceased brother George − Kimberly Vasil and Sharleen M.

Rellick-Smith (hereinafter, “Appellant”). Prior to purchasing the CDs, Decedent executed

powers of attorney designating Betty and Kimberly (hereinafter, “Appellees”) as her

attorneys-in-fact.   It purportedly was Decedent’s intention that, upon her death, the

proceeds of the CDs be divided equally among Appellant and Appellees. However, on

July 31, 2009, prior to Decedent’s death, Appellees removed Appellant’s name from the

CDs. In March 2013, subsequent to Decedent’s death, Appellees cashed the CDs, which

were worth approximately $370,000, and divided the money between the two of them.

       On October 10, 2014, Appellant filed an action against Appellees, claiming they

breached their fiduciary duties to Decedent by removing Appellant’s name from the CDs

and refusing to pay her any of the proceeds. Appellees filed a timely response to the

complaint, but, relevant to the instant appeal, did not raise any affirmative defenses

therein. Four months later, on February 11, 2015, Appellees filed a “motion to dismiss,”

arguing that Appellant lacked standing and that her claim was barred by the statute of

limitations.2   The case was assigned to the Honorable Carol Hanna, who granted

Appellees’ motion on the basis that Appellant lacked standing. Notably, however, Judge

Hanna determined that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to

raise it as a new matter in their answer, as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a) (“[A]ll affirmative

defenses including . . . statute of limitations . . . shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading

under the heading ‘New Matter.’”).

       Appellant appealed Judge Hanna’s order, and the Superior Court reversed and

remanded the case to the trial court, holding that Appellant, in fact, did have standing to


2 In their brief, Appellees recognize that the motion filed on their behalf was incorrectly

titled a “Motion to Dismiss,” and should have been designated as a “Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings.” See Appellees’ Brief at 3 n.2. We will utilize the proper designation
of “motion for judgment on the pleadings” throughout this opinion.


                                       [J-25-2021] - 2
pursue her claim. Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, 

 (Pa. Super. 2016). In its

opinion, the Superior Court observed that neither party challenged Judge Hanna’s finding

that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense. 

 at 901 n.12 (“Neither party

addresses on appeal the statute of limitations issue raised in [Appellees’] Motion to

Dismiss.”).

      On remand, the case initially was assigned to the Honorable William Martin, as

Judge Hanna had retired from the court on June 6, 2016. On May 16, 2017, Appellees

filed a motion for summary judgment wherein they made no mention of the statute of

limitations defense. Judge Martin denied the motion for summary judgment, finding there

were outstanding issues of material fact. Thereafter, the case was reassigned to the

Honorable Thomas M. Bianco, who presided over all remaining proceedings.

      On July 30, 2018, Appellees filed a motion to amend their pleading to include

numerous affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense. Acknowledging

Judge Hanna’s finding that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense by failing

to raise it in their answer to Appellant’s complaint, Judge Bianco nevertheless granted

Appellees’ motion to amend based on the Superior Court’s decision in Horowitz v.

Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 

 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that trial

court should have allowed party to amend its answer to affirmatively plead statute of

limitations defense despite the fact that amendment was sought more than four years

after original answer was filed), which, in his view, supports the liberal amendment of

pleadings. Judge Bianco reasoned, inter alia, that Appellant would not be prejudiced if

Appellees were permitted to amend their pleading, as Appellees’ assertion of the statute

of limitations defense did not come as a surprise to Appellant, given that Appellees raised

it in their February 2015 motion for judgment on the pleadings before Judge Hanna.




                                     [J-25-2021] - 3
Judge Bianco further determined that Appellant failed to establish that material evidence

was lost due to Appellees’ delay in raising the statute of limitations defense.

       Following the grant of Appellees’ motion to amend, the case proceeded to a non-

jury trial, at which Appellant testified to the facts set forth above. Appellant stated that

she could not recall when she learned that Appellees removed her name from the CDs.

Appellant also presented the testimony of Ann Marcoaldi, Decedent’s secretary and tax

preparer. Marcoaldi testified that Decedent purchased the CDs for estate planning

purposes, and that Decedent intended that the proceeds of the CDs be divided equally

between Appellant and Appellees following her death. Marcoaldi stated that she and

Appellant learned in September 2009 that Appellees removed Appellant’s name from the

CDs, and that they began to “investigate the removal around that time.” Rellick-Smith v.

Rellick, No. 919 WDA 2019, at 3 (Pa. Super. filed March 31, 2020). Ultimately, Judge

Bianco determined that Appellant learned that Appellees removed her name from the

CDs in September 2009, at which point the two-year statute of limitations began to run.

As a result, he concluded that Appellant’s action, filed on October 10, 2014, was barred

by the statute of limitations, and he declined to address the underlying merits of her claim.

       Appellant appealed Judge Bianco’s order to the Superior Court, arguing, inter alia,

that he erred in granting Appellees’ motion to amend their pleading to include a statute of

limitations defense because Appellees waived that defense by failing to raise it in their

initial response to her complaint. Furthermore, Appellant alleged that, in light of Judge

Hanna’s prior determination that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense,

Judge Bianco was precluded from granting Appellees’ motion to amend their pleading to

include that defense under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which generally prohibits a

judge from altering the resolution of legal questions previously decided by another judge




                                      [J-25-2021] - 4
of coordinate jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Starr, 

 (Pa. 1995).3

Finally, Appellant claimed she was prejudiced by Appellees’ delay in raising a statute of

limitations defense because her witness’s memory had diminished by the time the matter

finally proceeded to trial.

       The Superior Court affirmed Judge Bianco’s order in a divided, unpublished

memorandum opinion authored by Senior Judge Pellegrini. 

 The

court rejected Appellant’s contention that, under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, Judge

Bianco was required to hold that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense by

failing to raise it in new matter. It recounted that, in Riccio v. American Republic Insurance

Co., 

 (Pa. 1997), this Court explained that, when determining whether the

coordinate jurisdiction rule applies, we “look[] to where the rulings occurred in the context

of the procedural posture of the case,” and stated:

              Where the motions differ in kind, as preliminary objections
              differ from motions for judgment on the pleadings, which differ
              from motions for summary judgment, a judge ruling on a later
              motion is not precluded from granting relief although another
              judge had denied an earlier motion. However, a later motion
              should not be entertained or granted when a motion of the
              same kind has previously been denied, unless intervening
              changes in the facts or the law clearly warrant a new look at
              the question.

 (citation omitted).

       The Superior Court suggested that Appellees, in their motion to amend their

pleading, did not ask Judge Bianco to overturn Judge Hanna’s waiver ruling, but, rather,

presented an “entirely different procedural question: whether [Appellant] would be


3  As further discussed infra, departure from the rule is permitted in exceptional
circumstances, such as where there has been an intervening change in the controlling
law or a substantial change in the facts or evidence, or where the prior holding was clearly
erroneous and would result in manifest injustice if upheld. Starr, 

.



                                       [J-25-2021] - 5
prejudiced by the delay in raising the statute of limitations defense.” Rellick-Smith, 919

WDA 2019, at 7. For this reason, the Superior Court determined that “[t]he law of the

case doctrine did not bar [Judge Bianco] from addressing this question which had not

been presented to Judge Hanna” or raised in the previous appeal. Id.4 Additionally, the

Superior Court concluded that Appellant was not prejudiced by Appellees’ delayed

invocation of the statute of limitations defense, given that Appellees initially attempted to

raise it in their February 2015 motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was filed a

mere four months after Appellant filed her complaint.

       The Honorable Mary Jane Bowes authored a dissenting opinion in which she

opined that, under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, Judge Hanna’s finding that Appellees

waived the statute of limitations defense was binding on Judge Bianco, and, therefore,

precluded him from granting Appellees’ motion to amend their pleadings to include a

statute of limitations defense. First, Judge Bowes disagreed with Judge Bianco’s reliance

on Horowitz, noting that the coordinate jurisdiction rule was not implicated in that case.

She further suggested that Judge Bianco’s focus on the absence of prejudice to Appellant

was improper, as a showing of prejudice is unnecessary when an order allowing a

proposed amendment to a pleading violates the law of the case doctrine. Judge Bowes

concluded that Appellant had a right to rely upon Judge Hanna’s waiver determination,

reiterating that “[t]he law of the case doctrine recognizes that when later rulings upend

earlier rulings, the parties’ expectations are dashed, proceedings are inconsistent, and

finality is undercut.” Rellick-Smith, 919 WDA 2019, at 9 (Bowes, J., dissenting).

       Judge Bowes further noted that Judge Hanna’s finding of waiver was consistent

with both Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a), and Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a) (“A party waives all defenses and

objections which are not presented either by preliminary objection, answer or reply,

4 The coordinate jurisdiction rule is one of the distinct rules encompassed by the broader

“law of the case” doctrine. Zane v. Friends Hospital, 

 (Pa. 2003).

                                      [J-25-2021] - 6
except a defense which is not required to be pleaded under Rule 1030(b)[.]”), and,

therefore, was not “clearly erroneous.” Id. at 6. Moreover, she observed there had been

no intervening change in the law, facts, or evidence that would render the coordinate

jurisdiction rule inapplicable. See Starr, 

. Accordingly, Judge Bowes

opined that Judge Bianco had no basis for disregarding Judge Hanna’s ruling, and she

indicated that she would have vacated Judge Bianco’s order and remanded for findings

of fact and conclusions of law regarding the underlying merits of Appellant’s claims.

      Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and we granted review to

consider whether the Superior Court erred in affirming Judge Bianco’s decision allowing

Appellees to file an amended answer to include the affirmative defense of statute of

limitations, notwithstanding Judge Hanna’s prior determination that Appellees waived the

statute of limitations defense. Specifically, we must determine whether Judge Bianco’s

order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. This question presents an issue of law,

over which our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Zane,

 n.8.

      Appellant argues that Judge Bianco’s grant of Appellees’ motion to amend their

pleadings to add a statute of limitations defense, after Judge Hanna held that Appellees

waived the statute of limitations defense, was a clear violation of the coordinate

jurisdiction rule. Appellant further asserts that there were no exceptional circumstances

to support Judge Bianco’s departure from the rule, as Judge Hanna’s finding of waiver

was consistent with Pa.R.C.P. 1030, and thus not clearly erroneous, and there were no

intervening changes of law or fact.

      Appellant, as did Judge Bowes in her dissent, challenges Judge Bianco’s reliance

on Horowitz, emphasizing that Horowitz did not involve the law of the case doctrine or the

coordinate jurisdiction rule. Appellant maintains that Horowitz is also distinguishable




                                      [J-25-2021] - 7
because, in that case, the Superior Court concluded that there was no evidence to

suggest that the opposing party would be prejudiced by the amendment, whereas, in the

instant case, there was clear prejudice because her memory, and the memory of her

witnesses, which had diminished over the span of four years, were central to Judge

Bianco’s ruling on the underlying merits of the statute of limitations issue.

       Appellees respond by arguing, in the first instance, that Judge Bianco’s order

granting their petition to amend their pleading did not violate the coordinate jurisdiction

rule because his order was not actually inconsistent with Judge Hanna’s previous finding

of waiver. In this regard, Appellees note that, while Rule 1030 requires that affirmative

defenses, including a statute of limitations defense, be raised in an answer and new

matter upon pain of waiver under Rule 1032(a), Rule 1033(a) specifically allows for the

amendment of a pleading to “aver transactions or occurrences which have happened

before or after the filing of the original pleading, even though they give rise to a new

cause of action or defense.” Appellees’ Brief at 6 (quoting Pa.R.C.P. 1033(a)) (emphasis

original).

       Thus, Appellees submit that:

              [t]he waiver of those affirmative defenses that automatically
              occur upon a failure to plead them cannot serve as a basis to
              deny a subsequent request to amend a pleading to add that
              waived affirmative defense, because then a party could never
              amend a pleading to add an affirmative defense, as all unpled
              affirmative defenses are automatically waived the instant they
              are not pled. Such a result would be absurd and disfavored
              in the law.
Id. at 6-7. In support of their interpretation, Appellees cite this Court’s decision in Martin

v. Wilson, 

 (Pa. 1952), wherein we stated that, under Rule 1030, a failure to

plead an affirmative defense “renders the defense unavailable at the trial of the issue,”

 (emphasis added), positing that this Court’s use of the emphasized language




                                       [J-25-2021] - 8
suggests that waiver does not immediately occur upon a failure to plead the affirmative

defense.

       Appellees additionally contend that Judge Bianco’s order did not violate the

coordinate jurisdiction rule because, at the time he issued his ruling, the procedural

posture of the case was different than it was when Judge Hanna issued her decision

concluding that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense.         In this regard,

Appellees emphasize that Judge Hanna’s ruling was issued in response to Appellees’

motion for judgment on the pleadings, “which required [Judge Hanna] to consider and

accept all well-pled allegations of the complaint as true, and determine whether on the

facts averred, the law concludes that no recovery is possible, with any doubts on whether

to grant [Appellees’ motion]” being resolved in favor of Appellant, whereas Judge Bianco’s

ruling was rendered following the close of discovery, and was based on “completely

different facts and law; specifically, whether given Pennsylvania’s liberal standard for

granting amendments to the pleadings, would allowing the amendment prejudice

[Appellant] or be against a positive rule of law.” Appellees’ Brief at 20 (citing 

       To support their contention that the procedural posture of the instant case was

different at the time Judge Hanna and Judge Bianco issued their rulings, Appellees rely

on, inter alia, this Court’s decisions in 

 Ryan v. Berman, 

 (Pa.

2002) (holding coordinate jurisdiction rule did not prevent trial judge from allowing

defendants, who were doctors, to amend their pleadings to include a release that the

plaintiff had entered into in a separate lawsuit, despite a prior trial judge’s denial of the

defendants’ previous request to amend their pleadings), and Gerrow v. John Royle &

Sons, 

 (Pa. 2002) (holding coordinate jurisdiction rule did not bar second

trial judge, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, from considering an expert report




                                      [J-25-2021] - 9
that was attached to the response to the motion, even though prior judge had denied joint

motion to extend discovery deadline).

       Finally, Appellees argue that, even if the coordinate jurisdiction rule is implicated

in the instant case, there are exceptional circumstances that justified Judge Bianco’s

departure from the rule, i.e., the fact that Judge Hanna’s decision was, in their view,

“clearly incorrect,” and their belief that adherence thereto would “work a manifest

injustice.” Appellees’ Brief at 24. In this respect, Appellees contend that a determination

that Judge Hanna’s ruling was binding on Judge Bianco would conflict with the rule that

amendments should be liberally permitted, and prevent them “from asserting their legal

right to allege a meritorious defense.” Id. at 27.

       This Court previously has explained that, under the coordinate jurisdiction rule,

“[j]udges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each

others’ decisions.” Ryan, 

 (quoting Starr, 

). Beyond

promoting the goal of judicial economy, the coordinate jurisdiction rule serves “(1) to

protect the settled expectations of the parties; (2) to insure [sic] uniformity of decisions;

(3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper

and streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end.” 

 (quoting

Starr, 

).

       We have further cautioned that departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule “is

allowed only in exceptional circumstances such as where there has been an intervening

change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to

the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would

create a manifest injustice if followed.” 

 (quoting Starr, 

).

       Preliminarily, we reject Appellees’ argument that Judge Bianco’s order was not

“inconsistent” with Judge Hanna’s prior ruling, and, therefore, that the coordinate




                                      [J-25-2021] - 10
jurisdiction rule is not implicated in this case. Appellees’ Brief at 4. Prior to Judge

Bianco’s grant of Appellees’ petition to amend their pleadings to include a statute of

limitations defense, Judge Hanna, a judge of coordinate jurisdiction, held that Appellees

waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it in accordance with Rule 1030.

Judge Bianco’s decision, which allowed Appellees to amend their pleading to raise the

precise defense Judge Hanna held was waived, unquestionably conflicted with Judge

Hanna’s prior ruling on the same issue.5 6 The fact that Rule 1033 provides a mechanism

5  In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Baer opines that “the inquiry of whether
Appellees were entitled to judgment on the pleadings is a distinct legal question from
whether Appellees’ motion to amend their pleadings should be granted.” Dissenting
Opinion (Baer, C.J.) at 1. Respectfully, Chief Justice Baer’s position might be justifiable
had Appellees not sought permission from Judge Bianco to amend their pleadings
specifically to include the statute of limitations defense that Judge Hanna determined was
waived. Indeed, we recognize that a trial court generally has discretion to allow parties
to amend their pleadings, particularly when such amendment is not prejudicial to the
nonmoving party, and our holding is not intended to limit a trial court’s discretion in this
regard. However, as Appellant observes, the question presently before this Court “is not
whether the Trial Court erred in allowing the Appellees to file an amended Answer and
New Matter generally,” but, rather, “whether the Trial Court erred in allowing the
amendment to include the specific affirmative defense that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations.” Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. In granting Appellees permission to
amend their pleadings to include the exact defense Judge Hanna had already deemed
waived, Judge Bianco implicitly overruled and altered Judge Hanna’s ruling.
6 In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Mundy suggests that “nothing in Judge Hanna’s

order precluded Appellees from amending the complaint,” noting that “Judge Hanna did
not decide the issue of whether Appellees could later amend their answer to include that
defense,” and “did not declare that the defense was waived with prejudice.” Dissenting
Opinion (Mundy, J.) at 1-2. Justice Mundy further expresses concern that our holding is
contrary to the principle allowing for the liberal amendment of pleadings. Initially, we note
that it is not surprising that Judge Hanna, in declaring Appellees waived the statute of
limitations defense, did not address the issue of whether Appellees could later amend
their answer to include the defense, or hold that Appellees waived the defense “with
prejudice.” Why would she? Waiver of an affirmative defense is not a simple defect in a
pleading that can be corrected, and we are aware of no requirement that a judge
expressly state that a finding of waiver is made “with prejudice” to be considered a final
ruling. Further, we reiterate that the issue is not whether Judge Bianco erred in allowing
Appellees to file an answer and new matter generally, but, rather, whether he erred in
allowing them to amend their pleadings to raise the precise affirmative defense Judge
Hanna had previously ruled was waived. Finally, Justice Mundy offers that, because



                                      [J-25-2021] - 11
by which parties may seek leave to amend their pleadings does not, as Appellees

suggest, obviate the clear conflict between Judge Hanna’s and Judge Bianco’s rulings.

       We similarly reject Appellees’ contention that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is not

implicated in this case because, at the time the two rulings were issued, the case was at

a different procedural posture.7 As noted above, Appellees rely on, inter alia, this Court’s

decisions in Riccio, Ryan, and Gerrow. In Riccio, the plaintiff sued his medical insurer to

recover medical expenses incurred for the treatment of a herniated spinal disc. The

insurer filed an answer asserting that coverage was precluded under a policy exclusion.

After a one-day nonjury trial, the trial judge ruled in favor of the insurer. The plaintiff filed

a motion for post-trial relief, and the trial judge recused himself due to scheduling conflicts;

accordingly, the plaintiff’s post-trial motions were assigned to a different judge. The post-

trial motions judge concluded that the trial judge had applied an incorrect definition for the

term “spine” contained in the policy exclusion, found the exclusion did not apply, and

granted the plaintiff a new trial. The Superior Court reversed on appeal, holding that the



Judge Hanna “would have had the discretion to grant Appellees leave to amend their
answer to include a statute of limitations defense, despite her earlier ruling deeming it
waived,” she “fail[s] to see how the coordinate jurisdiction rule removes that discretion
from a subsequent judge in the same procedural posture.” Dissenting Opinion (Mundy,
J.) at 3 (emphasis added). Respectfully, not only is this statement inconsistent with her
prior position that “the procedural posture of the case and the legal inquiry involved were
different when Judge Bianco granted leave to amend than they were when Judge Hanna
denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings,” see id. at 1 (emphasis added), the
purpose of the coordinate jurisdiction rule, for better or for worse, is to prevent “judges of
coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case from overruling each others’ decisions,”
unless exceptional circumstances exist. Ryan, 

. As discussed below,
none of those exceptional circumstances exists in the instant case.
7 In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Donohue notes her disagreement with

both the majority and dissenting opinions “to the extent that they advance the idea that
the procedural posture of a case is a relevant consideration in a coordinate jurisdiction
rule analysis.” Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (Donohue, J.) at 5. As Justice
Donohue acknowledges, however, in examining the cases cited by Appellees for this
proposition, we emphasized that it was the “exceptional circumstances” that negated the
application of the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Id. at 6.

                                       [J-25-2021] - 12
coordinate jurisdiction rule barred the post-trial motions judge from overruling the trial

judge’s previous ruling, and disagreeing that the trial judge had applied an incorrect

definition of the word spine.

       On appeal, this Court explained that, although courts generally should not overrule

each other’s decisions, in order to determine whether the coordinate jurisdiction rule

applies, courts should look to the procedural posture where the conflicting rulings were

made. Noting that, under Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(a)(1), a post-trial motions judge can order a

new trial if he concludes that a factual or legal mistake was made at the trial level, and

that the mistake formed a sufficient basis to order a new trial, we determined that “the

post-trial motion process is a clearly distinct procedural posture from that of the trial judge

rendering a verdict at the conclusion of a non-jury trial.” Riccio, 

. We

elaborated:

              [W]e hold that the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not apply
              to bar a substituted judge hearing post-trial motions from
              correcting a mistake made by the trial judge during the trial
              process. To hold otherwise and not allow a judge deciding
              post-trial motions to overrule legal errors made during the trial
              process (whether made by the reviewing judge or another
              judge who presided over the trial) would render the post-trial
              motion rules meaningless and the post-trial motion process
              would become nothing more than an exercise in futility.

 (emphasis added).

       Thus, while we held in Riccio that the coordinate jurisdiction rule did not bar the

post-trial motions judge from overruling the trial judge’s verdict and granting the plaintiff

a new trial, our decision was based on the fact that Rule 227.1(a)(1) specifically allows

for the correction of errors made during the trial process.8

8 We ultimately concluded in    Riccio, however, that the insurance policy at issue did
contain a valid exclusion of coverage for the plaintiff’s injury, such that the trial judge’s
interpretation was proper; accordingly, we affirmed the Superior Court’s decision
reversing the post-trial motions judge’s grant of a new trial.


                                      [J-25-2021] - 13
       In Ryan, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against her doctors and

consulting specialists in 1985, alleging that their failure to diagnose her with Cushing’s

Syndrome required surgery in 1984 to remove a kidney and an attached tumor. Her

complaint also alleged that the disease prolonged and exacerbated a work-related injury

that she had suffered in 1982; notably, the plaintiff filed a products liability action in 1984

based on that injury. In 1989, the plaintiff settled the products liability action, and she

executed a release of claims for all damages resulting from her work-place injury.

       The defendants, upon learning of the release, sought to amend their answers in

the malpractice action to include the release, and moved for summary judgment, arguing

that the release barred the malpractice action. The first judge to which the case was

assigned denied both motions. The defendants filed a motion for extraordinary relief,

again seeking to amend their answers to include the release and moving for summary

judgment. A different trial judge granted relief, and the plaintiff appealed. The Superior

Court reversed, holding the second trial judge’s actions were prohibited by the coordinate

jurisdiction rule. On remand, the matter was assigned to a third judge for trial. During

trial, the defendants again moved to amend their answers to incorporate the release, and

the third judge took the matter under advisement. At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-

chief, the judge allowed the defendants to amend their answers to include the release,

concluding that, while the release did not bar the entire malpractice action against the

defendants, it did bar the claims of malpractice alleged to have occurred after the work-

related accident.

       On further appeal by the plaintiff, the Superior Court affirmed the third judge’s order

allowing the defendants to amend their answers to include the release executed in the

products liability action. However, the Superior Court held that the release barred the

plaintiff’s malpractice action entirely. We granted review to determine whether the third




                                      [J-25-2021] - 14
judge violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule when she overruled the first trial judge’s

order and allowed the defendants to amend their answers to the plaintiff’s complaint to

incorporate the plaintiff’s release in the products liability case. In holding that she did not,

we reasoned:

              In this case, as in Riccio, the procedural posture of the case
              was quite different at the time the two different decisions were
              made; the [third] judge who presided over the trial was in a
              superior position to reevaluate the question of the products
              liability release and its relation to the medical malpractice case
              than was the [first] pretrial judge who made the initial decision.
              During the trial of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, abundant
              evidence was presented which established that [the plaintiff]
              was seeking damages in this case for injuries suffered in a
              work-related products liability case; this supported the
              conclusion that the release in the products liability case barred
              the damages, or some of them, sought in this case. Thus,
              under the rationale of Riccio, the rule of coordinate jurisdiction
              did not apply.
Ryan, 

 (emphasis added). Thus, in Ryan, our decision was not based

solely on the fact that the decisions were issued at different stages of trial. Rather, as the

above language indicates, we relied on the fact that there was new evidence presented

at trial that justified the third judge’s departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule. See

Starr, 

 (departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule is permitted when

there has been a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute).

       Gerrow also involved a products liability action. Therein, the plaintiffs filed a

complaint against several defendants in 1997, and a judge set December 7, 1998, as the

deadline for submission of the plaintiffs’ expert reports. Prior to the expiration of the

deadline, all parties joined in a motion to extend the discovery deadline, but the motion

was denied by the same judge; nevertheless, the parties continued discovery after the

deadline. One of the defendants that had joined in the motion to extend discovery

recognized that the judge had set January 4, 1999, as the deadline for filing pre-trial



                                       [J-25-2021] - 15
motions, and, in order to protect its position, filed a motion for summary judgment. The

motion was based on the plaintiffs’ failure to timely submit their expert reports, without

which they could not establish a prima facie case. The plaintiffs filed a response to the

motion for summary judgment, attaching several expert reports that apparently were

sufficient to establish their prima facie case. The motion for summary judgment was

assigned to a second judge, who concluded that the plaintiffs’ attachment of expert

reports to their response to the defendant’s motion was an impermissible attempt to

circumvent the discovery deadline. He determined that the rule of coordinate jurisdiction

prevented him considering the reports, and he granted the motion for summary judgment.

       The Superior Court reversed, finding that the plaintiffs’ attachment of the expert

reports to their response to the defendants’ summary judgment motion was a permissible

supplementation of the record under Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(b),9 and, further, that the

coordinate jurisdiction rule did not apply under the circumstances of the case.

       This Court, in an Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, affirmed the

Superior Court’s decision, concluding, inter alia, that the coordinate jurisdiction rule did

not preclude the second trial judge from considering the expert reports which were filed

after the case management deadline established by the first judge for two reasons. First,

we found that the first judge’s decision was erroneous and created a manifest injustice.

See Starr, 

 (departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule is permitted

“where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if

followed”). In this regard, we stated:

              [I]t appears erroneous in the first instance for [the first judge]
              to deny the November 23, 1998 motion to extend the

9 Rule 1035.3(b), which pertains to a response to summary judgment, provides: “An

adverse party may supplement the record or set forth the reasons why the party cannot
present evidence essential to justify opposition to the motion and any action proposed to
be taken by the party to present such evidence.” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(b).


                                      [J-25-2021] - 16
               discovery deadline. The motion was joined by all parties. It
               was based on the necessity of extensive traveling to depose
               witnesses in several states, as well as a financial crisis faced
               by one corporate defendant. All parties were aware of these
               difficulties and believed they justified extension of the
               discovery timetable. [The first judge] did not permit hearing,
               argument, or conference on the motion and, in summarily
               denying it, gave no rationale for the denial. There is thus no
               basis for this Court to review his discretion in denying the
               motion. What appears to be an unreasonable decision has
               no explanation in the record, and the decision appears to be
               unjust. It would have been perfectly proper for [the second
               judge] to reexamine the discovery timetable in order to correct
               that error. That would have served the ends of judicial
               economy and might have corrected a manifest injustice.
Gerrow, 

.

       We further held that the coordinate jurisdiction rule did not apply because the two

judges were presented with different questions:

               [The first judge] had been presented with a scheduling issue
               affecting case management and the court's timetable. [The
               second judge], by contrast, was faced with the ultimate
               question of whether summary judgment should be granted,
               ending the litigation entirely. The considerations were entirely
               different, so the coordinate jurisdiction rule did not apply in the
               sense of precluding an examination of Appellees’ expert
               reports to determine whether they established a prima
               facie case, making summary judgment inappropriate.

.
       As in Ryan, our decision in Gerrow was not based on the mere fact that the

conflicting decisions were issued at different stages of trial. Rather, we specifically

determined that the decision of the first judge was erroneous, and created a manifest

injustice. We additionally noted that the considerations underlying both decisions were

entirely distinct.

       In the instant case, following Appellees’ February 2015 motion for judgment on the

pleadings wherein they asserted that Appellant lacked standing and that her claim was

barred by the statute of limitations, Judge Hanna held that (1) Appellant lacked standing;


                                       [J-25-2021] - 17
and (2) Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it as a new

matter in their answer under Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a). Judge Bianco’s decision more than three

years later allowing Appellees to amend their pleadings to include the statute of limitations

defense unquestionably was inconsistent with Judge Hanna’s prior ruling, and altered the

legal effect thereof.10 Although the Superior Court suggested that the rulings were not

inconsistent because Appellees did not ask Judge Bianco to overturn Judge Hanna’s

finding that they waived the statute of limitations defense, but, rather, merely requested

that Judge Bianco consider “whether [Appellant] would be prejudiced by the delay in

raising the statute of limitations defense,” Rellick-Smith, 919 WDA 2019, at 7, we are

unpersuaded by this logic. The question of whether Appellant would be prejudiced if

Appellees were permitted to amend their pleadings to include the statute of limitations

defense is relevant only if the trial court was in a position to grant the request. As

discussed above, because Judge Bianco’s order granting Appellees’ request for

amendment of their pleadings altered the effect of Judge Hanna’s prior ruling by undoing

her finding that Appellees had waived the statute of limitations defense, Judge Bianco’s

order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule, unless one of the limited exceptions to the

rule applies. Upon review, we discern no such applicable exception.

       First, unlike the first judge’s order in Gerrow, Judge Hanna’s ruling was not

erroneous. Rule 1030(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure requires that, with


10 It is this fact that renders Judge Bianco’s reliance on Horowitz misplaced.  The issue in
Horowitz was whether the trial court erred in denying a petition to amend an answer to a
complaint to include the affirmative defense of statute of limitations where the petition was
filed more than four years after the filing of the original answer. The Superior Court in
Horowitz determined that the trial court should have permitted the amendment because
it would not violate a positive rule of law, and there was no evidence that the non-moving
party would suffer undue prejudice if the amendment was allowed. Critically, however,
the trial court in Horowitz was not constrained by any prior ruling on the party’s petition to
amend its pleading, and the coordinate jurisdiction rule was not at issue.



                                      [J-25-2021] - 18
certain exceptions not relevant herein, all affirmative defenses, including but not limited

to the defenses of statute of limitations, “shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under

the heading ‘New Matter’.” Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a). Rule 1032(a) further provides that, with

the exception of certain expressly enumerated defenses, which do not include the

defense of statute of limitations, “[a] party waives all defenses and objections which are

not presented either by preliminary objection, answer or reply.” Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a). The

fact that Rule 1033 provides a mechanism by which parties may subsequently seek leave

to amend their pleadings does not render Judge Hanna’s initial ruling, issued more than

three years before Appellees sought permission to amend their pleading, erroneous.11

       Moreover, Appellees do not offer, and our review of the record does not reveal,

any intervening change in the controlling law, or, as was the case in Ryan, any substantial

change in the facts or evidence. Appellant filed her complaint against Appellees in

October 2014, and although Appellees undoubtedly were aware of the potentially viable

statute of limitations defense within several months, they failed to raise the defense as a

new matter in their answer to Appellant’s complaint, as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a),

instead asserting the defense for the first time in their February 2015 motion for judgment

on the pleadings. Appellees do not point to any change in the facts or evidence between

June 2015, when Judge Hanna ruled that Appellees waived the statute of limitations



11 In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Donohue opines that, in light of the

“well established rule that motions to amend should be liberally granted,” Judge Hanna’s
“refusal to allow the Appellees to amend their answer to raise the statute of limitations as
an affirmative defense was clearly erroneous.” Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
(Donohue, J.) at 5. To reach this conclusion, Justice Donohue relies on several Superior
Court cases to suggest that Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings filed with
Judge Hanna should have been construed as the “equivalent to a motion to amend,” and,
further, that, by refusing to consider the statute of limitations defense, Judge Hanna
denied the motion to amend. Id. at 3-4. Respectfully, this Court did not accept review of
this case to opine on this procedural issue or the validity of the line of Superior Court
caselaw on which she relies.


                                     [J-25-2021] - 19
defense, and July 2018, when they filed their motion with Judge Bianco seeking to amend

their answer to include that defense, that would support Judge Bianco’s decision to

disregard Judge Hanna’s prior ruling.

         For the above reasons, we find there was no basis for Judge Bianco to disturb

Judge Hanna’s holding that Appellees waived the statute of limitations defense.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Superior Court, vacate the portion of Judge

Bianco’s order granting Appellees’ motion to amend their pleadings to include a statute

of limitations defense, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

         Superior Court decision reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

         Justices Dougherty and Wecht join the Opinion Announcing the Judgement of the

Court.

         Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion.

         Chief Justice Baer files a dissenting opinion in which Justices Saylor and Mundy

join.

         Justice Mundy files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Saylor joins.




                                       [J-25-2021] - 20